Jewish and Christian Self-Definition. 
Volume One: The Shaping of Christianity in the Second and Third 
Centuries. 
Edited by E. P. Sanders. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980. 

The McMaster Project on Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, 
funded by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council, was to produce three  volumes of essays, each the 
product of a symposium (on Christianity, Judaism, and the Greco-
Roman Movements, respectively),  Movements), plus a synthesis of 
the most significant results by the project director Ed Sanders. 
This is the first volume and it contains thirteen essays by an 
illustrious slate of contributors plus a brief preface by the 
editor. The notes are placed separately after the essays (217-
271) and are themselves followed by a classified bibliography, 
index of names, and index of passages. 

Not all of the essays deal explicitly with the question of 
Christian "self-definition," although in one way or another they  
all have some pertinence to that theme. The opening essay on "The 
Problem of Self-Definition: From Sect to Church," by R.A.Markus 
of Nottingham, appropriately sets the stage for the discussion by 
identifying important contexts of self-definition such as 
competing Christian beliefs, varying institutional structures and 
comparison/contrast with the social world in which Christianity 
developed. In the remaining essays, those by Robert Grant ("The 
Social Setting of Second-Century Christianity"), A. Hilary 
Armstrong ("The Self-Definition of Christianity in Relation to 
Later  Platonism") and Robert Wilken ("The Christians as the 
Romans [and Greeks] Saw Them") tend to focus on the "identity" of 
Christians vis-a-vis their social, intellectual and political 
contexts; Jarislov Pelikan ("The Two Sees of Peter"), William 
Schoedel ("Theological Norms and Social Perspectives in Ignatius 
of Antioch"), G&e/;rard Vall&e/;e ("Theological and Non-
Theological Motives in Irenaeus's  Refutation of the Gnostics"), 
Raoul Mortley ("The Past in Clement of Alexandria") and P. M. 
O'Cleirigh ("The Meaning of Dogma in Origen") attempt to shed 
light on various  aspects of what later came to be accepted, or 
at least tolerated, as the traditions of the Christian 
mainstream; Gerd L&u%;demann ("The Successors of Pre-70 Jerusalem 
Christianity: a Critical Evaluation of the Pella-Tradition") 
performs another autopsy on the Pella traditions and indirectly 
speaks to the problem of the fate of "Jewish Christianity"; and 
Jacques M&e/;nard ("Normative Self-Definition in Gnosticism") 
joins Birger Pearson ("Jewish Elements in Gnosticism and the  
Development of Gnostic Self-Definition") in attacking head-on the 
question of "Gnostic" self-definition while George MacRae (and to 
some extent also Vall&e/;e) discusses why "the Church" rejected 
"Gnosticism." 

There is much to be learned from these treatments, even where the 
relationship to the primary problem of self-definition seems 
somewhat strained. If O'Cleirigh is correct, Origen's use of the 
term  &dDdogmata&d@ is a clue to his extending of Christian self-
definition even further than his predecessors in the direction of 
the philosophical (Stoic) perspectives of his non-Christian 
contemporaries; this seems a relatively small point when one 
thinks of the other sorts of evidence Origen offers for 
discussions of Christian self-consciousness -- in relationship to 
"gnosis" or "magic" or hellenistic "school traditions" or 
"Judaism," for example -- but it is an instructive lexical survey 
in its own right. Similarly, Mortley focuses on an aspect of the 
legacy from Clement of Alexandria that has not received much 
emphasis, Clement's interest in past history. Although it is hard 
to believe that there is anything uniquely representative of 
Clement  in this material, the sort of historical perspective he 
attests does represent one type of Jewish, Christian and 
hellenistic outlook as over against others. A broader based essay 
on early Christian "historical" self-understanding would fulfil 
the promise aroused by Mortley's interesting study. 

I could continue to comment in some detail on the individual 
essays, each of which is instructive in its own way. But since my 
overall reaction to the book was a sense of disappointment, it 
seems appropriate to ask why. A major problem for me is  that it 
never does become clear whether the essays are intended to 
address a carefully defined set of questions, and if so, what 
those questions are. In his brief preface, Sanders distinguishes 
between "the early history of Christianity" in which "arguments 
about what was right and wrong, both in faith and in practice," 
and the later "shift" to a position of excluding  opponents as 
"heretics"; "This shift in the consciousness of the  Christian 
community took place during the second and third  centuries CE. 
The essays presented here ask how it took place and why" (ix). 
Unfortunately, as Sanders himself well knows,  Paul is hardly 
tolerant of his Christian opponents in the first century, and 
they seem to be no more tolerant of him. It is not at all clear 
that such a "shift of consciousness" should be posited for a 
later date; nor is it clear that the essayists saw themselves 
speaking  to this sort of issue, on the whole. 

The title of the McMaster project, "Jewish and Christian  Self-
Definition," is not itself self-defining. Which Jews and which 
Christians in relationship to what? What counts for the historian 
as evidence of "self-definition"? How do individual and community 
relate to each other in such matters? At what point and for what 
reasons is it legitimate or helpful to prefix the adjective 
"normative"? These and a myriad of related definitional issues go 
unaddressed. Sanders comes close to perceiving such problems when 
he writes: "We are hopeful that we can probe behind the usual 
account of how orthodoxy was achieved (the evolution of canon, 
creed, and heirarchy) to the question of why Christianity and 
Judaism developed the way they did. What was the social setting, 
what were the driving forces, which pushed Christianity and 
Judaism more and more to insist not only that it was important to 
be Christian or Jewish, but to be so in a certain way? The 
question becomes more tantalizing when one realizes that this 
insistence characterized not only the victorious parties, but 
also many who made a bid for dominance, but lost" (x). 

Indeed! At what point does one stand and in what way does one 
ascertain who "won" or who "lost"? (Does "self-definition" ever 
include the idea of having "lost"?) Is it possible for one to 
rediscover the "driving forces" of some of  these "losers," and 
perhaps some of their perceptions of canon, creed and leadership? 
Would it be helpful to do so? Does not the very attribution of 
the designation "Christian" (or "Jewish") pre-judge the quest for 
"self-definition" in a certain direction? Etc. 

On the whole, this volume does not move very far beyond being a 
series of loosly connected essays exploring aspects of how 
orthodoxy was defined or achieved. The trilogy of articles on 
"Gnosticism" (MacRae, M&e/;nard,  Pearson) takes a step towards 
breaking new ground, but the volume contains  no similar focus on 
"self-definition" in other specific (e.g. Marcionism,   
Montanism) or general (e.g. "Jewish Christianity") groups with 
which appropriate comparisons and contrasts could be drawn. While 
the attitude of Christians in relation to Platonic philosophy is 
well treated by Armstrong, no special attention is given to 
Christian awareness of such matters as "magic" or "apocalyptic," 
for example. Although Pelikan's article draws attention to the 
extensive development of Christianity in Syria and to the east, 
there is no essay that focuses specifically on the self-
definition of eastern leaders such as Tatian and Bardesanes. 

In fairness, one volume probably could not cover all of these 
matters in any degree of detail. Nevertheless, they are important 
items to notice if one is serious about "the shaping of 
Christianity in the  second and third centuries." This volume 
does not really seem to be constructed with any view towards a 
balanced or thorough presentation of the issues. It is an 
interesting pot-porri, but not a serious attack on the problems 
as a whole nor a serious pointer towards a more satisfactory 
understanding of their historical resolution. Indeed, the volume 
does not provide sufficient clarity as to exactly what the 
problematic of "(normative) self-definition" is. 

/end/