Linguistic variation is causing many problems in the sphere of interethnic relations. According to the Language Law (1989) and Constitution of Kazakhstan, Kazakh is the state language, while Russian is proclaimed to be the language of interethnic communication - a term which the Russians of Kazakhstan are not satisfied with. President N. Nazarbayev, who endeavours to hold the multi- ethnic country together, has proposed that Russian be made an "official" language, although still inferior in status to Kazakh. Only 2 per-cent of Russians and 40 per cent of ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan claimed to be fluent in Kazakh in 1992. The Language Law also provided that in regions where a certain national group lives in compact communities, the language of that group can be elevated to the status of a local official language. It was officially decided to switch to a fully bilingual administration by 2000, although this goal is now considered to be unrealistic due to the lack of interest among the minorities, and also as a result of the acute shortage of Kazakh teachers and textbooks.

While some Slavic movements, such as LAD, campaign for making Russian the second state language, more moderate Slavic activists protest not so much against the law as such, but about its violation by administrative bodies resulting in the reduction of job opportunities for Russian-speakers, especially in regions where Russians constitute a minority. In December 1992, 15,000 demonstrators in Northern Kazakhstan demanded that Russian should be recognised as a second state language. In December 1994, the Parliament of Kazakhstan refused to discuss the status of Russian as a second state language. This issues remains an important political issue in Kazakhstan [p.2].

President Nazarbayev rejected dual citizenship on the grounds that it would divide loyalties by creating groups with different rights. He feared that this could lead to the fragmentation of the state, provoking, for example, the unification of heavily Russian-populated oblasts in the North with Russia. Dual citizenship is allowed only for ethnic Kazakhs living abroad. However, President Nazarbayev signed a package of agreements with Russia in March 1994, including a number of palliative solutions. For example, Russia and Kazakhstan consented to leave their borders open and not establish visa regimes. Moreover, people who migrate from one country to the other can acquire citizenship in their country of choice, including the right to sell their houses and take their possessions with them.

Suspicion nevertheless remains high, especially among the Russian community, that Kazakhstan is becoming a more authoritarian and ethno-centric state. These fears are heightened by the campaign to rename Kazakhstani towns, regions, streets and other things. In addition to changing names established during the legacy of Communism, traditional and non-political Russian names in regions compactly settled by Slavs have also been changed - such as the renaming of Petropavlovsk to Kzylzhar, which caused a wave of protests. Kazakh authorities also continue to encourage ethnic Kazakhs to settle in the northern region of the country - populated mainly by Slavs - in order to boost the Kazakh population in this area. High-ranking positions of power in the northern region, as well as in the Central Administration, are also increasingly occupied by Kazakhs. Russians, moreover, claim that lecturers who teach in Kazakh are paid 15-20 per cent more than those who instruct in Russian. Such events have led Russians to perceive that they are being pushed out of the country in order to provide space for repatriated Kazakhs, the majority of whom enjoy relatively high living standards and receive cash subsidies and interest-free loans from the government. The Russian-speakers are mainly employed in industry and have not received salaries for months due to the decline of this sector stemming from the disruption of economic ties with Russian producers. Russian emigration from Kazakhstan continues to increase. In 1994, 63,500 Russians officially migrated to Russia. The emigration rate increased by 19 per cent during the first half of 1994 (resulting in a negative migration balance of 182,000). The worst population loss has been in Karaganda, followed by Akmola and Pavlodar. In the long term, prospects for stability in Kazakhstan are fragile.

Relations with Russia will continue to have a significant effect on the future of Kazakhstan, both because of the large population of Russians and Russian- speakers, and because of potential problems along the extensive border with Russia. The national interests of Russians and Kazakhs appear to be more at odds here than anywhere else in Central Asia, mainly because the non-Kazakh population is reluctant to relinquish the power and influence it still commands. The Kazakhs therefore face tremendous opposition in their endeavour to impose their views on the rest of the population regarding the future shape of the country - a fact likely only to exacerbate the Kazakh's sense of frustrated nationalism. Moreover, since the highest percentage of minority-dominated oblasts are located along the Russian border, Kazakhstan has had to deal with the possibility of break-away regions. Indeed, in reaction to the rise of 'Kazakh nationalism', three of the northern 'Russian' oblasts in Kazakhstan have already begun to forge ties with bordering oblasts in the Russian Federation. If not resolved, such irredentist rhetoric may lead to actual inter-ethnic violence. In the event of a significant break-down in Kazakh-Russian relations, Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan would be more inclined to fight for their rights or insist on the partition of the country, rather than to emigrate to Russia. The Russian minority has become deeply rooted in Kazakhstan, and it would be unrealistic for the Russian Federation to absorb a massive influx of Russians from Kazakhstan. A deterioration in the relations between these two major communities in Kazakhstan could therefore have disastrous consequences [p.3].