1. Liv. 31.3.1. Thiel, Studies, p. 220, brings up and dismisses earlier scholarship questioning this passage's authenticity; his work accepted by John Briscoe, A Commentary on Livy Books XXXI-XXXIII (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973, Paperback ed. with addenda and corrigenda, 1989), p. 60. G. T. Griffith, "An Early Motive for Roman Imperialism (201 B.C.)," Cambridge Historical Journal 5 (1935) 1-14, believed that Philip's claim to have won both battles backfired on him.

2. Lib. 31.3.4. Aurelius was a legatus who had been in the region since 203, Liv. 30.26.4. Thiel doubts the passage, Studies, p. 220; but Briscoe, XXXI, pp. 61-3, accepts it without comment.

3. Polyaen. 4.18.2; Fron. Str. 3.8.1; Liv. 31.14.11; Walbank, Philip, p. 129.

4. Liv. 33.18.1; Walbank, Philip V, p. 129.

5. Liv. 31.14.7-11; Walbank, Philip V, p. 129.

6. Syll.3 535; IG ii2 844.1; Austin no. 88, pp. 157-8 with scholarship summary. The inscription honors Eumaridas from Cretan Cydonia for redeeming Athenians sold by an Aetolian raider in the Cretan slave market. Paus. 1.36 refers to an Athenian diplomatic offensive on Crete by one Cephisodorus aiming, apparently successfully, at turning Cretan towns against Macedon; cf. Ormerod, p. 150 n.

7. Plb. 16.26.9-10; IG ii2 2363; Liv. 31.14.5, to which a puzzling note in Sage's v. IX of the Loeb, "this is not confirmed by other testimony." Cf. McDonald and Walbank, 188-9.

8. Plb. 16.26.9; Liv. 31.15.7; Briscoe, p. 99. Berthold, Rhodes, p. 129 n.9, regarding Livy's clear statement of the Rhodian grant of isopolity, "it is extremely unlikely that Rhodes would ever have done such a thing." Rhodes was notoriously jealous of its citizenship, true, which this was not, unless an Athenian wished to exchange his homeland for Rhodes. Also, Athens was no more the average Greek city than the citizen who could afford to migrate to Rhodes was likely to be the average Athenian. Finally, the situation was not anything even remotely resembling normal circumstances.

9. Paus. 1.36.5-6. For Cephisodorus's career, see McDonald and Walbank, 200- 203.

10. Liv. 31.9.1-4; Briscoe, p. 79. McDonald and Walbank, 199, have problems in placing the passage, but not with this interpretation of it.

11. V. Gruen, Hellenistic World, 2.534; 2.382-398 for a survey and dismissal of all rival theories to explain Rome's declaration of war, based upon Gruen's strong faith in human rationality.

12. Liv. 31.5.5-6.

13. Plb. 16.28.3; Liv. 31.16.1; Walbank, Philip V, pp. 132-3, Commentary, pp. 538- 9.

14. Liv. 32.1.13 offers an inadvertent testimony to the age of at least one Roman unit, when he relates an omen reported by the naval commander Sulpicius in 199 that a laurel tree had grown on the stern of his warship. When the U.S.S. Iowa returned to service after thirty years in the mothball fleet, her wooden decks were covered with similar growth.

15. Thiel, Studies, pp. 206-19 offers a summary of Roman strategy, command, supply and resources.

16. lb. 16.29.1.

17. Liv. 31.16.4; Briscoe, pp. 110-101; Walbank, Philip V, p. 133.

18. Liv. 31.16.8.

19. C. G. Starr, "Rhodes and Pergamum," 64-65, followed with praise by Thiel, pp. 226-7; but doubted by Briscoe, p. 100. Van Gelder, p. 125, thought that Rhodes was lacking in energetic admirals after the death of Theophiliscus, but the Rhodian fleet was ably commanded after Lade.

20. Liv. 31.15.8.

21. Plb. 16.26.10 has Keos the initial destination for the Rhodian fleet departing Athens, while Berthold, Rhodes, p. 129 n. 9 notes the island's suitability for the suggested role. An inscription of uncertain date within the war alludes to a Kean-Rhodian naval alliance, C. Dunant and J. Thomopoulos, "Inscriptions de Ceos," Bulletin de correspondence hellénique 78 (1954): 338- 44.

22. Liv. 31.16.7. A dedication by the crews of a Rhodian warship on that island would seem to indicate that it was the Rhodian naval station in the area; von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 789; IG xii 2 640.

23. Plb. 16.31.3-4; Liv. 31.17.3-6.

24. Plb. 16.30.7; Liv. 31.17.3.

25. Plb. 16.31.5.

26. Cf. McDonald and Walbank, 64 n.65: "It likewise seems improbable that Philip had besieged Abydos so quickly and so unexpectedly that the two allies could not have aided it before its total investment."

27. Plb. 16.34.1; Liv. 31.16.8.

28. Plb. 16.35.1-2.

29. V. Starr, "Rhodes and Pergamum," 68; cf. Errington, Philopoemen, p. 85; Schmitt, p. 67 and n.

30. Plb. 16.34.10; Liv. 31.18.7.

31. Thiel, Studies, pp. 212, 219-20, 228.

32. Liv. 31.14.1-3, 4-7.

33. Liv. 31.22.7-8.

34. Thiel, Studies, p. 227, deriving the idea from Starr's argument concerning Abydos; Berthold, Rhodes, pp. 132-6, 135, "only three quadriremes," p. 140 "the attempt to play the sleeping partner." An account written strictly from the Rhodian point of view could make comments considerably more cutting about the lack of help given the Rhodians in their ongoing Asian war, v. infra.

35. Plb. 16.29.1-2.

36. Plb. 16.34.1; Liv. 31.16.8. Thiel, Studies, p. 230, believed that the presence of Attalus's troops in Athens, sent from Aegina, indicated the fleet's return from Asia after Abydos. In the face of Philip's unopposed ship-borne raids from Euboea, they might well signal the opposite. Livy has the dispatch of Cento's Roman squadron a reaction to these attacks, v. infra. Attalus's previous retreat to Pergamon after Chios is sufficiently suggestive of a second swift fleet withdrawal, reconstructed from the fragments though it is. At the end of the campaigning season of 199, under far less pressure in Thrace, Attalus again took his ships back to Asia, Liv. 31.47.2. Briscoe also accepts an Attalid withdrawal, p. 128.

37. Cf. Schmitt, pp. 69-70, for the difficulty in tracking Rhodes' fleet in this war.

38. Plb. 13.8.2; Liv. 34.32.18, 35.36.3; Walbank, Philip V, p. 110.

39. Liv. 31.15.8.

40. Flor. 1.23.8: "Aderat sponte in auxilium Attalus, rex Pergamenorum, aderant Rhodii, nauticus populus, qui navibus a mari, consul a terris omnia equis virisque quatiebat." Thiel, Studies, pp. 208-10, offers essentially the same tactical summary as Florus, although he is less generous to the Rhodian navy than was the Roman writer.

41. Cf. Thiel, Studies, pp. 229-230.

42. Liv. 33.23.1-3.

43. Liv. 31.23.1-8.

44. Liv. 31.23.9-10.

45. Liv. 31.24.1-4.

46. Liv. 31.24.15.

47. Liv. 31.24.18.

48. Liv. 31.36.4-13.

49. Liv. 31.28.4: "Ad Rhodos quoque missi legati ut capesserent partem belli." This quote, too, is used by the "cool ally" school, e.g., Thiel, p. 232.

50. Liv. 31.46.6. Briscoe, p. 155, discusses the appearance of the admiral's name in the Livy manuscripts, where it appears as Acesimbrotus, contrary to its spelling in Plb. 18.1.4, 2.3, and Syll.3 673.

51. Liv. 31.40.10, 44.1; Thiel, Studies, pp. 213, 220, 234. Thiel's estimates of the size and composition of the Roman fleet in this war are well-reasoned and well-informed.

52. Plb. 18.38.6-9; Liv. 33.13.9-12; Briscoe, pp. 153, 273; Thiel, Studies, pp. 234-5; cf. Walbank, Commentary, 2.599-600.

53. Liv. 31.45.10; Briscoe, p. 153. There is irony in Philip's own bases being under the assault of his favored lemboi, but it also testifies to the ship type's utility for amphibious raids.

54. Liv. 31.28.6, 45.12; D.C. 18.58.5/Zon. 9.15-16; Thiel, Studies, p. 233.

55. Liv. 31.45.14-46.5.

56. Liv. 31.33.1-3. Thiel, Studies, p. 233 n. 168 feels that this statement does not "square with the facts," but Livy is discussing Philip's expectations for the coming season--not his admiral's ability to carry them out.

57. Liv. 31.46.7-8, "Heracleides, praefectus regius, classem ibi [Demetrias] tenebat, magis per occasionem, si quam neglegentia hostium dedisset, quam aperta vi quicquam ausurus."

58. Liv. 31.46.7: "ut, si quid inde moverent Macedonum naves, in praesidio essent."

59. Thiel, Studies, p. 237, goes so far as to explain Heracleides' reluctance to attack the Rhodians precisely in this way.

60. Thiel, Studies, pp. 203-5, 229, estimates Philip's fleet as more than twenty capital units and "a great number of lembi;" while Walbank, Philip V, p. 147, makes his own calculations from the Chios figures and comes to twenty-five capital units and eighty lemboi. The number of the latter was probably much lower. There would have been constant attrition from wear, storms, destruction of bases such as Chalcis (which was such a base for the raids on Attica) and chance encounters with larger enemy warships.

61. Liv. 32.5.7; D.S. 28.9.1.

62. Liv. 31.46.9-16.

63. Liv. 31.40.9-10; Thiel, Studies, pp. 239, 243-4; Walbank, Philip V, p. 149.

64. Liv. 32.6.8, 7.8-12.

65. Liv. 32.16.1-5. For clarity's sake, Lucius is referred to as "Quinctius" in the following narrative, leaving his more celebrated brother the family cognomen. For the admiral's character and competence, heavily colored by Cato's later enmity, see Plu. Flam. 18.2-19.4. His performance as admiral seems to have been satisfactory enough.

66. Liv. 32.16.6.

67. Liv. 32.8.9-16.

68. Liv. 32.27.1.

69. Walbank, Philip V, pp. 321-2 provides a summary of views on Antiochus's raid north, including efforts to dismiss it as an invention; v. also Briscoe, p. 183, for more recent scholarship.

70. Liv. 32.16.10: "Eretria summa vi oppugnabatur; nam et trium junctarum classium naves omnis generis tormenta machinasque ad urbium excidia secum portabant." Thiel, Studies, p. 241, n, 218, argues that the transports would have brought up considerable apparatus, but Livy does go on to say that equipment was built on the spot. The warships' own artillery and perhaps gangways and shields for landing on the harbor walls would fulfill the requirements of Livy's Latin.

71. Liv. 32.16.14-16; Thiel, Studies, p. 242.

72. Liv. 32.17.3-4.

73. Liv. 34.32.18-20; Thiel, Studies, pp. 247-49.

74. Liv. 31.18.4-5.

75. Liv. 32.17.13-16, 23.4-10.

76. Liv. 32.23.11-12.

77. Casson, Ships, pp. 125-7.

78. Liv. 32.19.4, 23.1-3; App. Mac. 7. The Achaeans had been promised Corinth as the price of turning against Philip, but could hardly complain to the Romans after their own troops had arrived during the siege and also failed to take the site.

79. Liv. 32.25.1-2.

80. Liv. 32.23.13.

81. Plb. 18.1.1-2; Liv. 32.32.9; for the pristis see Casson, Ships and Seamanship, p. 127 and nn.

82. Plb. 18.1.6-11; Liv. 32.32.12-15.

83. Plb. 18.2.3-4; Liv. 32.33.6-7; Walbank, Commentary, 2.513, 529-30; Briscoe, pp. 228, 232-3. Philip had apparently mopped up Sestos in his final campaign in 200. Fraser and Bean apparently exclude Iasos and Bargylia from their bounds for the Peraea.

84. Plb. 18.4.1; Liv. 32.34.1 (Polybius verbatim).

85. Plb. 18.7.8; Liv. 32.35.2-4..

86. Plb. 18.6.3; Liv. 32.35.10-11, D.S. 28.11.1; App. Mac. 8.1. Torr, Rhodes, p. 19 notes that the offer to return the Peraea proper might have been another try at convincing Rhodes to accept a separate peace.

87. cf. Ormerod, pp. 133-5.

88. IG xi 4 751/Syll.3 582. The demos that dispatched Epicrates is shown to be that of Rhodes by the following inscription.

89. IG xi 4 752 and IG xi 4 753. Telemmnestos son of Aristeides would be a likely Rhodian proxenos.

90. Cf. von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 789.

91. Just. 30.4.1 for the cone and the date; Plu. Mor. 399c for the prophecy.

92. Str. 1.3.15 (57); v. von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 788, noting that at some time in this period a citizen of Lindos received a statue from the people of Thera.

93. Just. 30.40.2. A true volcanic quake would probably have not extended to Rhodes, but movement on a fault line could have allowed the release of lava from the Thera magma reserve; v. Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geology (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 78-9, 85- 89.

94. Liv. 33.18.3, 5. At least some of the Achaean troops appear to have been an regular unit under their own commander, Theoxenus, who dedicated with them a silver bowl listed in several decades' worth of inventories at Delos, probably on their way home; v. Van Gelder, p. 465, the inscriptions mentioning it beginning with ID ii 396, dated to 194; and cf. G. T. Griffith, Mercenaries, p. 91, who believes that this was not a mercenary unit.

95. Griffith, Mercenaries, pp. 90-91; One wonders how Thiel, a Dutchman, would have reacted to this observation, if it had come to his attention in this or any other context. For Rhodes' army and the Rhodians' distaste for shore duty, v. Torr, Rhodes, p. 58.

96. IG xii 1 1036/Syll.3 586; IG xii 1 202; Ath. Mitt. 15, 334, 3. All applicable inscriptions are quoted in the notes to Syll.3 586.

97. Polyaen. 5.27. Livy is essentially in agreement with Polyaenus, as praetors and propraetors traditionally functioned as Roman admirals, v. Thiel, Studies, pp. 216-219. Whatever Pausistratus' actual rank was during the land war with Philip V, he died an admiral fighting Antiochus III, v. infra, Pt. 3.

98. Liv. 33.18.8-22.

99. Liv. 33.18.22; Plb. 18.48.1.

100. Plb. 18.44.6, Plu. Flam. 9.5; Liv. 33.30.5: "et naves omnes tectas tradere praeter quinque et regiam unam inhabilis prope magnitudinis." There is a problem in Polybius's and Appian Mac. 3's use of the term for the "naves tectas" of which Livy speaks. The term is traditionally applied to a harbor tug, ship's boat, or a river vessel, Casson, Ships, p. 248 n. 93, 330, 336, although Appian's Greek is more certain than Polybius's that these vessels did have their upper oarbanks covered. Cf. Briscoe, p. 306. A vital clue might be Dem. 32.6 and 34.10, where the small boat towed behind a warship is called a lembos, as they were skaphai, Heliod. Aeth. 5.24.2. If the word "tender" is used to approximate both terms, then these vessels in this context would be the large consorts of Demetrius's old flagship, built to fight Ptolemy II's and Lysimachus's monsters, but in 196 too large for Philip's or anybody else's style of naval warfare.

101. App. Mac. 9.3; Briscoe, p. 306.

102. Plb. 18.46.5; Liv. 33.34.10.

103. Plb. 18.41.1-10 for Attalus's eulogy. The king had suffered a stroke at a council of war in Elatea, Liv. 33.2.2; and been returned by his fleet to Pergamon before his death there in 196, Liv. 33.21.1.

104. Liv. 31.45.7-8, 33.30.10-11; Thiel, Studies, pp. 234, 250, Briscoe, pp. 153, 308.

105. Contra Thiel, p. 249, n. 255.

106. Liv. 32.38.1-9; Just. 30.4.5; Walbank, Philip V, pp, 164-5; Errington, Philopoemen, pp. 87-9.

107. Liv. 32.39.30-40.3, 34.32.18-20; Just. 31.3.2.

108. Plb. 16.36.1-37.7, 18.17.1-5; Liv. 32.40.10-11; Plu. Philo. 12.4-5.

109. Liv. 31.32.4-34.7, 26.10; Plu. Flam. 13.1-3.

110. Liv. 34.35.9, 36.3-4. Errington, Philopoemen, pp. 40-45 offers his own speculations about the extent of Nabis's role on Crete, and v. supra, Ch. 5, Pt. 2.

111. Liv. 34.25.6-12.

112. Liv. 34.26.8-11.

113. Liv. 34.26.11. Leucas was the Roman navy's new base in the Adriatic, Thiel, Studies, p. 247.

114. Starr, 65-67, Thiel, Studies, p. 226, 235.

115. Liv. 34.30.7; cf. Zon. 9.18. Von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 791; again divides this number by three, hearkening back to the old tactical division of Rhodian ships into three- ship sub-flotillas (v. supra, Ch.2, Pt. 1). It would be tempting to see that operating here and in the three ships at Athens in 199, but two ships could have been detached from the previous "Western Fleet" of twenty to reach that number. On the other hand, the fleet numbers of the Syrian war often show the same divisibility.

116. Liv. 34.29.1.

117. Liv. 34.28.4-6; Thiel, Studies, p. 252, n. 273, working from an estimated average of 250 men per major fleet unit plus the crews of the lighter vessels.

118. A triemiolia, M. Segrè, "Dedica votiva dell' equipaggio di una nave rodia," Clara Rhodos 8 (1932): 228; Lionel Casson, Ships, pp. 306-9 for his additions to Segrè's scholarship on the crews of Rhodian vessels.

119. Liv. 34.19.5-13.

120. Liv. 34.34.1-37.5. Flamininus may have had some desire to spare the historic city itself.

121. Liv. 34.38.4.

122. Liv. 34.38.3-40.7.

123. Liv. 34.35.5-10. These provisions make Thiel, Studies, p. 253-4, doubt the supposed Rhodian "pacification" of Crete he had previously accepted. The Romans would have been more acceptable than the Rhodians to what was left of the koinon.

124. Liv. 34.40.7, 40.10-11; Thiel, Studies, p. 254.

125. Plb. 3.2.8, 15.20.2, 16.1.8; Liv. 31.14.5; App. Mac. 4.1; Trog. Prol. 30; Just. 30.2.8; FGrH 260 F45 (Porphyry), FHG iv. 558. For the modern scholarship, see Walbank, Philip V, pp. 113-4, Commentary, 2.471-3; Briscoe, pp. 37-9; McDonald and Walbank, 182-4. The doubters include Errington, Macedonia, p. 197, p. 291, n. 18, and Gruen, Hellenistic World, pp. 387-8. Will, 2.115-6 supplies all arguments. Objections center around the lack of active co-operation by the agreeing parties and their eventual shared failure--reasons sufficient to doubt the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis of the Second World War.

126. Schmitt, p. 84: "der kranke Mann am Nil."

127. Van Gelder, p. 126-7; Berthold, Rhodes, pp. 119-124. Both defenders have the advantage of analyzing the Rhodians' decisions from the perspective of the people who made them.

128. Plb. 5.62.2-3, 16.2.9, and above, Chapter 5, Part 3.

129. Plb. 5.69.7-11.

130. Plb. 5.63.1-65.11, 86.1-6; Mahaffy, pp. 250, 264-6.

131. Green, pp. 289-297, for a succinct summary of these years.

132. Plb. 16.18.5-19.11; Just. 31.1.1-2; Joseph. AJ 12.130; Mahaffy, pp. 292- 3.

133. Liv. 33.19.8-10; Green, pp. 289-297.

134. Plb. 18.39.3; Liv. 33.19.8-11, D.C. 18.60; FGrH 260 (Porphyry of Tyre) F 46; Will, 2.118-9. An interesting passage from Maccabees, 4.19, alludes to Jewish supporters of Antiochus taking up a subscription to fit out five triremes for him at around this time.

135. Thiel, Studies, p. 255 "undoubtedly at Flamininus's instigation;" Berthold, Rhodes, pp. 140-141.

136. Liv. 33.19.10; Casson, Ships, pp. 163-5; to be preferred to Briscoe, pp. 285- 6.

137. Liv. 33.20.1-3, Plu. Cim. 13.4 for the original treaty, apart from all subsequent argument concerning it.

138. Liv. 30.20.6.

139. Briscoe, p. 286.

140. Plb. 18.41b.1, absent from the Loeb edition, , , ' µ µ µ .

141. Thiel, Studies, p. 255.

142. E.g., Will, 2.182.

143. Liv. 33.19.6-7, 20.3; cf. Walbank, Philip V, p. 174.

144. Briscoe, p. 286, quoted in Berthold, Rhodes, p. 141, n. 37. Schmitt, pp. 75-7, has a somewhat better-informed view of Antiochus's and Rhodes' situation and goals. Cf. Will, 2.181-2.

145. Cf. Polybius's critique of Zeno and Antisthenes, 16.14.3-20.8, in which Polybius goes so far as to mention his correcting correspondence with Zeno; v. supra, Ch. 1, Pt. 2.

146. Liv. 33.20.7.

147. Liv. 33.20.8-9.

148. Liv. 33.20.12-13. Walbank's claim, Philip V, p. 177, that Antiochus's subsequent continued advance into Asia Minor was "in collusion" with the Rhodians is a bit much, particularly when he notes that Eumenes for his part kept the Senate continuously informed of each step of Antiochus's advance towards the Hellespont. After the Romans' wholesale withdrawal from Greece by 194, both Rhodes and Pergamon were doing what they could and awaiting their moment. Walbank, Commentary, 2.602-3, bases his conspiracy theory upon Antiochus's "gift" of Stratonicea, which the Rhodians had held before he expelled the Macedonian garrison and returned it to them. To have retained it would have been a hostile act, cf. Berthold, Rhodes, 83-5. Walbank also misdates Ephesus to this period in the face of the epigraphic evidence, v. supra, Ch. 4, Pt. 2.

149. Liv. 33.41.1-9.

150. App. Syr. 24, " ." For his earlier career, Plb. 10.29.6, and above, Chapter 4, Part 2.

151. Liv. 37.10.1, at the Panhormus disaster, where he fooled Pausistratus into a belief that he would surrender his fleet in exchange for repatriation, v. infra, Pt. 3. Livy's statement in that passage that Polyxenidas was aware of a personal insult delivered against him in council at Rhodes certainly indicates that he had maintained some connections with his native island.

152. See Thiel, Studies, pp. 273-6, although he should have noted Antiochus's 218 conquest of Tyre in assessing the length of the Seleucid naval build-up. Cf. von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 791.

153. The suspicion is Rostovtzeff's, Social and Economic, 2.608-9, 3.1460, citing Syll.3 604.

154. Liv. 33.38.1-8.

155. Plb. 18.52.1-4, contra Walbank, Commentary, 2.623; cf. von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 791.

156. Liv. 33.20.12-13.

157. For the garrison commander, [ ] µ on Tenos, see IG xii 5 830, lines 11-12; the man's exact role disputed in Fraser and Bean, p. 168; for the Rhodian rose on Tenos and Cythnos's coinage, see Donald V. Sippel, "Tenos and the Nesiotic League." Ancient World 13 (1986) 43-6; for the league proxeny, IG xii 5 817, lines. 18-19; Fraser and Bean, p. 170; for the land dispute between Samos and Priene, see Syll.3 599/I. Priene 37; Berthold, Rhodes, p. 149, and for all of this von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 791.

158. Liv. 37.12.9.

159. Liv. 34.58.4-6; App. Syr. 3.

160. App. Syr. 5 preserves Eumenes' grim and extremely accurate assessment of his prospects before the war. Pergamon received its most advanced and intricate fortifications during the reign of Eumenes II; see Hansen, p. 84, n. 5. The prevailing theory there quoted that Eumenes' lengthy and intricate perimeter dates from the years after the war cannot be sustained in the light of Eumenes' earlier tactical situation. Between the threat of Antiochus's attacks and bad relations with his neighbors, Eumenes had pressing reasons to fortify at the moment of his accession.

161. Thiel, Studies, p. 298, although he also recognizes the tactical reasons for the delay; Berthold calls the interbellum, with Antiochus moving towards both the Hellespont and Egypt, "the present satisfactory strategic position of the island," p. 150.

162. Liv. 34.58.2-3; D.S. 28.15.3.

163. Liv. 35.13.1, 25.1-7; Thiel, Studies, p. 283.

164. Liv. 36.26.5-9; Plu. Philo. 14.30; Errington, Philopoemen, pp. 102-4.

165. Liv. 35.30.12-13; Plu. Philo. 14.4-7; Errington, Philopoemen, pp. 106- 109.

166. Liv. 35.35.1-19; Plu. Philo. 15.2.

167. Liv. 35.31.4; Berthold, Rhodes, p. 153.

168. Liv. 35.43.3, 50.7, 36.8.1,; App. Syr. 12; Thiel, Studies, pp. 273, 287, and Thiel, always careful in reckoning all sides' fleet strengths, calls this "only part of his fleet," as Livy's phrasing also makes clear.

169. Liv. 35.20.12, 37.4.5, Thiel, Studies, pp. 264-6, accepted by John Briscoe, A Commentary on Livy: Books XXXIV-XXXVII (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 174-5.

170. For the fleet's limited achievements, Liv. 35.50.10; Thiel, Studies, 285-8 believes that the fleet's marines tried and failed to reach Chalcis overland; for Demetrias, Liv. 36.20.5-6, 33.7; for the younger Scipio, Liv. 35.34.5-7, which also preserves a less dishonorable (to the fleet) story of P. Scipio's capture on land, the older story preserved in App. Syr. 29 and D.S. 29.8.1. Philip at Demetrias was in the pleasant position of being able to hurt Antiochus, by seizing the city, and the Romans, by letting vital warships escape, while resuming control of his great- grandfather's city and naval base to use for the next round of conquest, which he would not live to complete; see Walbank, Philip V, pp. 195-201, 207.

171. For analysis of Atilius's command strictly from the perspective of Roman politics, v. T. Corey Brennan, "C. Aurelius Cotta: Praetor Iterum," Athenaeum 77 (1987): 476-7.

172. Liv. 36.42.1-6; Thiel, Studies, p. 295.

173. Liv. 36.42.6.

174. Liv. 36.41.4-7; App. Syr. 21; Thiel, Studies, pp. 296-7.

175. Liv. 36.42.8; Thiel, with reason, heaps praise upon the Roman commander for decisiveness in making his decision while time remained to effect it, Studies, pp. 294. Briscoe, XXXIV, p. 281, thought that Livius would have had to have had orders from the Senate for the move, but Thiel, Studies, pp. 312-4, has provided ample evidence to show the Senate's lack of concern for any aspect of their aging fleet, so long as its services were not required by the army.

176. Liv. 36.43.2-3.

177. Liv. 36.45.5, listing twenty-five ships, App. Syr. 22, for twenty-seven-- nothing stronger or weaker than von Gaertringen's belief that the old "threes" division was in effect urges the higher number, "Rhodos," col. 777.

178. Liv. 36.43.11-12.

179. Liv. 36.43.4-9.

180. Liv. 36.43.10: "the fleet made for Cissus, the harbor of the Erythraeans, as if there it would more easily await the enemy."

181. Liv. 36.43.8; App. Syr. 22. Thiel, Studies, p. 301, for the idea of the night voyage from Chios to Phocaea and the requirement for pilots intimately acquainted with the Lycian coast.

182. Liv. 36.43.4-11, among such not Thiel, v. Studies, pp. 300-301. Polyxenidas had prevailed in council with the king to fight the allies separately at sea.

183. Thiel, Studies, pp. 301-2.

184. Liv. 36.43.6-8.

185. Liv. 36. 44.1, "ut appropinquare hostes adlatum est, occasione pugnandi laetus..."

186. Liv. 36.44.3-45.4; App. Syr. 22; for modern accounts, compare that of Rodgers, pp. 398-401 with Thiel's reaction to it, Studies, pp. 302-3.

187. Liv. 36.45.6.

188. Liv. 37.7.1-5; Thiel, Studies, pp. 295-6.

189. Liv. 36.45.6-7. App. Syr. 22 has the Rhodian fleet meeting the Romans at Chios, which would have required the Rhodians to leave the Syrian fleet between their native island and Rhodes. Thiel, Studies, p. 311 n. 410 explains the error as a careless abbreviation of Polybius.

190. Liv. 36.45.7-9.

191. Liv. 37.7.3-4; Thiel, Studies, p. 316.

192. Liv. 37.7.2; v. Thiel, Studies, p. 315 for the criticism. Rodgers, p. 401, as an American admiral familiar with the idea of a "mothball fleet," suggests that Hannibal was on his way to activate the Phoenicians' "reserve" fleet, which his popularity in the region might make a more voluntary and willing matter than an order from the latest conqueror, Antiochus. Hannibal had been received at Tyre during his flight from Carthage with every kind of honor, Liv. 33.49.5-6.

193. Liv. 37.9.5-11.

194. Liv. 37.10.1-3. Appian's account, Syr. 24, makes no mention of a personal vendetta between the two admirals. Either Appian or his copyist misspelled the names of Rhodian commanders throughout the narrative. Pausistratus is Pausimachus, Eudamus, Eudorus. Livy's transliterations are substantiated in each case by epigraphic evidence, v. infra.

195. Liv. 37.10.3-7.

196. Liv.

197. App. Syr. 24; Liv. 37.11.13.

198. Liv. 37.11.1-4.

199. Liv. 37.10.13-14; App. Syr. 24.

200. Plb. 21.7. For other analysis, see Rodgers, p. 405; Thiel, Studies, p. 320; and Casson, Ships, p. 123, who reproduces and translates the original Greek. His figure 115 is an Egyptian graffito of a ship mounting a similar, but not identical, device. Walbank, Commentary, 3.97 provides an "enhanced" reproduction of the graffito, from which he draws conclusions about the device's construction Casson forbore, in addition adding his own views on the Greek, 3.97-99.

201. The most spectacular use of such incendiary fluids was in the fire-ship that destroyed Alexander's first mole at Tyre, in which iron cauldrons suspended from the timber-carrier's yardarm upended and poured flaming material onto the conflagration, Arr. Anab. 2.19; cf. Curt. 5.3.2-4. For a survey of incendiary weapons in antiquity, see J. A. Partington, A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1960), pp. 1-9.

202. Liv. 37.11.4-5; App. Syr. 24.

203. Liv. 37.10.6; App. Syr. 24.

204. This problem is fully treated in Thiel, Studies, pp. 273-5, and his conclusions are accepted by Briscoe, XXXIV, p. 283 against A. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, "The Treaty of Apamea (188 B.C.): The Naval Clauses." Journal of Roman Studies 59 (1969), 32-3, n. 15, who are nonetheless also disturbed by the aphracts' subsequent disappearance from the narrative.

205. Thiel, Studies, pp. 318 n. 497, 351, 365-6 notes the intensity of piracy in this war, mostly directed against Roman positions and transport vessels, in Eastern as well as Western waters. V. infra for specific instances.

206. Plb. 21.42.13-18. Rostovtzeff also makes a connection between Antiochus's policies and increasing piracy in the Aegean and Propontis; Social and Economic, 2.610-11, 3.1460, citing this passage.

207. Liv. 37.11.7-8; App. Syr. 24.

208. Liv. 37.13-15; App. Syr. 24; van Gelder, p. 135.

209. , restored twice in Inscr. Lind. 264, from A. Maiuri, Annuario della reale scuola archeologica di Atene 2 (1916) 139, no. 10, a list of three associations of Dionysiac . Cf. von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 791; Berthold, Rhodes, pp. 154-5, n. 18.

210. Plb. 21.7.5-7, "on account possessing a certain energy and daring" vs. "having a more deliberate nature and being more resolute than reckless." Cf. van Gelder, p. 136; and Walbank, Commentary 3.99; making the correction from Liv. 37.12.9, a paraphrase. For Pamphilidas, v. infra.

211. Liv. 37.12.7-11, App. Syr. 25.

212. Liv. 37.11.14. The latter were probably the vessels Pausistratus had sent out earlier for supplies.

213. Liv. 36.45.8, 47.9.1-5.

214. Liv. 37.12.6: "praeda maxime hominum raptim in naves imposita tantum moratus."

215. Liv. 37.13.1-6.

216. Liv. 37.13.9-10 vs. App. Syr. 25, who mentions the need to improve the allies' morale. Seizing the plunder of an enemy's raiding expedition would make sense from a brigand's point of view.

217. Liv. 37.13.7-12, "clausumque iam mare commeatibus Italicis erat."

218. Liv. 37.13.11.

219. Liv. 37.14.1-2.

220. Liv. 37.2.10, 14.1-2; Thiel, Studies, pp. 326-7 for the conclusion, which results from the difference in ships leaving Italy and arriving at Piraeus. This flotilla did not touch at Delos.

221. Liv. 37.27.1, "id erat horreum Romanis, eoque omnes ex Italia missae onerariae derigebant cursum." Thiel, Studies, p. 327 is too conscientious in expressing uncertainty about whether inspecting the supply line was Regillus's purpose.

222. Livy 37.14.1.

223. Liv. 37.14.3.

224. Often emended to in tempestate, but as Briscoe, XXXIV, p. 313, points out, the wording is not disputed elsewhere in Livy, e.g., 38.5.8 and 40.9.7, and the phrase with a valid meaning appears elsewhere, see Cicero, In L. Calpurnium Pisonem Oratio, ed, R. G. M. Nisbet, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 164 on 92.30.3.

225. Thiel, Studies, p. 327, switches from the too dubious to the too certain when he tears into van Gelder, p. 137; and Rodgers, p. 407; for suggesting that the admiral he himself calls, passim, "the fool Regillus" would have needed an escort in from Chios. The commanders at Samos had no way of knowing how many or how few ships the newest admiral had around him, despite Thiel's assertion that Regillus's own two quinqueremes plus Epicrates' four ships were sufficient for safety.

226. Liv. 37.14.3; Thiel, Studies, p. 328, "naturally also by the ideal client king."

227. Liv. 37.14.4-6.

228. Thiel, Studies, pp. 329-330, alluding obliquely to the sinking of the Merrimac in the mouth of Santiago harbor in 1898, and the Japanese efforts at Port Arthur in 1905. The raising of the Baden from Scapa Flow in 1919, and the ships sunk in Otranto, Oran, Alexandria, and Pearl Harbor during WWII extend the parallels further.

229. Liv. 37.15.5-8, Thiel, Studies, pp. 330-331 for the plan's validity.

230. Liv. 37.16.3-14; Thiel, Studies, 331-3. If, as Livy says, the rowers were armed with whatever came to hand, "quibus quisque poterat telis," the Rhodians may have fought with their most famous (and portable) domestic weapon, the sling. See W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part V, Chapter 1: Stone Throwers and Slingers in Ancient Greek Warfare (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), p. 8, referring to Rhodian slingers at Syracuse, specifically, Th. 6.43; in the march of the 10,000; Xen. Anab. 3.4.15-18, where the Rhodians among them either had or improvised slings. On p. 24 Pritchett cites D.S. 5.18.3-4 and Curt. 5.6.18 for slings worn as belts or headbands. They could not only have been carried so on shipboard, then, but proved useful at sea or in just this sort of situation. Livy refers to an exchange with missilibus.

231. Liv. 37.17.4-8.

232. Liv. 37.17.1-10; Thiel, Studies, pp. 334, at his most scathing: "this parody of an admiral," while even Sage, the Loeb translator, (Vol. X, p. 340, n. 1) feels driven to remark "The Roman naval operations of this period seem peculiarly aimless."

233. Liv. 37.18.3, 8-10.

234. Plb. 21.10.1-14; Liv. 37.18.10-19.2; Zon. 9.20; App. Syr. 26; Thiel, Studies, p. 335. For the Rhodians' lukewarm willingness to negotiate, v. Berthold, Rhodes, p. 156, for the usual broader explanation of Rhodes' willingness to parley, cf. van Gelder, p. 138; Thiel, Studies, p. 336, n. 566, accepted by Briscoe, XXXIV p. 320.

235. Liv. 37.21.7-22.3. Regillus took the opportunity to loot Phocaea's shrines and temples at Bacchium, heretofore left unplundered by both sides.

236. Liv. 37.22.2-5.

237. Liv. 37.23.5. For the crewing of the polyremes, again see Casson, Ships, pp. 104-105.

238. Liv. 37.23.2-4; George E. Bean, Turkey's Southern Shore: An Archaeological Guide (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 158-9, with a map, more material on the site and ruins of Phaselis, and other ancient testimonia regarding the insalubrious marsh near the northern harbor, where the Rhodians would have awaited Hannibal as he came up the coast.

239. Liv. 37.23.2-6. Other sources for Side include Zon. 9.20; Nep. Han. 8.4, in which the Rhodians have superior numbers, App. Syr. 28, and Eutrop. 4.4.1. Casson, "The Ram and Naval Tactics, " in L. Casson and J. R. Steffy, eds., The Athlit Ram (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991), p. 81 n. 53 alludes to the blow that sank the "seven."

240. IG xii 1 41, from the 1st Century, notes the difference in the officer's career between service in the triemioliai and cataphractoi; as does an inscription published by M. Segrè, "Dedica votiva dell' equipaggio di una nave rodia," Clara Rhodos 8 (1932), 228 no. 8; cf. I. Lindos II no. 707, and for all see Casson, Ships, pp. 134, and n. 128, 309, and n. 39.

241. These might have been among the vessels presented to Livius's under- equipped expedition to Patara earlier in the year.

242. Liv. 37.23.5-6. Thiel, Studies, p. 340, n. 574 provides the reconciliation accepted by McDonald and Walbank, "The Treaty," p. 32; and Briscoe, XXXIV, p. 325.

243. Liv. 37.23.8-9.

244. Liv. 37.23.9-10; cf. Thiel, Studies, pp. 341-2; van Gelder, p. 138; and Fik Meijer, A History of Seafaring in the Classical World (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 180- 181.

245. Rodgers, p. 410, understands the necessity for a commander's haste in the face of superior numbers and looming disaster.

246. Eudamus remained in his command at least to 171, v. infra, Ch. 7, Pt. 2; cf. Walbank, Commentary, 3.99.

247. Liv. 37.23.9-11.

248. Thiel, Studies, p. 341; McDonald and Walbank, "The Treaty," 33-4.

249. Liv. 37.24.3-4. It would be an argumentum ex silentio to deduce that Apollonius was killed on board this likely flagship, but he does disappear from Livy's subsequent narrative and the loss of the commander would explain his command's demoralization and rout.

250. Liv. 37.23.8-9.

251. Liv. 37.24.8-10, "alius alium accusantes, quod cum potuisset, non omnis submersa aut capta classis hostium foret." It is possible that this talk resulted in the less-than- understanding phrasing of Livy 37.23.10-11 about Eudamus's beginning of the battle. Polybius, almost certainly Livy's ultimate source, had already announced his intention of seeking beyond the Rhodian official record; v. supra, Ch. 5, Pt. 3; Ch. 1 Pt. 2; but George Bean, Turkey, p. 151, notes that the waters off the southern coast of Asia Minor, although calm in the morning, grow rough towards evening. With damaged fair-weather ships and tired oarsmen to face a rising sea, Eudamus's failure to pursue becomes even more understandable.

252. Liv. 37.24.12-13.

253. Liv. 37.25.1, "si Rhodiis ea cura dempta fuisset, vacuos eos tuta eius regionis maria praestaturos."

254. Liv. 37.25.4-6; Plb. 21.11.1-10 survives, giving the Scipio brothers' counter arguments, which have a certain hollow quality in their list of enemies spared and kingdoms defeated but not yet annexed.

255. Liv. 37.25.3-4, 26.3-5.

256. Liv. 37.26.5-10.

257. The later fleet numbers at Myonessus suggest that Regillus had split the difference, or divided his fleet again in the face of the enemy. Probably fifty-three larger vessels and an unknown number of lighter craft went to join Eumenes at the Hellespont; with Regillus sending twenty-three of them from his forces at Samos; Thiel, Studies, pp. 349, 360. The Roman navy was going to support the Roman army at the cost of all other considerations or die trying.

258. Liv. 37.27.1-4.

259. Plb. 21.12.1; Liv. 37.27.4-6. The ships were lemboi and celoces, such as Antiochus had had in his fleet of 197, v. supra.

260. Liv. 37.27.1-28.1, 7.

261. Liv. 37.28.6-9.

262. Liv. 37.28.9.

263. Liv. 37.29.1, "egressi milites nautaeque sunt ad commeatus et vinum maxime dividendum in naves."

264. Liv. 37.29.3-5.

265. Liv. 37.30.1-2, App. Syr. 27.

266. Liv. 37.29.9.

267. Liv. 37.30.2, 6: "Robore navium et virtute militum Romani longe praestabant...Plurimum tamen, quae solet, militum virtus in bello valuit."

268. App. Syr. 27: " µ µ µ ."

269. App. Syr. 27; Rodgers, p. 416.

270. App. Syr. 27: " µ ." The best current definition of the epotis is to be found in Casson, Ships, pp. 85-6, 151, n. 78, 225-6, n. 5.

271. Liv. 37.30.1-2; App. Syr. 27; Berthold, Rhodes, p. 161, "the certain mark of Rhodian activity." Cf. Thiel, Studies, pp. 352, with two useful diagrams on pp. 353 and 354; Rodgers, pp. 412-417; and Meijer, pp. 182-3. Appian lists twenty-nine ships as the total Syrian casualties, but as Livy repeats the figure of forty-two in 40.52.6, it seems reasonable to suppose a conflation of the breakdown; v. Thiel, Studies, p. 356, n. 624.

272. Liv. 37.31.5-6. Cf. Flor. 2.8.12; Just. 31.6.9.

273. Liv. 37.45.2.

274. Nep. Han. 9 says that he fled to Crete; with Liv. 39.51.1 and Plb. 23.13 putting him in Bithynia after Magnesia.

275. Nep. Han. 13.2, von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," col. 793. Liv. 35.14.5-12, Plu. Flam. 21.3, and App. Syr. 10 record the story of the meeting with Scipio from three separate traditions.

276. Liv. 37.31.5-8; App. Syr. 27. The ships the Rhodians had destroyed offered no such trophies.

277. Liv. 40.52.6; Thiel, p. 356, n. 624.

278. App. B.C. 4.67; Schmitt, p. 81 and n.1.