Mental Representations
Cognitive Science views the mind-brain as a computational device.
The idea of computation is that formal operations occur over tokens; these
can then be interpreted by semantic rules. But there are a lot of
theories of computation. Two types of computation:
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symbolic, or rule-based, or von Neumann
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connectionist (PDP)
In the first case, representations are local, in other words for any idea
we can point to a location in the computer and say "that is idea is represented
here". In the latter case, the idea is represented, but in a distributed
fashion: a conbination of activation states represents a set of ideas,
but any given idea is not represented in a discrete location. Symbolic
computation is protypically serial, whereas connectionist computation is
(except in limiting cases) always parallel.
Useful notions (along with something less than a proper definition):
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syntax --- formal structure
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semantics --- meaning
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cognitive capacity --- not the actuality of applying cognition, but ability
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productivity --- when a capacity can have indefinitely many realizations
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intentionality --- being "about" something *
* Do not confuse with intension, which contrasts with extension and means
roughly connotation.
The relation between syntax and semantics is hard to get a handle on,
in the case of language and also more generally, because there seems to
be a conflict between our intuitions that the mind-brain processes computationally
and the fact that it represents intentional states.
Ways that representational content is grounded:
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Structural Isomorphism --- this is the traditional theory of ideas
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Causal Historical --- a causal chain connects the representation
to its object
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Biological Function --- successful definitions are complicated, idea is
straightforward
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Functional Role Semantics --- locates meaning in symbol-symbol relations
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Informational Semantics --- locates meaning in symbol-world relations
6 kinds of representation acc. to Thagard:
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sentences, or WFFs **
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rules
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representations of concepts, frames
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schemata **
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scripts, analogies, images **
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connectionist representations **
Schemata (plural form) are generic knowledge structures that can easily
be applied widely. This results in a certain amount of error through
misapplication, but is balanced by speeding processing and limiting the
amont of information that memory needs to store: whenever you can
rely on a schema (singular) that you already have, you don't need to go
to the effort of creating a new mental model. Scripts are a subclass
of schemata that are used to account for generic or stereotyped actions.
** discussed by Bloch |
Cognitive Architecture
This article talked a little more about different models of computing,
which is releveant to discussions today. But it also considered (briefly)
more specific architectural arrangments of the type we will see in the
next couple of weeks. |
(The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science is a very useful resource.
You can return to it and read articles as you need to. Also, the
plentiful links allow you to create your own hypertext document as you
read, so following up on casual references is very easy. NOTE:
in your bulkpack I included a glossary of terms for cognitive science,
which might prove useful particularly when you are off-line.)
Bloch article
I would like you to consider several questions relating to this article;
the last of these is something you only will be able to answer as we get
further into the course:
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What is the contribution of cognitive science to anthropology, and the
contribution of anthropology to cognitive science, on Bloch's view?
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Is Bloch basically right? Does he understand the issues he discusses?
How or how not?
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Does this article lay the groundwork for research of the next decade?
If not, does Bloch have insights that have not been mined very well yet?
I will now give you my views, but I am open to being persuaded that I am
wrong (the paper is frustratingly vague in some respects, I find).
In particular, I am concerned that he is conflating distinct issues,
including: the nature of computational processes, modes of categorization,
and logic; in particular, he seems to confuse the serial, surface nature
of natural language and the binary logic of digital computers (because
they are traditionally programmed to perform operations serially).
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis --- "we dissect nature along lines laid down
by our native languages. . . by the linguistic system in our minds"; position
in the debate regarding the relation between language and thorught; I think
this is in the background of Bloch's arguments (though he doesn't mention
it) relating to the relation between language (as syntatic and rule-governed)
and thought (as serial).
On the other hand, one part of Bloch's argument seems clear: cultural
anthropologists tend to attribute "beliefs" to groups of people; in religious
studies, this manifests itself in claims like "Christians believe that
all people are born with original sin". These are necessarily expressed
in language, and thus (he argues) are an inadequate expression of the cultural
knowledge of those people; further (he argues) there is a principled restriction
on certain sorts of knowledge being expressed in language. It is
impossible to describe in words what constitutes a "good swidden".
We can take his arguments in two ways, I think: in one case, cultural
knowledge is not "sentential", so we should not attribute beliefs to groups
of people; in the other, some cultural knowledge is sentential, but other
cultural knowledge isn't. Then the traditional approach of anthropologists
is correct, but must be supplemented. The idea of an epidemiology
of representations only makes sense if the former case.
As for Bloch's claim that through fieldwork he has learned to chunk
knowledge in much the same way natives do: if this is all we can
do by way of "understanding" other cultures, then can't we question whether
this method really does profit the psychologist? After all, the latter
wants to understand cognitive capacities, but the anthropologist is just
applying those capacities, not understanding them.
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Problems Relating to the Study of Religion
Many traditions allow for things like miracles, supernatural occurences,
direct divine action in the world, etc. The natural sciences rely
on regular, law-governed events that in principle could be repeated; and
on a naturalistic view of causation. In many religious traditions,
natural laws are dependent on divine will. Therefore scientific theories
cannot adequately address certain sorts of phenomena recognized by certain
religious traditions. Cosmologists do have to come to terms with
the notion that some natural laws are a contingent function of the actual
state of the world, and did not hold in the earliest moments of the universe.
This has interesting parallels to certain theological doctrines.
Personal, subjective experience is a large part of what is of interest
to scholars of religion. This necessarily is problematic for scientific
views, though there are not principled limits to the study of experience.
Also, scholars of religion (like many historians) tend to find the contingent
nature of religious events to be more interesting than regularities.
Science tends to be concerned with studying regularities, whereas applied
technology is focused on individual cases.
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Religious Studies as a Field
Theology --- studies religion from within the orientation of a particular
faith
Religious Studies --- studies religion using tools and assumptions that
are widely shared by educated people; does not require the adoption of
beliefs of a particular faith
Two breeds of Religious Studies, which I will call:
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phenomenology of religion
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scientific history of religions
Both can go by the name History of Religions. The latter is loosely
connected to philosophical phenomenology; a chief assumption is that religion
is sui generis, thus it rejects reduction on principle; this metaphysical
view underwrites the existence of Religious Studies as a separate department
of knowledge. Otto's idea of the numinous (The Idea of the Holy,
1917). This became the dominant trend in American departments of
Religious Studies largely through the efforts at the University of Chicago
(Wach and Eliade).
An earlier trend in Religious Studies entered the US a few generations
earlier, and is associated particularly with philologists-historians like
Morris Jastrow at the University of Pennsylvania. This earlier movement
did not find an institutional structure to maintain it. It had derived
from historical research relating to the historical background of the Hebrew
scriptures, and the study of ancient documents from nearby civilizations
(Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Sumeria, Ugarit, etc.). Scholars began
to realize that these documents provided a ground for the study of ancient
history independent of (and sometimes contradicting) the views hold in
theologically-based studies of scripture.
In recent decades, various attempts have been made to create a new model
for the "scientific" study of religion. Much of this is sociological
research that does not differ in any principled way from other sorts of
sociological research; it is simply focused on religious movements.
Another is the cognitive trend that we are studying. There is also
a tradition of studying "Religion and Science"; this focuses mostly on
the putative conflict between science and religion as epistemological systems
(systems of knowing), and authors argue that such a conflict either does
or does not exist; but this is not a "scientific" approach to religion
at all.
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