by Shamim Rashid

Wendell Phillips, an American abolitionist, once said: "Revolutions are not made. They come . . . (Fischer 181).

The Islamic Revolution in Iran was considered by most to have begun on February 1, 1979, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran from fourteen years of exile in France (Wright 216). The political situation before Khomeini's return, however, is often ignored. Before the formation of the "Islamic Republic," Iran was subjected to the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty. Established in 1925 when Reza Khan crowned himself first "shah," or king, of the Pahlavi Dynasty (Bakhash 10), the monarchy became an important factor in the tumult that followed. Reza Khan was forced to abdicate the throne to his son, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, and live the rest of his life in exile. Because of serious opposition to this rule (Wright 17) he died in South Africa in 1944 (17). Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi's regime made no significant changes in political structure, and it was during his rule that the foundation for the Islamic Republic was laid.

The emergence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini "was a response to domestic issues that had simmered throughout the century as well as to international trends in the postwar period" (40). Domestic issues and foreign interferences were dividing the shah from his subjects, and the Iranian people were ready to escape from his grasp. "...Khomeini personified the political, social, and moral upheaval that energetically addressed the fundamental questions of existence for both the Iranian individual and the Iranian state in the twentieth century" (40). Wendell Phillips maintained that " . . . a revolution is as natural a growth as an oak. It comes out of the past. Its foundations are laid back in history" (Fischer 181). The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran was caused by domestic disputes, such as serious opposition to the shah, and the presence of foreign influences rather than Ayatollah Khomeini's return from exile.

The primary cause of the Islamic Revolution was the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's oppressive regime. The shah, who "commanded an army of four hundred thousand soldiers, a large police force, and a fearsome secret police, SAVAK, with four thousand full-time agents and scores of part-time informers" (Bakhash 9), created terror in the hearts of the Iranian people. The shah initially limited the powers of and later abolished independent political parties (10). The shah arranged for his government's takeover of public schools and universities, business groups, and religious and other private organizations (11). He even controlled the media and the parliament (10). In addition to nationalization of private organizations, the shah and his bureaucracy "forced villagers to sell their farmland and often razed entire villages" (11) to supposedly build a more efficient agro-industry. Middle class private homes were bulldozed and destroyed to "make way for new streets and avenues" (11). An analyst of the Iranian Revolution describes how the shah "showed the Iranians no compassion and no empathy" (12). The constant tightening of control by the shah caused typical citizens oblivious to politics to find "the bureaucracy increasingly involved in their lives" (11). As a result of the numerous government violations against the people's rights, riots erupted in 1977 (11), well before Ayatollah Khomeini's return from exile in France.

The Iranian people were further disturbed by foreign support for the shah and his dictatorial regime. Bakhash describes how "the shah had the support of both great powers, the western European states, his immediate neighbors, and the Arab States of the Persian Gulf" (10) prior to his overthrow. Khomeini best presents the dispute between the shah's regime and the Iranians:

"Is there monarchy, hereditary rule, or succession to the throne in Islam? How can this happen in Islam when we know that the monarchic rule is in conflict with the Islamic rule and with the Islamic political system?" (Khomeini 9)

Khomeini's argument is representative of the Iranian people because they are predominantly Muslim, or followers of Islam. Islam is not merely a religion to Muslims, but should be integrated into all aspects of life. For the true Muslim, there is no separaton of church and state. It is thus that the Iranian people as a whole could not remain under a dictatorial monarchy and its oppressive laws. But oppressive is an understatement to Khomeini who believes that the pre-revolutionary Iranian monarchial laws were "imported from England and Belgium and copied from the constitutions of the European countries" (9). Khomeini further claims that Belgian embassy agents "copied those laws and corrected their defects from the group of French and British laws, adding to them some Islamic laws for the purpose of camouflage and deception" (9). Khomeini's disagreement with the European influence of the pre-revolutionary laws was that the principles they promoted were "alien to Islam and [were] in conflict with it" (9). Khomeini's claims are supported by Shaul Bakhash, who describes how the shah's father (Reza Shah) attempted to westernize Iran and "adopted the European style law codes and established a system of secular courts" (Bakhash 21) that disregarded Islamic principles.

Not only were the Iranian people subjected to the rule of a dictator, but they were constricted by laws that did not even match their ethnic and religious background. The most demeaning influence forced upon the Iranian people was the adoption of western clothing styles. The shah's father, Reza Khan, started a campaign to imitate rich and powerful Europeans through clothing (Munson 48). In many cases, women were forbidden to wear their required veils, and religious scholars were told to abandon their robes (Fischer 186). "Reza Khan's clothing laws affected all Iranians and violated the basic values of most" (Munson 48).

Foreign interference did not end with western clothing and basic law. Many outside influences have had a significant impact on Iran. During World War II, the country was occupied by Great Britain, Russia, and the United States (Munson 49). "By the 1970s," according to Robin Wright, "Iranians increasingly appeared to be looking outward, not inward" (Wright 40-41). Foreign influences may not necessarily have a negative effect on a country, but they certainly did for Iran during the reign of the shah. Mesmerized by dreams of a more modern, western Iran, the shah became the protectorate of western interests in the Middle East (Dreyfuss 16), particularly to the United States: "Prior to the Khomeini era, Iran seemed to be an oasis of stability in an otherwise volatile Middle East - a staunch political ally and a seemingly insatiable market for the products of American military-industrial complex" (Esposito 120). This alliance, however, proved economically detrimental to Iran because "London and Washington also intended to prevent Iran from engaging in policies that in any way might threaten the exclusive hegemony of the Anglo-American oil and financial interests" (Dreyfuss 16). The shah's hopes of modernization grew to promises of a "Great Civilization" (Bakhash 12) through an intentional raise in oil prices (12). Although Iran's revenues multiplied drastically, the shah engaged in an overzealous spending spree (12). It was this 1974 skyrocket in oil prices that marked the beginning of the decline of the Iranian economy. According to Bakhash, "the benefits of the [momentary] economic boom were not evenly spread" (12): the city dwellers fared better than those of the countryside, and "housing conditions in large urban centers declined for the lower income groups" (12). Prices for food, shelter, and other necessities increased dramatically while "ships waited for months for their turn to unload cargo at Iranian ports," yielding massive shortages of goods as well as electricity (13). The Iranian people were not only subjected to political strife: they were beginning to suffer the stifling economic effects of tyranny. The distance between social classes grew along with mass resentment of the shah and his allies.

In addition to economic gain, the United States manipulated Iran while it was on the brink of revolution for political advantages. The response of the Iranian people toward the shah's motives was achieved through Islam. The United States capitalized upon this through a "developing alliance between the White House and the Muslim Brotherhood [a group which acted as the liaison between revolutionaries] and aiming this strategy at the Soviet Union" (Dreyfuss 4). Dreyfuss explains former National Security Chief Zbigniew Brzezinski's public view was that "Islamic fundamentalism [was a] "bulwark against communism" (5). Although Khomeini claimed that efforts were exerted "to import western laws to replace the laws of Islam," he also stated that a major focus of western foreign policy "was to defeat the Russian influence in Iran" (Khomeini 10). Dreyfuss extends the theory of American involvement in Iran to say that the United States actually staged the overthrow of the shah (Dreyfuss 3). It is not certain whether the United States intentionally aided in the overthrow of the shah and "put Khomeini into power" (2). But the United States certainly manipulated the shah like a puppet: "Throughout the crisis, he waited for the United States to tell him what to do" (Bakhash 17).

In Washington, however, "counsels were divided: the State Department . . . believed the shah should negotiate with the opposition [while] Brzezinski . . . believed that the shah should be told that he would have US support for whatever measures he thought necessary to restore order" (17). The shah's indecisiveness and the conflicting advice from meddlers in Washington opened opportunities for the Iranian people to rebel without suffering the consequences. They were tired of political, social, and economic hardships from the shah and his hypocritical allies. To the Iranian people, the United States was a symbol of hypocrisy. Whereas Amnesty International "issued its report charging brutality and torture of political prisoners by the shah of Iran" (Dreyfuss 16), the Carter administration was involved in the supply of arms and ammunition, and " . . . behind the scenes deals with traitors in the shah's military" (2).

The Iranians were no longer tolerant of the shah's policies, which contradicted Islamic principles. Because "constitutional methods of opposition against the shah were ineffective" (Bakhash 10), the Iranians were pushed "toward an increasingly radical position" (10). They were ready to struggle for good against evil; "The Iranians themselves might not be qualified to call themselves pure, but the enemy certainly was evil" (Carlsen 8).

The emotions and fortitude necessary for the Islamic Revolution were already set in place before Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France. The Iranians were ready to fight evil, and for the Ayatollah, "everything was separated into good and evil; each struggle in the world fell into the categorization of the oppressed fighting against the oppressors" (7). Iranians were tired of the political, social, and economic manipulation of Iran. "Iranians wanted change, and the Ayatollah's return marked the moment for catharsis" (Wright 37). The Islamic Revolution was caused by public emotions of political, social, and economic opposition to the shah rather than Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran.

Bakhash, Shaul. The Reign of the Ayatollahs. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984.

Dreyfuss, Robert. Hostage to Khomeini. New York: New Benjamin Franklin House Publishing Company, 1980.

Esposito, John L. Islam and Politics. 2nd ed. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987.

Fischer, Michael M. J. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah. Islamic Government. New York: Manor Books, Inc., 1979.

Munson, Henry. Islam and the Revolution in the Middle East. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1988.

The Snowman Press. A Personal Meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini: Islam and the Self. Pamphlet. Vancouver, British Columbia: Boyd Press Inc., 15 July 1982.

Wright, Robin. In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989.