To spend decades in the company of a long dead African
bishop cannot
fail to leave its mark on the sojourner. It may be extreme to speak
of
Stockholm syndrome, and I suppose it might be questioned whether it
is he
that holds us hostage or we him, but perhaps the relationship is more
one of
the old Spanish married couple that Peter Brown spoke of in the preface
to
his Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine,*1 bound by
ties of
illusión, a shared version of the world arising out of shared
experience.
Augustine holds special sway over his students, more than
most other
ancient figures, for several reasons. First, his influence over after-generations
has been broad and deep and he has merited close study. Second, his
association over the last centuries with one and another stream of
modern
Christianity has assured him a cadre of partisan readers, both supporters
and
opponents, but has also assured that few people read him seriously
without
preconceptions. Third, the vast bulk of his surviving oeuvre makes
it
impossible to pay brief scholarly calls on him and come away with any
serious
observations. To work seriously on Augustine is to declare, willingly
or not, a
kind of allegiance and to establish a kind of co-dependency. We must
know
this of ourselves, our colleagues, and our forerunners, if we are to
advance in
such study.
Robert Markus and Peter Brown have provided, from their
long and wise
experience, striking snapshots and some bits of video footage (as it
were) of
the last half-century. To one whose memory is reliable, if at all,
only for the
last quarter-century, they seem, of course, as giants from another
era. The
fifties and sixties, years when the bibliography of Augustinian secondary
literature began truly to “gallop”—in André Mandouze’s word*2—defined
the
landscape in which we all now live, the years between Courcelle and
Marrou
on the one hand and Brown and Markus on the other.
And like many citizens of these decades, Augustine has
gone through his
own changes. He entered the post-war world as rather a fashionable
liberal,
and to study him was to declare yourself as, howbeit traditionalist,
of a
forward-looking bent of mind. Does he end this half-century, as others
might,
rather chastened and subsiding back into conservative ideas, unchanging
himself perhaps but understood differently by new generations for whom
the
forward-looking conservatism of another era seems no longer so coherent,
or
so nearly liberal?
This is not to say the last decades, especially since the
discoveries of
Divjak and Dolbeau,*3 have not been exciting ones, though perhaps not
entirely riveting. The revelations of the new letters and sermons have
sufficed
to enthrall the scholars, but have not made headlines beyond scholarly
circles.
Augustine remains philosophically quite broad-minded, but just a little
bit
more high church and state church than most of his modern readers would
prefer.
And his language: the old cadres of ecclesiastically-trained
Latinists who
could edit and interpret him with proprietorial care have largely slipped
away,
replaced in quality if not in quantity by younger scholars without
ecclesiastical
roles. His original Latin words are far more readily available in print
to readers
on every continent than ever before, and if we consider digital versions
of his
texts, bid fair to be nearly ubiquitously available very soon. But
translation is
the necessary precondition of any but an extremely narrow readership,
and
the greatest services to scholarship in the last half century have
been supplied
by the Bibliothèque Augustinienne in French, the Nuova Biblioteca
Agostiniana in Italian, and the New City Press in English.
Prognostication is a silly exercise: at best what the
prophet says will
happen is a useful sketch of what won’t. But issues that loom in 2001
are
easier to see: how we will respond to them is the question. I will
confine
myself here to sketching a few that interest or worry me.
Pierre-Marie Hombert’s Nouvelles recherches sur la chronologie
augustinienne*4 is a sobering reminder, first of all, of the ever-renewed
labor
of mastering any of Augustine at all. Five million words of text can
scarcely
be imagined, much less read and known with any consistent intensity.
When I
worked on the Confessions in the 1980s, I passed every page and line
of
Augustinian text then known before my eyes, fully aware that if I ever
said I
had done so, Isidore of Seville would rise up to call me a liar—and
fully
aware he would be justified in doing so, for the “reading” I gave those
texts
was partial and focused on their relevance for the Confessions only.
While I
pursued those studies, I thought I could identify only two other travelers
in
the last century who had followed the same idiosyncratic path, reading
every
text to throw light on the Confessions—Alfaric and Courcelle. A handful
of
other suspects have crossed my path over the years who may have similarly
ranged so broadly, but they have done so with different inquiries in
mind, and
we have all missed much that we might have seen. And time passes and
the
mind forgets what it has known.
And so in every generation and repeatedly in every lifetime,
every one of
us needs to refresh, reread, remind ourselves what we have known and
what
is there to be known, just of the primary texts. Hombert suggests,
and I
venture to hope it is possible, that renewed effort of attention and
comparison
can bring new fruit to chronological (and by implication other) studies.
Mechanical means of searching, finding, knocking, opening, tabulating,
and
recording what we seek may support that effort, but in the end, nothing
substitutes for patient years of attention.
But who will pay that attention, and why? Old quarrels
have faded, and
few fight out denominational battles with Augustine any longer, nor
is he a
particularly convenient tool to use in battles between orthodoxy and
atheism,
if any are still fought. And if he now belongs to the undiscipline
of “late
antique studies” (by “undiscipline” I mean only that the phrase refers
to
nothing that is widely recognized by deans, provosts, rectors, or presidents
as
an organizing factor in great universities) rather than the old undiscipline
of
“patristics” (known as a discipline, to be sure, in theological schools,
but only
there), it can only be for the good that he is seen in a wider, richer,
less
ideologically predictable context. We are still a long way from forgetting,
however, if we could ever forget, that the Augustine of history was
associated
with people and movements and ideas whose later history has been linked
through the generations to living social organizations well beyond
the
academy’s walls. To know Augustine of the fourth century historically
requires us to forget all the other Augustines encountered along the
way
since.*5 The study of Chrysostom or Jerome or Cosmas Indicopleustes
requires a far less vigorous effort of forgetting.
But to see Augustine without his futures, to see him in
his own time,
remains a great challenge.
One discipline that has brought less to the table for Augustinian
studies
than all would have hoped fifty years ago is archaeology, and the limitations
here are purely external. Despite the good work of the UNESCO Carthage
excavations of two decades ago, Augustine’s own sites remain essentially
unexplored since Marec’s work of half a century ago at Hippo.*6 But
Tagaste
may be lost irrevocably, and the high plains of north Africa remain
now
unexploited for fully sixty years, since World War II, for all that
they clearly
contain sites and opportunities of great interest for the history of
Roman
Africa, Augustine’s own time not least of all. In this regard, Augustinian
studies and studies of Roman Africa are decidedly backwards, compared
say
to study of Roman Britain or (even more pertinently) to what has been
done
with the study of early medieval Italy in the last generation.
But any report on Augustinian studies runs the risk of
resembling the old
Monty Python sketch about “news for parrots.” There is a wider world
yet of
debate and discovery in humanistic studies with whose fate our studies
are
inevitably bound up. I will confine myself to one, not quite prognostication
perhaps expectation is the better word—in that domain.
Augustine writes often and with great care about the nature
and function
of the human soul. From the Soliloquia of 387 to the last pages against
Julian
forty and more years later, it was important for him to know and say
what he
could about the immortality, the immateriality, and the peccabilities
of the
soul. So much is obvious even to the superficial reader. But what is
less
obvious, and has been if anything beclouded by the last generation’s
quarrels
over particular doctrinal points (what did Augustine really think of
the origin
of the soul?), is the extent to which his deployment of the notion
of soul was
part of a broad late antique movement that has continued to shape Western
thought ever since. Plato and Aristotle may be credited with having
disciplined
earlier Greek notions, but Augustine and his late antique Christian
and
Platonic counterparts gave new reality and experiential sense to the
soul.*7 If
the Confessions are indeed “the first modern biography” in any useful
sense,
it is because they assume that the soul is a scene of narrative, and
that the
narrative of the soul is the deepest and truest story of the person.
Augustine
tells us his version of his own such story, and no biographer from
his day to
this can possibly escape its sway.
But that form of story-telling depends on a particular
configuration of
“soul.” The soul must be a unity that has lost its coherence and seeks
in life to
regain it: whether the interpretative structure is Augustinian or Freudian,
the
fundamental assumption is the same. But if instead, as serious cognitive
scientists now argue, the notion of “soul” disappears behind the rigorous
analysis of multiple seats of activity in the brain and endocrinological
system,
all of which contribute to the lived experience that Augustine interpreted
as
evidence for “soul,” then readers of Augustine are presented with both
challenge and opportunity. On the one hand, our connivance with Augustine
and his heirs, evinced every time we tell a life-story or talk about
their
theology, is called into question. If it is not a question of how the
soul exists
but whether, and whether any unitary mind/soul/personality can be posited,
then much of what we say as humanistic scholars in many disciplines
is
suddenly rendered questionable. But as students of Augustine, we have
the
opportunity to engage the skeptical materialist in conversation. We,
if no one
else, understand the theoretical underpinnings and the plausibility
of the
construction they gave rise to. No one can or should predict what the
imagined configuration of the human personality of the mid-twenty-first
century will be or should be, but the issue is one that must be faced.
And to
bring current debate and discovery back into Augustinian studies cannot
but, I
think, be fruitful.
Notes
1. Peter Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine
(London: Faber and Faber, 1972) 16.
2. André Mandouze, Saint Augustin: L’aventure de la raison et
de la grâce
(Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968) 28.
3. On these letters and sermons, see the afterword in Brown, Augustine
of
Hippo: A Biography, new edn. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2000) 441–81. But note also the work of P.-M. Hombert (below, note
4),
who begins already to subvert the chronology that Dolbeau established
and
that Brown depends on.
4. (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2000).
5. It’s an old battle. At the “premier colloque international sur saint
Augustin”
held in Algiers and Annaba/Hippo in April 2001, André Mandouze
spoke of
the long struggle that he and Henri Marrou had carried out “against
Augustinianisms and for Augustine”; virtually those very words can
be found
in Marrou’s Saint Augustin et l’augustinisme (Paris: Seuil, 1955) 180.
[See
also James J. O’Donnell, “The Authority of Augustine,” The 1991 Saint
Augustine Lecture at Villanova University, Augustinian Studies 22 (1991):
7–35.]
6. For an impressionistic glimpse of the sites today, see my trip report
on the
Algiers/Annaba conference at http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/algeria.
7. No treatment I know of the ancient history of the “soul” carries
the story
from pre-Socratics to late patristic figures: it is an important stretch
of cultural
history left unconnected in fragments of specialized studies.