The Theatrics of Anger in Apuleius's Apologia

The Theatrics of Anger in Apuleius's Apologia*

This discussion takes its start from a passage early in the speech where Apuleius caps his treatment of the mirror with some observations on the physical appearance of his opponant Sicinius Aemilianus.

Sicinius Pudens, the adolescent step-son of Apuleius in whose name the charge of magic has been entered, has earlier proclaimed to the court (with some show of indignation) that Apuleius, the "philosopher," owns a mirror. It seems th at, in addition, the prosecution has at least insinuated that Apuleius employs the mirror to some foul end. What Apuleius is supposed to have done with the mirror is uncertain (it is to his advantage to be opaque in this connection, and of course we don't have the speech of the prosecution for comparison), but two possibilities arise: either Apuleius is excessively addicted to his own appearance and spends an indecent amount of time adorning himself before the mirror, or he uses it as an instrument of mag ic.

Apuleius's response to these incriminations is two fold: First he argues that mere possession of a miror is no proof of the manner of its use. Second, he suggests a number of ways in which the use of a miror may be viewed as a mark of good character. A ll good men love their own imagines (so they are honored with public statues), and it is in the miror where one's image is most artfully repoduced. The miror, as well, serves a respectable function for those men of letters who pursue the path of kn owledge, the philosophers. So Socrates used a miror in the ethical training of his disciples, Demosthenes used one to prepare his oratory (as if the miror were the presiding judge), and for the likes of Plato, Archytas, Epicurus and Arc himedes the miror was an essential tool for their inquiries into optical phenomena.

With the examples of the lives of these men still fresh in the minds of his audience, Apuleius presents, by way of contrast, the image of Aemilianus:

Ap. 16: quem tu librum, Aemiliane, si nosses ac non modo campo et glebis, uerum etiam abaco et puluisculo te dedisses, mihi istud crede, quanquam teterrimum os tuum minimum a Thyesta tragico demutet, tamen profecto discendi cu pidine speculum inuiseres et aliquando relicto aratro mirarere tot in facie tua sulcos rugarum.

If you had gotten aquiainted with the book (of Archimedes), Aemilianus, and if you had dedicated yourself not only to the field and the clod but also to the abacus and the compass--trust me on this point--although your frightful face is all but identic al to a tragic Thyestes, nevertheless, out of a desire to learn, you would gaze directly into the miror. Then, having abandoned the plow, you would marvel at all the furrowed wrinkles on your face.

The tables have turned, and Apuleius suggests the real reasons for Aemilianus's diffidence towards mirors: His illiteracy and lack of education (associated here, as elsewhere, with rusticity) makes him blind to the uses to which mirors are put by philo sophers, and without the impetus of such knowledge nothing could compell him to behold the horrible image of his own face.

By this description, Aemilianus is both illiterate and deformed. The imputation of illiteracy, and the corresponidng contrast of the life of the rustic with that of the philosopher, play a crucial role in Apuleius's overall defense. For in contrast to Aemilianus, Apuleius claims for himself the life of letters and the title of 'philosopher'--so much so that he imagines his own trial to be at the same time the defense of philosopy as a whole (para. 3). Apuleius will capitolize on this identity in at least two ways. First he will seek to establish an allegiance between himself and Claudius Maximus on the grounds of their shared erudition and philosophical devotion (C.M.'s erudition is appealed to on a number of occasions by Apuleius, f requently in contexts where he is involved in exposing the buffoonish illiteracy of the prosecution: 11; 13; 38; 41; 63; 83; 91. And although he is not a philosopher himself, Claudius Maximus is friendly to philosophy, and his exemplary patience and moderation are recognizably the marks of a stoic disposition: 19; 25; 35; < a href=#38.1>38; 41; 48-9; 81). Second, as a man of letters, Apuleius situates himself as an authority in the interpretation of texts, and it is on the issue of the interpretation of texts--specif ically Pudentilla's letter--that the case ultimately hangs (see esp. para. 83 on the need for interpretation).

But why does Apuleius combine his attack on the illiteracy of his opponant with an abusive description of his physical appearance? Here we find ourselves involved in another invective strand in the tapestry of the Apologia, the one that will sup ply the topic of the following discussion. We can begin to trace it out by focusing on the image of the tragic Thyestes: "quanquam teterrimum os tuum minimum a Thyesta tragico demutet."

The myth of Thyestes, who unwittingly dines on his children and thus inaugurates the curse on the House of Atreus, was well known to Roman theater audiences both from a number of tragic plays on that theme (including Seneca's Thyestes) and from its frequent treatment in the saltica fabula, a popular tragic spin-off genre characterized by voluptuous pantomime dance. Apuleius's description of Aemilianus would accordingly evoke for his audience images of the theater, and specifically the ref erence to the "face like a tragic Thyestes" recalls the image of the tragic costume-mask of that character. We are fortunate to be able to at least approximately reconstruct this image for ourselves from a number of ancient sources. The first of these is the Onomastikon of the second century A.D. Greek antiquarian and lexicographer Pollux, which records some 28 separate mask types used in the ancient tragic theater. The first six of these belong to the category of "Old Men," among whom we should in clude Thyestes:

Pollux, Onom. 4.133ff.: Now these would be the tragic masks: Shaven man, White, Graying, Black, Blond, Blondish. These are the old men: The Shaven man is the oldest, with white hair. The hair is attached to the onkos. The onkos is the bit above the face of the mask rising to a peak. The Shaven man has a clean-shaven chin. The white man's hair is entirely gray, and he has curls around the head, a firm chin, and jutting eyebrows and off-white complexion. The onkos is short . The Graying man represents people who are naturally going white, and he is black and sallow. The name of the black man comes from his complexion, and he is curly around the chin and head; the face is rough and the onkos big. The blond man has cur ls and a smaller onkos and has a good complexion The blondish man is otherwise similar save that he is sallower, and he represents sick characters. (Translation Slater and Csapo, Context of Ancient Drama (Ann Arbor: 1995), p. 398)

We should imagine Thyestes to be quite old (and this reinforces Apuleius's regular attacks on Aemilianus's senility: 1; 36; 53), so of the six Old Men that Pollux describes, the first two with all w hite hair would seem most fitting. It is unlikely that Thyestes was portrayed by the mask of the Shaven man, since in an unattributed tragic fragment quoted by Cicero (Tusc. Disp. 3.26) the character describes his "beard stiff with filth." A likely candidate, then, is Pollux's second mask, the White man, which we find represented on a painted wall of the Third Style (ca. 20 B.C.- 20 A.D.) in the House of Julia Felix at Pompeii:

The deformity of the tragic mask with its protruding onkos, wide eyes and gaping mouth would, by association, be enough in itself to expose Aemilianus to ridicule. In fact, Apuleius's technique here, called caricature (imago), is a standa rd one in the rhetorical repertoire whose specific function is to incite derision (for instances in the Apologia where Apuleius explicitly prescribes the response of laughter, see: 5; 7; 35). Th e technique is described by Cicero in his rhetorical treatise De Oratore, where we find Julius Caesar holding forth on the nature of derision and it's utility for the orator ("est plane oratoris movere risum," he announces at 2.136):

Cicero De Oratore 2.268ff: Valde autem ridentur etiam imagines, quae fere in deformitatem aut in aliquod vitium corporis ducuntur cum similitudine turpioris: ut meum illud in Helvium Manciam "iam ostendam cuius modi sis," cum ille "ostende, quaeso"; demonstravi digito pictum Gallum in Mariano scuto Cimbrico sub Novis distortum, eiecta lingua, buccis fluentibus; risus est commotus; nihil tam Manciae simile visum est."

Caracatures also produce loud laughter, and are usually spoken with an eye towards the mimicry of the ugliness of a deformity or blemish of the body . Take for example what I said to Helvius Mancia: "Now I will show the type of person you are." To whi ch he said: "Please, do show." I pointed with my finger at a twisted Gaul with his tongue hanging out and with flaccid cheeks, painted on the Cimbrian shield of Marius that hangs below the New Shops." Laughter burst out. Nothing seemed so like to Mancia.

The eloquence of Caesar's gesture is effective in the same way as is Apuleius's assimilation of the face of Aemilianus to the familiar image of the tragic mask of Thyestes: Physical deformities, ugly features, of a rhetorical opponent are emphasized by th e likening to a recognizable image in which those features are portrayed in the extreme.

Caesar implies that humor lies in the caricature of "some deformity or blemish of the body." But, in the case of Mancia, the deformities which Caesar highlights are carefully chosen. 'Distortus' is as descriptive of a physical condition as it is of a moral state: So Apol. 16: "At ego non mirer, si boni consulis me de isto distortissimo uultu tuo dicere, de moribus tuis multo truculentioribus reticere." And the term serves double duty as a criticism of oratorical techniqu e: So Quintilian (Institutio Oratoria 6.3.29), "Oratori minime conuenit distortus uultus gestusque, quae in mimis rideri solent," where ridicule is prescribed as the appropriate response to the twisted expression and gesture of the overly dramatic speaker. The wagging tongue has obvious extension as a description of an uncontrolled quality of speech, as do the flaccid cheeks, which are in addition part of the stock caricature of the effeminate: So Cicero (In Pisonem 25.2), "Erant illi com pti capilli et madentes cincinnorum fimbriae et fluentes purpurissataeque buccae . . . . " Finally, the fact that the likeness is of a Gaul capitalizes on xenophobic sentiments of Caesar's Roman audience. In short, the caricature is funny not because the physical attribute themselves are particularly risible, but because they evoke a nexus of specific moral and cultural criteria that define in the negative the ideal Roman public figure, the uir bonus dicendi peritus. The laughter is normative.

Returning to Apuleius's caricature of Aemilianus we may ask what are the specific qualities beyond the physical that this image evokes. The point of comparison between Aemilianus and the tragic Thyestes are the wrinkles of the face (t ot in facie tua sulcos rugarum). Naturally, wrinkles are a blank marker for old age, and they are variously appropriated in different contexts: as markers of the auctoritas of old age or again of its physical deterioration (Cicero De Sen ectute 62.6, on auctoritas; Juvenal 6.144 on the physical deterioration of an aging woman); as the visible signs of anxiety often resulting from a life of hidden sin (Ovid ??, "De rugis crimina multa cadunt"; Juvenal 10.193 on the life of a cinaedus; Juvenal 13.215 on the thankless lot of the present-day orator). As we should expect, the meaning of old age and its physical effects will be variously determined in different contexts.

In the context of the Apologia there are two competing images of old age. One is the portrait of Sophocles that Apuleius produces 'extemporaneously' while he waits for a passage from his biological treatises to be located and read to the court:

Ap. 37: Sophocles poeta Euripidi aemulus et superstes, uixit enim ad extremam senectam, cum igitur accusaretur a filio suomet dementiae, quasi iam per aetatem desiperet, protulisse dicitur Coloneum suam, peregregiam tragoediaru m, quam forte tum in eo tempore conscribebat, eam iudicibus legisse nec quicquam amplius pro defensione sua addidisse, nisi ut audacter dementiae condemnarent, si carmina senis displicerent. ibi ego comperior om[a]nis iudices tanto poetae adsurrexisse, m iris laudibus eum tulisse ob argumenti sollertiam et coturnum facundiae, nec ita multum omnis afuisse quin accusatorem potius dementiae condemnarent.

The poet Sophocles, the model and instructor of Euripides, lived to a great old age, and when he was accused of insanity by his very own son as if he had deteriorated over time, is said to have produced his Coloneus, that most excellent of trage dies, which he happens to have just completed writing at that time, and to have read it to the jury and added nothing else in his defense, except that they should condemn him swiftly for insanity, if they found the poem of an old man displeasing. As I und erstand it, then all the jury rose from their seats, and with marvelous praise acquitted him on account of the cleverness of his demonstration and the strength of his eloquence, and there was no one present but who judged the accuser, rather, guilty of in sanity.

The obvious immediate parallel to Sophocles is Apuleius, who proceeds to have his own writings read in his defense. But the noteworthy other senex in the speech is Aemilianus, whose own illiteracy and lack of eloquence is highlighted against the example of Sophocles, the model of literate culture.

At the same time the anecdote cuts another way: Apuleius makes it clear that one charge to which an old man is susceptible in the context of the court is insanity (dementia), precisely the character Apuleius will stamp on the senectus of Aemilianus. In the proem of the speech Apuleius begins ex persona with a brief mention of the well-know character of Aemilianus, to whom we are introduced as a "senex notissimae temeritatis," whose rashness has driven him, in the absence of real evidence, to stuff his case with empty abuse. And later, in response to Aemilianus's empty accusation that Apuleius keeps instruments of magic wrapped up in a linen handkerchief, Apuleius mocks his opponent's logic (if the items are h idden, how does Aemilianus know that they are magical?), which he claims stems not from any cleverness, but from the "furor infelix animi et misera insania crudae senectutis."

By Apuleius's description, then, Aemilianus's wrinkled old age is plagued with a dementia characterized by unchecked rage. The type is recognizable from Seneca's stoic dialogue De Ira, where the steady-minded philosopher refutes a long string of arguments advanced by an interlocutor in favor of the emotion of anger, which, Seneca concludes, must be banished from the soul if one is to attain the desirable equanimity of the ideal auquus iudex. In the course of the dialogue uncomplimentary t raits of the angry man are trotted out one after another, wherein we find the basic lexicon for Apuleius's description of his opponent as insanely angry.

The angry man, Seneca informs us, is characterized by his rabies (frenzied madness). He shares this trait with the wild beasts, except in one regard: man is the one animal in possession of the rational faculty, so rabies is for him a perv ersion of his natural mental condition (3.3.4); the angry man, unlike the other beasts, when caught in the throws of madness will even turn on the one who feeds him (4.8.3). We are reminded here of Sicinius Pudens, who, under the wicked influence of Aemil ianus, deserts his liberal education (omni disciplina repudiata) and turns with animal fierceness (efferatum) to misguided attacks against his mother and her new husband Apuleius. His disposition in this, Apuleius tells us, most resembles his uncle Aemilianus (28). In fact just previously Apuleius has used the term rabies to describe the irrational rage of Aemilianus, when he claims that it is the marriage to Pudentilla that has incited Aemilianus to pursue the charge of magic:

Ap. 28: quod quidem matrimonium nostrum Aemiliano huic immane quanto angori quantaeque diuidiae fuit; inde omnis huiusce accusationis obeundae ira et rabies et denique insania exorta est.

And it was this marriage that was the cause for Aemilianus of all this excessive torment and all this distress; hence arose all the frenzied madness and insanity of this trivial accusation.

rabies, ira and insania appear together in Seneca's dialogue: The philosopher argues that anger is not so much inherent to human nature, as much as it is the nature of the intellect to overcome its natural obstacles. Men can walk tigh t-ropes, dive to great depths, or live without wine or other pleasures only by hardening their minds . . .
Seneca De Ira 4.12.5: . . . et tamen ad finem operis non magno auctoramento labor peruenit: nos non aduocabimus patientiam, quos tantum praemium expectat, felicis animi inmota tranquillitas? Quantum est effugere maximum malum, iram, et cum i lla rabiem saeuitiam crudelitatem furorem, alios comites eius adfectus!

. . . and yet at the end of their work their labor wins them only a small return. Will we not summon ourselves to patience, we who wait upon such a great reward: the gentle tranquillity of a happy soul? For that is what it means to escape that greates t of evils, anger, and with it madness and fierceness and harshness and rage, and the other emotions that accompany it!

And furor, one of the harmful emotions that accompany anger, is another trait of Aemilianus's, one that he shares with the epileptic slave Thallus (atque contende, si vis, furorem tuum cum Thalli furore), the boy Apulei us is supposed to have secretly induced into a magical trance in the presence of fifteen witnesses. The complex relationship Apuleius develops between the slave boy and Aemilianus (who introduces Thallus as a witness for the prosecution) displays further points of contact with Seneca's angry man. Seneca describes anger as an affliction similar to an illness (morbus) of the body, a pestilential swelling of harmful fluids (tumor . . . corporibus copia vitiosi umoris intentis . . . pestilens abunda ntia; 3.20.1) whose symptoms are akin to that of Thallus's epilepsy as described by Apuleius at paragraph 50. Apuleius has just provided a brief review of human pathology, discussing causes of illness resulting from abnormal conditions of heat and col d, of the various bodily tissues, and finally of fluids, vapors and biles:

Ap. 50: quorum e numero praecipuast materia morbi comitialis, de quo dicere exorsus sum, cum caro in humorem crassum et spumidum inimico igni conliquescit et spiritu indidem parto ex candore compressi aeris albida et tumida ta bes fluit.

Of which causes the primary cause of the ill-omened affliction, about which I spoke, is when by a noxious fire the flesh is liquefied into a thick and bubbling bile, whence a vapor is produced, and from the heat of the compressed air flows a swelling w hite puss.

In benign cases, Apuleius explains, the pressure is realized through pustules on the skin, but should the harmful fluid reach the head, then it attacks and debilitates the rational faculties, and in extreme cases the patient displays symptoms of epilep sy (The description of the disease derives from Plato's Timeus (85b), as does the specious etymology for its Greek name, 'hieros nosos' (divine sickness), as if it were so called because it attacks the mind--the most divine part of the body) . Here too the symptoms of Thallus's epilepsy are comparable to those of Seneca's description of anger. Wise men, says Seneca at the beginning of the dialogue, define anger as a temporary insanity, one that takes hold when the rational faculty has been disable d (praeclusa ratione; 1.1.2). And later he observes that, "those men whom anger possesses can not be sane." The statement is followed by a vivid description of a man in the grips of anger's madness:

Seneca De Ira 3.1.3: Vt scias autem non esse sanos quos ira possedit, ipsum illorum habitum intuere; nam ut furentium certa indicia sunt audax et minax uultus, tristis frons, torua facies, citatus gradus, inquietae manus, color uersus, crebr a et uehementius acta suspiria, ita irascentium eadem signa sunt: flagrant ac micant oculi, multus ore toto rubor exaestuante ab imis praecordiis sanguine, labra quatiuntur, dentes comprimuntur, horrent ac surriguntur capilli, spiritus coactus ac stridens , articulorum se ipsos torquentium sonus, gemitus mugitusque et parum explanatis uocibus sermo praeruptus et conplosae saepius manus et pulsata humus pedibus et totum concitum corpus magnasque irae minas agens, foeda uisu et horrenda facies deprauantium s e atque intumescentium-nescias utrum magis detestabile uitium sit an deforme.

In order that you may learn that those whom anger possesses are not sane, behold their very appearance; for just as the unmistakable signs of a raging men are a brash and threatening expression, a severe brow, a savage face, agitated movements, anxious hands, changing complexion, quick and roughly drawn breath, so are the same signs of angry men: the eyes blaze and flash, there is a great blush over the entire face swelling with blood drawn up from the chest, the lips quiver, teeth grind together, the hair prickles and stand up on end, the breath is forced and hisses, there is a creaking of the limbs as they contort themselves, speech is broken in a voice that emits moans groans and the like, and the hands are clapped together and the ground is struck by the feet the whole body is violently shaken as it enacts the exaggerated menacings of anger, the face is foul and horrifying to behold of men contorting and swelling--you would know not whether the vice is more abominable or deformed.

Although the symptomology is not identical, there are resemblances between this description of anger and Apuleius's description of the Thallus:
Ap. 43: est enim miser morbo comitiali ita confectus, ut ter an quater die saepe numero sine ullis cantaminibus corruat omniaque membra conflictationibus debilitet, facie ulcerosus, fronte et occipitio conquassatus, oculis heb es, naribus hiulcus, pedibus caducus. . . . uelle hercle adesset: tibi eum, Aemiliane, permisissem, et tenerem, si tu interrogares; iam in media quaestione hic ibidem pro tribunali oculos trucis in te inuertisset, faciem tuam spumabundus conspuisset, manus contraxisset, caput succussisset, postremo in sinu tuo corruisset.

He is so wretched in his infection with the ill-omened sickness, that three or four times daily without the aid of any charms he collapses and exhausts his every limb with thrashing, scored with lesions on the face, battered about the brow and head, sl uggish in his eyes, and clumsy on his feet . . . . By god I wish he were here: I would have handed him over to you, Aemilianus, and I would have held him, for you to interrogate him; at once in the middle of the interview, here in this very place before t he tribunal, he would have cast his fierce glance at you, and foaming at the mouth he would have spit in your face, contracted his hands tossed up his head and at last collapsed in your lap.

In this last passage we discover the underlying motivation of Apuleius's description of Thallus and his disease. Apuleius is not especially interested in defaming the character of the slave (by all accounts he is already held in the lowest esteem), nor is it his intent merely to produce a gratuitous display of medical expertise. Rather, he seeks to develop an elaborate equation between the physical morbidity of the slave and psychological infirmity of Aemilianus, the primary target of his rhetorical at tack. This equation is performed symbolically in the image of Thallus collapsed writhing in the lap of Aemilianus. A few paragraphs later, the equation is made explicit:

Ap. 52: Immo enim si uerum uelis, Aemiliane, tu potius caducus qui iam tot calumniis cecidisti. neque enim grauius est corpore quam corde collabi, pede potius quam mente corruere, in cubiculo despui quam in isto splendidissimo coetu detestari. at tu fortasse te putas sanum, quod non domi contineris, sed insaniam tuam, quoquo te duxerit, sequeris. atqui contende, si uis, furorem tuum cum Thalli furor: inuenies non permultum interesse, nisi quod Thallus sibi, tu etiam aliis furi s. ceterum Thallus oculos torquet, tu ueritatem, Thallus manus contrahit, tu patronos, Thallus pauimentis inliditur, tu tribunalibus; postremo ille quidquid agit in aegritudine facit, ignorans peccat: at tu, miser, prudens et sciens delinquis, tanta uis m orbi te instigat.

But if you want the truth, Aemilianus, you are more the epileptic, who collapse under the weight of your own slander. For it is not less grave to fall down bodily than it is to do so in spirit, for the foot than for the mind to slip, to be spat on in o ne's chambers than to be refuted in this most distinguished gathering. But perhaps you imagine yourself to be sane, because you do not keep yourself at home, but follow your insanity wherever it leads you. And yet compare, if you would, your rage to that of Thallus. You will find that there is not a great deal of difference, save that Thallus rages against himself, while you rage against others. Again, Thallus rolls his eyes, while you twist the truth; Thallus contorts his hands, while you contort advocat es; Thallus is dashed against the pavement, you against the tribunal; finally, whatever he does out of disease, he does unknowing, but you, wretch, run afoul in full consciousness, so great is the power of the sickness that drives you.

We have considered ways in which Thallus's illness is figured in descriptive terms that are consistent with Seneca's discussion of anger: Symptomatically both afflictions can be understood in terms swelling noxious humors, violent disruptions in the no rmal habit of the body, and a debilitation of the rational faculty. Apuleius's assimilation of the manifestations of epilepsy to those of anger allows him to map the disease of Thallus on to his target Aemilianus: The epileptic and the angry man are both marked by furor and insania, and now Aemilianus's savage anger takes on the aspect of a morbus, whose symptoms we recognize from the stereotype of the iratus of Seneca's De Ira.

And there are more parallels between Seneca's description of the angry man and Apuleius's portrait of Aemilianus. In the absence of reason, the angry man displays a heedless willfulness (contumacia) which, in the extreme case will cause him to r ise up against the gods themselves. Seneca's example (3.21.8) is the emperor Gaius Caesar (Caligula), who is said to have become enraged at the sky when a pantomime performance was interrupted by weather, and subsequently to have challenged Jupiter to a f ight. "Quanta dementia!" Seneca exclaims. We are reminded again of Aemilianus, who we learn has spurned even the most minimal religious observation on account of his contempt and willful disobedience of the gods (ob deorum contempt um . . . ob hanc divini contumaciam; for this Aemilianus is dubbed 'Mezentius', another caricature drawing this time on Vergil's heathen). And Caligula's rage over a spoiled pantomime highlights a further quality of anger and its irrationality: th is is that it tends to erupt over trivial matters. Incongruency between anger and its occasion exposes the angry man to ridicule:

Senca De Ira 4.11.1: Si uero sine uiribus est, magis exposita contemptui est et derisum non effugit; quid enim est iracundia in superuacuum tumultuante frigidius?

But if anger is without force, it is rather exposed to contempt and will not escape ridicule; what, after all, is more tepid than anger than swells up in vain?

Aemilianus is subject to just this ridicule. For with rising indignation, Apuleius tells us, of the type one would hesitate display in the presence of even a poisoner, Aemilianus has accused Apuleius of distributing a tooth powder. Apuleius addresses t he audience:

Ap. 7: uidi ego dudum uix risum quosdam tenentis, cum munditias oris uidelicet orator ille aspere accusaret et dentifricium tanta indignatione pronuntiaret, quanta nemo quisquam uenenum. quidni? crimen haud contemnendum.

I saw how earlier certain people could barely hold their laughter, when that so-called orator delivered severely the accusation of 'tooth-powder' with a show of indignation such as hardly anyone would conjure up in the face of a poisoner. The crime is hardly suitable for condemnation.

It is, of course, this response of ridicule that Apuleius's caricature of Aemilianus as the angry man is ultimately designed to evoke.

Why, then does Apuleius select a portrait of the angry man consistent with Seneca's stoic moral philosophy as the caricature of his rhetorical opponent? A partial answer to the question appears if we consider the contrast Apuleius invents between Aemil ianus and the presiding magistrate, the Roman pro-consul Claudius Maximus. It is a regular device of Apuleius's speech to inject the name of Maximus at just that point where the pitch of invective against Aemilianus reaches its peak, and twice in these co ntexts Apuleius appeals to Maximus's patienta or aequitas, which Aemilianus has for some reason or other been so rash as to put to the test. So, for example at paragraph 35, after trivializing Aemilianus's accusation that Apuleius has purcha sed certain exotic varieties of fish for illicit purposes, Apuleius addresses the magistrate:

Ap. 35: ne tu, Claudi Maxime, nimis patiens uir es et oppido proxima humanitate, qui hasce eorum argumentationes diu hercle perpessus sis; equidem, cum haec ab illis quasi grauia et uincibilia dicerentur, illorum stultitiam ri debam, tuam patientiam mirabar.

Indeed, Claudius Maximus, you have endured exceedingly and are almost too forgiving to suffer for too long, by god, these arguments of theirs. In fact, as these things were being pronounced as if they were serious and defensible, I laughed at their stu pidity while I marveled at you patience.

And earlier in the speech Apuleius has occasion to note the aequitas of Aemilianus just after recalling to the court an earlier case, regarding the legitimacy of a will, in which Aemilianus allegedly perjured himself in the court of the uir c larissimus Lollius Urbicus, who is in attendance at Apuleius's trial:

Ap. 3: quam quidem uocem et tua aequitate et mea innocentia fretus spero in hoc quoque iudicio erupturam, quippe qui sciens innocentem criminatur eo sane facilius, quod iam, ut dixi, mentiens apud praefectum urbi in amplissima c ausa conuictus est.

It is my hope that, along with your sense of justice [Maximus] and my innocence, [the voice of Lollius Urbicus] will burst forth in this case too, for [Aemilianus] knows that he accuses an innocent man, and he does so all the more lightly, now that, a s I have said, he has been convicted of lying in a substantial action before the city prefect [Urbicus].

Finally, in the description of that earlier case in the court of Urbicus, Aemilianus appears typically as over-bold in his madness (tanta pertinacia, iste vecordissimus), while this time is Urbicus who displays the example of equanimity (but not without some effort): "adeo ut aegre Lollius Urbicus ab eius pernicie temperarit."

The qualities of patienta and aequitas that Apuleius attributes to Maximus are recognizable as the stoic virtues of Seneca's aequus iudex, the ideal figure against whose moderate and rational disposition the perversion of the angry man can be measured. When challenged with the proposition that anger inheres naturally in the human soul, and can not, therefore, be escaped, Seneca responds that just as other harmful impulses can be overcome by the intellect (e.g. desire for wine and sex) so too can the mind, through exercise of patientia, overcome anger (2.12.5). "Let us summon ourselves to patientia," he exclaims, for therein lies a great reward: escape from the anger and its accompanying afflictions: madness, ferocity , cruelty, rage etc (2.12.6). The aequus iudex will show clemency to all but the most serious offenders, and will seek to engender the same qualities in others (1.6.3). He will be not permit himself to be aroused to anger by the insults of others ( 1.11.7). His humility will prevent him from seeking vengeance against wrongdoers (1.14.2). He will treat angry men as children for their ignorance (2.26.6). In contrast to Aemilianus, these are the virtues possessed by Claudius Maximus, whose humanitas belongs among the qualities Seneca, at the end of his essay on anger, urges his audience to embrace (3.43.5).

We see in this contrast the economy of Apuleius's attack on Aemilianus at work. By adopting the image of the angry man from stoic moral philosophy, Apuleius at once makes use of a popular system of thought out of which he constructs a recognizable cari cature of his oratorical opponent. At the same time, and by means of the same system of thought, he can fashion Claudius Maximus after the positive example (stoic equanimity) that the caricature of Aemilianus negatively enforces.

We undertook the comparison of Aemilianus and Seneca's angry man with the goal in mind of making sense of the caricature of Aemilianus as a tragic Thyestes. It is possible now to reveal a first level of meaning. Recall that the physical feature on whic h the caricature hinges is Aemilianus's wrinkles, indicating a shared old age with the Thyestes character. Reading broadly in the Apologia, we contextualized senectus as it relates specifically to Aemilianus, whose old age we found to be mar ked by demented anger (insania, rabies, furor, ira etc.) recognizable from the description of that emotion and its effects in Seneca's dialogue De Ira. This anger, as it turns out, is also a signal trait of the tragic Th yestes. Consider first these lines from the beginning of the first speech of the Furies in Seneca's own Thyestes. They are addressed to the shade of Tantalos and concern the miseries forecast for his sons Atreus and Thyestes, and further progeny:

Seneca Thyestes 23: . . . Perge, detestabilis
umbra, et penates impios furiis age.
certetur omni scelere et alterna uice
stringatur ensis; nec sit irarum modus
pudorue, mentes caecus instiget furor,
rabies parentum duret et longum nefas
eat in nepotes.

Go, vile shade, and lead your household gods to the furies. Let the contest in crime begin, may the sword of each be drawn against the other, and may there be no limit to angers or shame. May blind rage spur on their minds; may the animal fierceness of their parents take hold, and may a far-reaching crime go forth among your descendants.

Tantalos has notoriously served up his son Pelops as an entree in a feast with the gods, for which crime he is punished eternally in the underworld, and here we learn that his punishment shall be extended to include his descendants: Thyestes and Atreus (and Agamemnon, Aigisthos and Orestes to follow) shall live in a world governed by the chaotic and destructive forces of anger (again, ira, furor, rabies). Anger is thematized throughout the tragedy, in which Atreus exacts revenge ag ainst his brother Thyestes for the seduction of his wife and the theft of important livestock by slaughtering the sons of Thyestes and feeding them to the father during what appears to be a feast of reconciliation. In Seneca's telling of the myth it is At reus who is primarily associated with the mad rage forecast by the Furies (iratus, 180; ira, 504-10; tumet ira, 738; but also note the vetus regni furor of Thyestes, 302), while Thyestes--up to a point--shows signs of stoic mod eration (so the speech of 446ff. where he prefers anonymity over the excesses of power: immane regnum est posse sine regno pati). But Atreus's madness will eventually infect Thyestes too, or at least this is the sense we get at the play's close, as Thyestes calls down curses upon his brother for his horrible crimes.

The Thyestes myth was treated in a number of other Roman tragedies, including now lost plays by Ennius, Varius and Curiatius Maternus, and it is probable that in these treatments the ira of Thyestes, occasioned no doubt by the crime of Atreus, w as a prominent theme. This at least would explain Horace, carmen 1.16.17: "irae Thyesten exitio graui / strauere . . ." (anger wrecked Thyestes in severe ruin). And in a passage from the Controversiae (1.1.21) to which we shall return later, the Elder Seneca describes a certain oratorical style employing a display of extreme anger (non irasci tantum debere sed furere) in the manner of a Thyestes (more Thyesteo). These passages, finally, give us access to a Roman view of the tragic Thyestes as an emblem of (destructive) anger, the anger that plagues the line of Tantalos and that also provides the topic for Seneca's moral dialogue De Ira. As such, it is easy to see the suitability of the tragic Thyestes to the caric ature of Aemilianus, whom Apuleius throughout his defense portrays as the stereotypical angry man.

Ira, then, is the anchor of one line of invective aimed against Aemilianus. Understood in terms of stoic moral philosophy, it defines a condition of the soul of animal fierceness, irrationality and morbidity contrasted with the equanimity and re asoned self-control exhibited by Claudius Maximus. Its emblem is the horrifying tragic mask of Thyestes. We may now ask where Apuleius fits into this scheme, for as much as he abuses his opponent for his excessive raving, Apuleius too finds it necessary i n the course of his defense to resort to the posture of ira. Two passages are important in this connection. Early in the speech, after describing the accusations against him as so many venomous slanders (male dicta) tainted by the bias of self-interest, Apuleius explains why his own sense of honor requires him to address the charges rather then treat them with silent contempt:

Ap. 3: est enim pudentis animi et uerecundi, ut mea opinio fert, uel falsas uiturationes grauari, cum etiam hi, qui sibi delicti alicuius conscii sunt, tamen, cum male audiunt, impendio commoueantur et obirascantur, quamqua m, exinde ut male facere coeperunt, consueuerint male audire, quod, si a ceteris silentium est, tamen ipsi sibimet conscii sunt posse se merito increpari; enimuero bonus et innoxius quisque rudis et imperitas auris ad male audiendum habens et laudis assue tudine contumeliae insolens multo tanta ex animo laborat ea sibi immerito dici, quae ipse possit aliis uere obiectare.

In my opinion, honor and shame require that I be troubled by these made-up abuses, since even these men, who are aware of their own wrongdoing, when they are maligned become excessively disturbed and grow furious, even though from that time when they b egan their crimes they have been accustomed to their bad reputations; even if others keep it quiet these men know nevertheless that they are open to rebuke. But a good and benign man, one whose ears are uncultured and inexperienced in bad report, one who out of a habit of receiving praise is unskilled in slander, he struggles all the harder against the very same things spoken without cause against him, the sort of things of which he could truthfully accuse others.

Apuleius's account of the causes of anger lays the ground for his representation of the ira of his opponents as irrational and grounded in a guilty conscience, and at the same time paves the way for his own legitimate expression of anger in resp onse to the maledicta and contumeliae that constitute the charges leveled against him. It also recalls a similar passage from Seneca's De Ira:

Seneca De Ira 4.31.1: Duo sunt, ut dixi, quae iracundiam concitant: primum, si iniuriam uidemur accepisse-de hoc satis dictum est; deinde, si inique accepisse-de hoc dicendum est. Iniqua quaedam iudicant homines quia pati non debuerint, quae dam quia non sperauerint.

There are two things, as I have said, which incite anger: First, when we appear to have received some injury--about this enough had already been said; next, when we seem to have received some injury unjustly--about this something remains to be said. Men judge some things unjust which they ought not to have suffered, and others things they judge unjus t which they suffer contrary to expectation.

Seneca elsewhere includes maledicta and contumeliae among the injuries that would incite anger, the same brand of verbal abuse that Apuleius attributes to his accusers. But whereas Apuleius reserves the right to be disturbed at these (no te here he does not yet claim for himself the emotion ira, but associates it again with the prosecution: obirascantur), Seneca on the other hand holds that the good man will remain serene in the face of insult, and his dia logue is littered with anecdotes from the lives of famous men who exemplify this virtue: Philip of Macedon could endure insult and this is what made him superior to his son Alexander (3.23.2); "Diogenes the Stoic" and Cato were both spat upon in public (t he former while speaking on anger) and neither were noticeably perturbed (3.38.1); Antigonus bore lightly the maledicta of his soldiers (3.22.2).

Apuleius, too, recognizes the value of self-control, a fact to which he calls attention at paragraph 16: "non sum iurgiosus," he claims after recusing himself from an attack on the morality of Aemilianus (an attack, he adds, t hat he would be quite capable of carrying out). And later, insulted this time for his alleged poverty, the signs of which are his pouch and staff, Apuleius has the good grace to interpret the contumelia rather as a compliment:

Ap. 22: Proinde gratum habui, cum ad contumeliam diceretis rem familiarem mihi peram et baculum fuisse.

I took it, therefore, as a compliment when you said with intent to insult that my entire possessions consisted of the pouch and the staff.

He continues, explaining that the pouch and the staff are the emblems of noteworthy philosophers like Crates, Diogenes and Antisthenes, among whose company he would be honored to be included. We are reminded here of Seneca's anecdote from the life of A ntigonus, who when jeered at by Greeks (at the time under his siege) for his small stature and flat nose, is said to have responded that it would mean good luck for him, if a Silenus were present in his camp (3.22.4).

Eventually, however, Apuleius's tolerance is forced to its limit. This happens in the course of his narrative of the role of Herrenius Rufinus, key witness for the prosecution and notorious profligate, in the manufacture of the charges leveled against him. At the outset Apuleius announces that here too he will seek to preserve the self-control that is his habit (hominem, quam modestissime potero, . . . demonstrabo), but the implication is clear: Apuleius has finally landed upon a topic so vile (qui unum neminem in terris uiliorem se aut improbiorem aut inquinatiorem relinquit) that some anger is justified, and even necessary. Dramatically, the moment is ripe. The audience has been cued from earlier in the speech (the passage above) to expect a display of anger from Apuleius, and while occasionally he has given us a taste of his vituperative power (the caricature of Aemilianus as Thyestes being a good example of this), up to now mode ration has been the rule.

In what follows Apuleius unleashes on Rufinus with a rapid barrage of abusive attacks designed to expose the moral degeneracy and base motives of his accuser: Physically deformed in old age, as a youth Rufinus danced in the salti ca fabula and assumed the habits of effeminacy and pathic homosexuality typically associated with the histrio. As an adult he converted his home into a brothel, where lately he has earned a livelihood off his wife's prostitution, after having d epleted a substantial inheritance in fruitless attempts to satisfy his various sordid appetites. But now his wife is aged and exhausted, and Rufinus looks to Pudentilla's fortune to salvage his estate. To this end he seduces the young Sicinius Pontianus w ith the cheap allurements of his only daughter, and persuades the boy to admonish his mother, Pudentilla, against proceeding with her plans to marry Apuleius. But Rufinus's intentions are found out. When he learns that the betrothal of Pudentilla to Apul eius is still intact, Rufinus flies into a rage (ira extumuit. . . exarsit furore), calls Apuleius a magician and a poisoner, and threatens to kill him.

At this point in the narrative, directly upon recalling the ungovernable rage of Rufinus, Apuleius finally gives vent to his own ira:

Ap. 78: se mihi sua manu mortem allaturum. uix hercule possum irae moderari, ingens indignatio animo oboritur. tune, effeminatissime, tua manu cuiquam uiro mortem minitari? at qua tandem manu? Philomelae an Medeae an Clyteme [n]strae? quas tamen cum saltas-tanta molitia animi, tanta formido ferri est-, sine cludine saltas.

[he said] that he would deliver me death by his own hand. Hercules! I can scarcely contain my anger, immense is the indignation that rises within me. You! Most effeminate! With your hand you threaten death to a man? And what hand is that? The hand of a Philomela, of a Medea, of a Clytemnestra? When you dance these parts you are so limp of spirit, so shy of the sword that you dance without your toy dagger.

The double entendre of sine cludine is obvious, and it is the suggestion that an emasculated histrio would dare threaten the real man (uiro), Apuleius, that produces his show of ira and indignatio. We should no te Apuleius's efforts to justify his outburst. First, it meets the criteria set out earlier for justified anger: Apuleius, though himself innocent, has suffered the injury of insult and slander (contumelia and maledicta) at the hands one who se own behavior deserves strong censure. Second, in contrast to the uncontrolled raving of Rufinus (described in terms elsewhere applied to Aemilianus), Apuleius's indignation is checked by his regular habit of moderation (uix hercule pos sum irae moderari). On the other hand, Apuleius's outburst is equally liable to be viewed as a transgression of the moral code of stoic equanimity he has employed against Aemilianus throughout the speech . At the very least he has fallen short of the ideal of the aequus iudex on which he anchors his praise of Claudius Maximus, and in fact, for a moment, may himself be open to caricature as the angry man, the same caricature he has thus far so effectively manipulated to his own advantage. Wh y would Apuleius go to lengths to orchestrate this dramatic moment if its ultimate effect is to compromise his rhetorical position?

The solution to the problem appears when we take into account the theatrical nature of Roman oratory. Consider first the one instance in Seneca's dialogue where the display of anger is not categorically censured. It has been suggested by the interlocut or that anger is worthwhile because it makes for the better orator, to which Seneca responds:

Seneca De Ira 2.17.1: Immo imitatus iratum; nam et histriones in pronuntiando non irati populum mouent, sed iratum bene agentes; et apud iudices itaque et in contione et ubicumque alieni animi ad nostrum arbitrium agendi sunt, modo iram, modo metum, modo misericordiam, ut aliis incutiamus, ipsi simulabimus, et saepe id quod ueri adfectus non effecissent effecit imitatio adfectuum.

Yes, but he only imitates his anger. For stage-actors too, when they perform, though not actually angry themselves, nevertheless incite the audience because they act the angry part well. So, too, before the jury and in verbal disputes and wherever else we deem it appropriate to feign other emotions such as anger fear and pity, we simulate these emotions in order to excite them in others, and often what true emotions could not effect is effected by the imitation of emotions."

Whereas the expression of anger as a true emotion (uerus adfectus) is a failure of self-presentation, and earns the response of ridicule, anger as imitation is a part of the oratorical apparatus. It belongs among the techniques of pronuntatio , or 'delivery'--a techniques that belong as much to oratory as they do to the dramatic stage. Finally, anger as a function of pronuntatio, subsumed under the conventions of courtroom dramaturgy, has a rhetorical efficacy that bald anger lacks. For the remainder of this discussion I want to show that the deeper strategy underlying Apuleius's portrayal of Aemilianus as the stereotypical angry man consists in his demonstrating (a) that he is firmly in control of his dramatic self-presentation, sp ecifically over his use of the dramatic posture of ira, and (b) that Aemilianus lacks this control.

It may at first seem strange, or even paradoxical, that Apuleius would seek to establish his innocence in part by proving that he is a better orator than his opponent. This paradox is resolved when one considers that, in the context of the trial at Sab ratha, an essential criterion for moral probity is the ability to perform well as a public speaker. This fact may be illuminated by Apuleius's praise of Lollianus Avitus, who preceded Maximus as the pro-consul of North Africa and whom Ap uleius describes as a orator of the first degree. The background for the praise of Avitus is that, as Apuleius narrates it, after young Sicinius Pontianus returned to his senses after a brief but damaging association with Rufinus and Aemilianus, he soon s ought to resume an education in oratory which he had earlier pursued under the guidance of Apuleius. Apuleius at the time recommended Pontianus by personal letter to Avitus for oratorical instruction. Apuleius's praise of Avitus focuses on the letter of a cceptance he has received in reply. The letter, Apuleius explains, shows all manner of oratorical excellence; it's eloquence should be a model to which all learned men would aspire. Stylistically, is displays all of the features identified singly with the great Roman orators, beginning with the dignity (gravitas) of Cato and ending with splendor (opulentia) of Cicero. Avitus's eloquence is the mark of the optimus uir, or following Cato's prophetic normative definiti on of the orator, the uir bonus dicendi peritus. Finally, Apuleius views his possession of such an example of eloquence as the letter from Avitus as the purest witness to his own innocence.

But the efficacy of the letter lies in its being an example of oratory. The written text of the letter requires a voice, and Apuleius presents himself as the one suited to supply it: "scio te, Maxime, libenter eius letteras auditurum; et quidem se praelegam, me voce pronuntiabo." (I know that you, Maximus, will gladly listen to his letter, and if I may read it to the court, I will deliver it in my own voice, 94). Apuleius's pronuntatio, or dramatic delivery involv ing imitation, of the eloquence of Avitus brings to life before the court the example of the man. And in a very real sense conforming to the dramatic conventions of oratory, by enacting the example Apuleius assumes its uirtus. Of course Apuleius do es not miss the opportunity to demonstrate the failure of the prosecution to assimilate to the example of the orator: "audesne te ergo, Aemiliane, cum Auito conferre?" (Do you dare, then, Aemilianus, to compare yourself to Avitus? 96).

Apuleius represents, then, an arena where virtue exists as a function of public performance. Success in this arena, moreover, should be viewed as the product of a formal education, upon entering into which Pontianus signals his return to good society. It should be noted that Aemilianus and Rufinus are revealed as hostile to this education where boys are inducted into the culture of oratory. Pontianus's brief collusion with them means the interruption of his oratorical education. Now the younger son of Pudentilla, Sicinius Pudens, has fallen into this same bad company, with the same result: Pudens no longer attends school as he had when he was under the charge of Apuleius, but instead spends his time carousing in taverns and frequenting the brothels and gladiatorial schools. Typically, the corruption of his youth is measured by his lack of eloquence in the public arena of the court ("enim Latine neque loqui vult neque potest. . . . audisti, Maxime, priuignum meum . . . uix singulas syll abas fringultientem.")

Like oratory itself, the oratorical education entails a substantial imitative component. This is illustrated in a statue of the Roman school boy whose iconography we recognize from other statues of grown men in the authoritative posture of the orator.

And from Quintilian we learn that there is a formal study (scientia) of performance technique (pronuntatio) that belongs to the oratorical education. In the following passage Quintilian relates the pronuntatio of the orator to the dramatic technique of the comic actor (comoedus), recalling Seneca's comparison of the orator to the histrio. But Quintilian imposes some proscriptive limits on the oratorical use of stage technique, and in so doing establishes a special cr iterion according to which the success of the pronuntatio of the orator is to be evaluated:

Quintilian Inst. Orat. 1.11.3: Dandum aliquid comoedo quoque, dum eatenus qua pronuntiandi scientiam futurus orator desiderat. Non enim puerum quem in hoc instituimus aut femineae uocis exilitate frangi uolo aut seniliter tremere. Nec uitia ebrietatis effingat nec seruili uernilitate inbuatur nec amoris auaritiae metus discat adfectum: quae neque oratori sunt necessaria et mentem praecipue in aetate prima teneram adhuc et rudem inficiunt; nam frequens imitatio transit in mores. Ne gestus qui dem omnis ac motus a comoedis petendus est. Quamquam enim utrumque eorum ad quendam modum praestare debet orator, plurimum tamen aberit a scaenico, nec uultu nec manu nec excursionibus nimius. Nam si qua in his ars est dicentium, ea prima est ne ars esse uideatur.

Some attention should be paid to the comic actor, but only in so far as the aspiring orator needs to be educated in the ways of dramatic delivery. For it is not my wish that the boy whom we instruct in this be softened by the weakness of feminine vocal ization, or that he become timid in the manner of an old man. Nor should he imitate the faults of drunkenness, nor be tainted by the servility of the slave, nor learn the fear of love's coveting. These things are not requisites of oratory, and they are p rone to infect the mind with softness and a crudeness, especially when that mind is still young, since imitation often becomes habit. For certainly we should not seek all of our gestures and bodily motions from the comedic actors. And although it is tru e that in a certain way it behooves the orator to have command over some of these, for the most part he should stand apart from the stage, and refrain from excessive facial expression, gesticulation and perambulation. For if men who speak possess any art in these matters, it is foremost that they appear to be artless.

The student of oratory must cultivate the skill of pronuntatio, but only in so far as he may learn to represent the dignified postures and attitudes appropriate to his art. While stage technique is an essential part of the culture of oratory, in discriminate use of stage technique indicates a lack of cultivation (mens rudis), and threatens to undermine the qualities of character that the oratorical education seeks to foster. In fact the image of the stage actor, indulging in imitation of b ase qualities, may be viewed as the image of the failed orator, unable to manipulate the techniques of public performance in such a way as to confer upon himself the authority of the uir bonus. The example of Herrenius Rufinus comes to mind, whose youth was spent acting in the saltica fabula, in which he assumed the manner of uncultured softness and sexual license (indocta et rudi mollitia . . . impudicitiam) that stereotypically belong to that performance genre (i n part because the pantomimus played the roles of women: Apuleius cites for Rufinus the roles of Clytemnestra, Philomela and Medea). We posses one image of the saltica fabula from a wall from the House of the Four Styles in Pompeii, and it may be useful to juxtapose this with the image presented above of the youth in the posture of oratory:

*

The dancers with their voluptuous gestures strike an apparent contrast with the calm control of the would-be orator, but in that they are both essentially expressions of the dramatic technique of pronuntatio, the two images are closer to one ano ther than they may at first appear. For to the extent that the orator is a performer, his performance is always susceptible to caricature drawing on uncomplimentary images of the stage (e.g. Cicero Pro Caelio 65). Thus each of the above images may be viewed as rhetorical representations, alternately sympathetic and hostile, of the same performative act. And in general we could say that, while the self-presentation of the orator depends on theatrical technique, it is, on the other hand, to his disad vantage for his public persona to be exposed as a theatrical effect. So Quintilian prescribes that the art of pronuntatio consist precisely in its self-concealment (nam si qua in his ars est dicentium, ea prima est ne ars esse uideatur).

The general requirements for pronuntatio hold true in the special case of anger. Here too Quintilian requires that the orator conceal the imitation of the emotion by assimilating as closely as possible to the real thing: ". . . in iis quae es se ueri similia uolemus, simus ipsi similes eorum qui uere patiuntur adfectibus. . . " (in regard to what we want to be like to the truth, may we ourselves be similar in our emotions [i.e. luctus, ira, indignatio] to those people who truly suff er; 6.2.27). Quintilian offers specific instructions for achieving this end, but first he describes two ways in which displays of anger fail as expressions of the successful orator. Each relates to different facets of Apuleius's caricature of Aemilianus a s the angry man. The first concerns the bald emotion, uninstructed by the art of oratory (Quintilian introduces the following section with the announcement that he now intends to discuss those things that are appropriate to pronuntatio, which has to do most with production of emotions, or adfectus):

Quintilian Inst. Or. 11.3.61: sed cum sint alii ueri adfectus, alii ficti et imitati, ueri naturaliter erumpunt, ut dolentium irascentium indignantium, sed carent arte ideoque sunt disciplina et ratione formandi.

But while some emotions are true, others are fictive and imitated; true emotions burst forth, like those of people who grieve or grow angry or indignant, but these lack art and need to be formed by education and reason.

This is, stated as briefly as possible, the description of Seneca's angry man, the model for the uncontrollable furor and irrational ira of Aemilianus. Here for the first time we mark the significance of this model in the special context of orat ory. While the successful orator performs a calculated imitation of anger, an imitation formed by disciplina, or formal education, Aemilianus's anger is raw. In this respect he is portrayed as lacking in cultivation in precisely those manners of s elf-presentation that define oratorical success. And his lack of cultivation, in turn, is signaled regularly in the course of Apuleius's speech through use of such adjectives as rudis (* * *), indoctus (* * *), barbarus (* * * *), and rusticus (* * * *) .

On the other hand, anger as an imitative fiction fails as an oratorical device when it fails to conceal its own fictionality:

Quintilian Inst. Or. 11.3.62: Contra qui effinguntur imitatione, artem habent; sed hi carent natura. . .

On the other hand, those who represent (anger) in imitation possess art, but they lack nature.

And again . . .

Quintilian Inst. Or. 6.2.26: Nam et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio, si uerba uultumque tantum, non etiam animum accommodarimus.

Sometimes the imitation of grief, anger and indignation is subject to ridicule, if we adjust only our words and our expression, and not our soul.

Art without substance in imitations of anger falls short of its goal as an oratorical device; superficial imitations of anger are open to ridicule. In this connection we recall two instances in Apuleius's speech where he seeks to expose the artificiali ty of Aemilianus's anger. First, early in the speech, Apuleius refers to the falsae uituperationes of the prosecution. Here we should read uituperatio as the technical term for the verbal expression of indignatio, so false attacks expose the fictive nature of the posture of righteous anger from which they are launched. And, to revisit a passage already discussed, Apuleius explicitly calls attention to the ridiculous nature of the fierce indignation with which Aemilia nus vitiates Apuleius's trafficking in exotic tooth powder. It is worth noting that Apuleius refers to this show of indignation as a function of pronuntatio (dentifricium tanta indignatione pronuntiaret), and thus emphasizes its imitative aspect. The show of anger would be exaggerated even in the case of the most heinous crime (i.e. poisoning), and it is Aemilianus's inability to control his performance that exposes him to ridicule. This too is evidence of lack of cultivation , for we recall from Quintilian's discussion of the scientia pronuntationis that the mark of the mens rudis is the inability to effectively appropriate to the ends of oratory the techniques of pronuntatio.

We may summarize, then, Apuleius's critique of Aemilianus's oratorical performance as it applies to displays of anger. They are on the one hand uncultivated expressions of bald anger, lacking the doctrina, or education that instructs the self-re presentation of the orator. On the other hand they are fumbling misappropriations of imitative techniques that constitute that self-representation.

Let us consider, now, why Apuleius's own display of anger in the speech is successful as a performance act. The prerogative is that the pronuntiatio conceal its imitative aspect (ea prima est ne ars esse uideatur). Paradoxically, Apuleius meets this criteria by enacting the posture of anger within a narrative that is itself unmistakably grounded in the rhetorical conventions of the genre. Recall that Apuleius vents his ira and indignatio at the climax of an extended attack o n Herrenius Rufinus. Earlier we reviewed the main points of the attack. Each of these points, it turns out, are standard topoi of rhetorical invective. First, Rufinus is portrayed as passive homosexual in his youth, when he acted the (female) parts of the pantomime in the saltica fabula. Here we find two combined topoi, with parallels in Cicero's portrayal of Verres, among other places, as the passive youth (in Verrem 2.1.32-3, and of Verres's son at 2.3.159-62); the effeminate histrio or pantomimus appears frequently, as has already been mentioned, and perhaps the most famous example is the emperor Nero, among whose most egregious transgressions was to portray female roles in the pantomime dance (e.g. Dio Rom. Hist. 62.9.5). Apuleius accuses Rufinus of having devoured his patrimony. Similar accusations made by Crassus against Brutus appear as models of rhetorical wit in Cicero's handbook De Oratore (222-225). To maintain his ruined estate Rufinus pr ostitutes his wife. Quintilian (Decl. 325) sites this as a standard theme for declamation in the schools, and it also appears in the rhetorical first satire of Juvenal (1.55), and again in Ovid Amores (2.19.578). Finally, Cicero, in his spee ch on behalf of Milo, reports Clodius's attempted murder of his client ("homo effeminatus fortisimum uirum conaretur occidere . . ."; Pro Milone 89) in terms that are echoed in Apuleius's report of Rufinus's threat on his life ("tune, eff eminatissime, tua manu cuiquam uiro mortem minitaris?").

The point of revealing these parallels is to demonstrate the thoroughly conventional quality of Apuleius's attack on Rufinus. Each element of the attack represents a standard topos of oratorical invective, and as a whole the attack is a virtuosi c display of Apuleius's control of the formal tools of his genre. It is, again, a performative genre: standard rhetorical topoi will be accompanied by stock gesture, expression and voicing, which in this case combine in the posture of anger that Ap uleius announces as the verbal attack rises to a climax ("uix hercule possum irae moderari, ingens indignatio animo oboritur."). To assess the success of the performance in terms of Quintilian's requirement that imitatio in oratory be artfully concealed, it will help to refer once more to Apuleius's critique of Aemilianus's anger. For Aemilianus, the main point of failure is that his show of anger is conventionally inappropriate: his indignatio is out of proportion t o the topic (tooth powder, in fact). It is precisely by mismanaging the dramatic conventions that Aemilianus exposes the fiction of his performance, and as the imitative aspect of his anger becomes patent by contrast to its rhetorical context, Aemilianus is open to ridicule, the ultimate mark of the failed performance. Conversely, Apuleius will hide the imitative aspect of his anger through skillful manipulation of the generic conventions. The performance is transparent until the conventions collapse.

We may now, finally, relate the discussion again to the image of the tragic Thyestes. It can now be seen that this image represents both of the failures of Aemilianus's oratorical performance of anger. First, it caricatures Aemilianus as the stereotypi cal angry man, fierce and irrational in his rage. In this sense Aemilianus matches the description of Seneca's iratus, and may be contrasted with the stern equanimity of the judge Claudius Maximus. Additionally, following Quintilian's normative dis cussion of pronuntatio, Aemilianus's uncultivated anger marks his lack of sophistication in the techniques of self-representation that define the orator, the uir bonus dicendi peritus. One of these techniques of self-representation involves the dramatic imitation of anger. This specific imitative style, adopted from the tragic stage, is in fact directly identified with the Thyestes character in a passage from Seneca the Elder (Controversiae 1.1.21). Quintilian too relates pronuntat io to the techniques of the stage, but limits its scope to the portrayal of such gestures and attitudes that would fit the dignity of the orator, and requires of pronuntatio first and foremost that its imitative quality be undetectable. Herein lies the second failure of Aemilianus: where before his anger was shown to be raw and uncontrolled, now it is exposed as an inept and ridiculous imitation. Apuleius owns a mirror, and, following Demosthenes, the wise orator uses the reflecting surface of the mirror for the cultivation of his manners (ad discuplinam morum). Demosthenes sought to perfect his oratorical delivery (nouissimam pronuntiandi congruentiam) as he rehearsed alone before a mirror. When Apuleius holds the mirror up to Aemilianus, on the other hand, what appears in the reflection is not an image of the orator, but the reflection of a dramatic mask.

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These pages were built by Andrew James Wiesner and are the result of a semester's work in a seminar on Apuleius's Apology taught by Professor James O'Donnell of the Department of Classical Studies at the University of Pennsylvania.

The preceding study is instructed throughout by two articles, both by William S. Anderson, influential in the introduction of the concept of persona to the criticism of Roman satire, and especially of Juvenal:

The first article illuminates a set of formal rhetorical postures and figures that combine in the constitution of the public self-representation (persona) of the Roman orator, and shows this persona in high-relief as it is subjected to satirical treatment in Juvenal. The second article examines anger as a formal element of the rhetorical persona and its adoption into the rhetorical satires of Juvenal.

I have also used two important studies of invective in the Apology, both by Thomas D. McCreight:

The first is an exhaustive study on the lexical level of generic techniques of invective in the Apology, focusing principally on elements of diction that are unusual or unique to the speech. The second concentrates on generic invective motifs and h ow they are interwoven in complex patterns to achieve special effects. The article also shows how Apuleius's invective is specifically aimed at criticizing the oratorical performance of his opponents.

For a theory of persona as constituted through a series of performative acts, I used the following:

And worth the diversion is a related approach to a central document of American revolutionary history:

Four books are helpful for general information on the Roman theater and Roman attitudes about the theater:

Two interesting studies relate the Roman theater to oratory:

This is a good source book for many aspects of Roman education:

Apuleius's use of stoic thought as a vehicle for contrasting the characters of Sicinius Aemilianus and Claudius Maximus was brought to my attention by Professor Keith Bradley (University of Victoria) in a lecture he delivered to the Classics Dep artment of the University of Pennsylvania on Friday, February 9, 1996. The title of the lecture was "Law, Magic and Culture in the Apology of Apuleius."

Finally, much of the data around which this study is built has been gathered via word searches in the PHI CD-ROM using the MUSAIOS search software.