Marc Leprêtre
Language
Policies States: a brief assessment on language, linguistic rights and national
identity
This paper gives an overview on the different
language policies implemented in Russia and in
the Soviet successor states, stressing the importance of the historical background,
the relations between language and nationalism, and language promotion as a
tool for preventing inter-ethnic conflicts and for ensuring a peaceful and
balanced linguistic diversity. The text is structured in six sections:
historical overview: language policy and nation-building in the USSR;
interethnic tensions in the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet context; the
awakening of national groups in Russia and linguistic legislation; linguistic
rights in the constitutions of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia;
basic features of language policy in Lithuania and Latvia; and strategies for a
peaceful and balanced management of linguistic diversity in the Russian
Federation and the Soviet successor states.
LANGUAGE POLICIES IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES: A BRIEF ASSESSMENT ON
LANGUAGE, LINGUISTIC RIGHTS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY[1]
Marc Leprêtre[2]
mlepretre@retemail.es
Historical overview: language
policy and nation-building in the USSR
The processes of language planning and language policy
carried on since 1991 in the Soviet successor states can't be explained without
a short reference to the historical, political and social outcomes raised by
the nationality and language policies implemented during decades in the USSR.
Nevertheless, insofar as the topic of this paper is what is going on nowadays
regarding the management of language diversity, I will try to summarize this
historical background[3].
The ideological bases of the Soviet nationality
policies and the process of nationalization[4] implemented in the republics had a
rather paradoxical character as far as on the one hand the Soviet regime
entitled the nationalities with a well-defined political and territorial status
-even for those which had not yet reached a pre-capitalist state of
development- which led to a process of nation-building where political and
territorial units were created on the basis of nations that constituted
themselves as historical cultural communities during the Tsarist period,
contrary to what had been the usual pattern in Western Europe. On the other
hand, these processes took place in a parallel way with a gradual policy of
repression of national historical cultures that only preserved the most
ethnographic and folkloric elements. Furthermore, and according to the analysis
proposed by Gellner regarding the formation of nations during the processes of
modernization[5], we can
argue that Soviet Marxism did not consider the peripheral nationalities has
deep rooted societies in the modern economic and politic structures, but as
'folkloric' or 'ethnographic' nations. Noneless, the logical ground of
Bolshevik policy towards nationalities after the Revolution - the korenizatsiia[6]-
constituted a formula according to which those nations whose collective rights
had been denied and repressed during the Tsarist period should have access to
the free exercise of these rights within the general framework of the building
of socialism in order to reach by themselves the conclusion that national
sovereignty was not by itself a solution to all the national, cultural, social,
politic and economic problems of development. The final goal was therefore the
merger of all nations into a single socialist community, once all national
cultures had had the opportunity to bloom during the period of construction of
socialism. All this was stressed by Stalin at the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b)
in 1930:
Il
faut laisser les initiatives nationales grandir et se déployer en manifestant
toutes leurs vertus potentielles pour leur permettre ensuite de se fondre en
une seule culture avec une seule langue commune. L’épanouissement des cultures, nationales par la forme et socialistes
par le contenu, sous le régime de la dictature du prolétariat dans un seul
pays, pour leur fusion en une seule culture socialiste par la forme comme par
le contenu, avec une seule langue commune au moment où le prolétariat
triomphera dans le monde entier et où le socialisme entrera dans les moeurs,
voilà précisément où est l’essence dialectique de la conception léniniste du
problème des cultures nationales.[7]
This policy was likewise aimed to be a lenitive for
the social, political and national tensions that emerged successively in the
cities, the rural areas and the periphery of the State during the Revolution,
the Civil War and the process of building of the Soviet state. In order to
solve these tensions, the Bolsheviks implemented three kinds of policy:
a)
the application of the principle
of national-territorial autonomy as the cornerstone of the recently created
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic of Russia;
b)
the formation of autonomous
territorial units in peripheral regions; and
c)
the implementation of korenizatsiia at large scale.
At the same time, these policies were followed by two
corollaries to ensure full support from peasants and urban workers to the
regime: the NEP and the massive enlistment of proletarians into the Party.
From a sociolinguistic point of
view, the outcomes of the Soviet nationality policies can be summed up as
follows:
La politique linguistique est sans aucun doute le plus
original de l’action menée par le pouvoir en matière nationale. C’est
aussi, cela est certain, sa plus parfaite réussite[8].
Actually the different language policies implemented
in the Soviet Union are for sure one of the most salient achievements of the regime
insofar as we can't detach them from the political, social and economic events
which took place during seven decades neither from the changes in the
correlations of forces within the top ranks of the State and of the federated
republics. The changes in the demographic structure of the population during
the process of modernization of Soviet economy and society contributed likewise
to strengthen, especially in the urban areas, the tensions raised by the
contacts between languages together with other factors as the size of
linguistic and national groups, the experience (historical o recent) of
contacts with other ethnic groups, the geographic location or concrete
linguistic, religious and cultural kinships. Insofar as the policies
implemented by the State in order to ensure the equality between nations were
based on the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the dialectical relations
established between the different nationalities, the underlying motivations of
linguistic and national policies were that the modernization of the different
ethnic groups of the USSR could not be achieved if the autochthonous
populations didn't manage to reach a high
level of literacy, culture and social and political consciousness. At the same
time, the new needs of the Soviet society (industrialization, technologic
challenges, building of socialism) required the creation of a new society with
an adequate critical mass of individuals able to deal with new technical and
intellectual tools in order to implement and make real the projects designed by
the State.
On the other hand, the Socialist
Revolution happened in a country which didn't possess the objective conditions
for its consolidation - the structure of the
population was overwhelmingly formed by peasant, the urban proletariat was
scarce, the level of industrialization still low according to Western standards
as well as the political and cultural development of the population- although
the new regime managed to set up new structures of power after a long civil
war. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the new State and the building of
socialism required a radical change in the social, political, cultural and
economic composition of the country. As far as the industrialization of the
USSR was a sine qua non condition for
its own survival, the most effective and fast way to gain the support (or
neutrality) of the non-Russian nationalities, as well as to inculcate into them
the new political culture was to use the autochthonous languages as one of the
main tools of this process of learning and change. It was therefore necessary
to set up a new educational system and new cultural, ideological and
communicative domains in different languages. This is the reason why language
policy was from the very beginning one of the main cruxes of the Soviet policy
towards nationalities.
Language policy was carried on by the Narkomnats[9] by means of four main activities:
a) the selection of a standard code for every
autochthonous language and its dissemination as a common language of
communication for the populations of the autonomous territorial units;
b) the
modernization of the lexicon according to
the needs of a modern industrial society;
c) the reform or creation of new alphabets for the autochthonous
languages; and
d) the large-scale literacy campaign in the peripheral regions by
means of the teaching of the autochthonous languages in new national school
systems.
As a long term result of this kind of policies, at the
end of the Soviet Union the overall picture of the sociolinguistic situation of
both the autochthonous languages and Russian as the common language of
communication between all the parts of the State was as follows:
Table
1. Ethnic groups, knowledge of Russian and of the language of the titular
ethnic group (1989)
|
Republic |
Majority groups (%) |
% Knowledge of Russian |
% Knowledge of language of titular ethnic group |
Armenia
|
Armenians
(93) Azeris (3) |
45 19 |
-- 7 |
|
Azerbaijan |
Azeris (83) Russians (6) Armenians (6) |
32 -- 69 |
-- 15 7 |
|
Belarus |
Belorussians
(78) Russians (13) |
80 -- |
-- 27 |
|
Estonia |
Estonians
(62) Russians (30) |
35 -- |
-- 15 |
|
Georgia |
Georgians
(70) Armenians (8) Russians (6) Àzeris (6) |
32 52 -- 35 |
-- 26 24 10 |
|
Kazakhstan |
Kazakhs (40) Russians (38) |
64 -- |
-- 9 |
|
Kyrgyztan |
Kyrgyz (52) Russians (22) Uzbeks (13) |
37 -- 39 |
-- 12 4 |
Latvia
|
Latvians (52) Russians (34) |
68 -- |
-- 22 |
|
Lithuania |
Lithuanians
(80) Russians (9) Poles (7) |
38 -- 67 |
-- 38 21 |
|
Moldova |
Moldavians
(65) Ukrainians
(14) Russians (13) |
58 80 -- |
-- 14 12 |
|
Tajikistan |
Tadjiks
(62) Uzbeks
(24) Russians (8) |
31 22 -- |
-- 17 4 |
|
Turkmenistan |
Turkmen’s
(72) Russians (10) Uzbeks (9) |
28 -- 29 |
-- 2 16 |
|
Ukraine |
Ukrainians
(73) Russians (22) |
72 -- |
-- 34 |
|
Uzbekistan |
Uzbeks (71) Russians (8) |
27 -- |
-- 5 |
Source:
Own elaboration from the data provided by Natsionalnij
Sostav Naselenija SSSR (1991).
In short, Soviet language policy
not only promoted the Russian language as the ‘lingua franca’ used for
All-Union and inter-republican communications, but also improved and
strengthened the position of the titular nations of the republics as well as
that of their respective languages. At the same time, the gradual decline of
the percentage of ethnic Russians in the USSR and a birth rate dramatically
lower than that of the populations of Central Asia and Caucasus contributed to
create a latent feeling of insecurity within the majority group which provoked
the raising of a new type of Russian nationalism as a reaction towards the
intensification of nationalists movements in the borders and the core itself of
the Union. Finally, the outcomes of the Soviet language policy reflect the
contradictions inherent in the processes of centralization and decentralization[10],
of promotion and repression which constituted the main characteristics of
Soviet nationalities policies splitted between the class strategy and the
nationalist tacticism:
Thus when Gorbachev came to power in March
1985, Russian was being vigorously promoted as the language of inter-ethnic
communication, the language od the Great Russian nation [...] The other
languages of the Soviet Union were under varying degrees of pressure and many
of them were in decline [...] That the policy of ‘national-Russian’
bilingualism seemed to be effective was reflected in census returns which
regularly recorded high (if declining) retention rates for the mother tongue
among the non-Russian nationalities (in many cases over 90%) and rising rates
of acquisition of Russian as a second language (with, admittedly, quite widely
ranging percentages...) [11]
Interethnic tensions in the
Russian Federation in the post-Soviet context
The
break-up of the Soviet Union and the increase of interethnic tensions within
the very same Russian Federation implied the intensification of the Russian
identity crisis that had been taking place during the process of construction
of the Soviet patriotism from the mid 30’s. The first signs of tension
coincided with the declaration of sovereignty of the Autonomous Republics of
Mari El, Komi and Tatarstan during the summer of 1990. These declarations of
sovereignty meant an attempt to force the federal authorities into granting
them a higher level of autonomy that would allow local authorities to control
and manage their natural resources (diamonds, petroleum, gas, wood industry) in
order to have direct access to foreign markets.
The
initial negotiations aiming at the signature of the Union Treaty of 1991
accelerated this process in such a way that, not only the sixteen Autonomous
Republics of the RSFSR declared their sovereignty, but also the Autonomous
Regions of Birobidzhan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Khakassia, Gorno-Altay and
Adygea, which claimed their conversion into Autonomous Republics, also did the
same. In addition, as was the case at the beginning of the 20’s, new
territorial entities with no legal basis emerged, constituted from the
unilateral decisions taken by local Soviets: the Greater Volga Association; the
Greater Ural Association; the Far East Association; the Association of the
Towns of Southern Russia; the aforementioned old Autonomous Regions reconverted
into Autonomous Republics; the de facto
independent Republic of Chechnya; and finally, the Tiumen District. Thus,
Russia faced, throughout the entire Soviet State, a process of territorial,
economic and social disintegration which had marked consequences on the
configuration of a new national identity which, for the first time since the
Middle Ages, had to dissociate the concepts of Empire and State.
The
Russian nation nowadays faces likewise an acute crisis of national identity and
is looking for its own self-definition. In contrast with the classical paradigm
according to which the national and identity issue is mainly the preoccupation
of ‘incomplete nations’[12] that are struggling to reaffirm
themselves in the face of larger and more ‘complete’ nations, in today’s Russia
it is the dominant ethnic group who is looking for its self-definition. Broadly
speaking, the existence of a Russian State (Rossiiskoe
Gosudartsvo) was previous to the Russian nation(ality) (Russkaya narodnost) and, at the same time, the Russian Empire
preceded the Russian State. According to this, the emergency of Russia as a
nation was infallibly linked to the continuous process of expansion of the
Empire towards the territories inhabited by alien ethnic groups. Another
feature of the Russian Empire, later on shared with the Soviet Union, was found
in the relations that were established between the Russian Nation and alien
peoples. During Tsarism, the dominant classes of the peripheral societies were
progressively assimilated by the elites of the center, such as was the case of
the Tatars, the Georgians, the Germans, the Balts or the Poles. During some
specific periods of the Communist regime, this same type of relationship was
established, insofar as class or ideological considerations prevailed over
ethnic identifications. In addition, during the period of the korenizatsiia to be Russian or to belong
to a Russified national elite implied a curb on individuals who aspired to
holding important positions in the national Republics. On the other hand, the
very same Russians did not consider themselves as a particularly favoured
nation by the previous regime: the economic indicators of the RSFSR were not
substantially better than those of the other Republics, the purges of the 30’s
had caused more victims there than anywhere else, the Russians had contributed
more than any other people to the Second World War, the environmental situation
was awful, ethnical minorities identified them with Soviet totalitarianism,
their contribution to the maintenance of the Centro-Asiatic Republics was
considerable, etc. Finally, from the political point of view, the RSFSR was in
no way privileged since it shared same rank with a great number of smaller
ethnical groups and it was even underrepresented from the institutional point
of view, insofar as many All-Union institutions took the place of Russian
institutions. From this point of view, the coming of independence has not
implied an improvement in the situation. While the loss of territories included
in the Russian Empire and later on in the Soviet Union (especially Central Asia
and Transcaucasia) was not a very traumatic experience, the secession of
Belorussia and Ukraine was interpreted as an historic, identity and cultural
amputation. In addition, the new map of the borders has turned almost 25
million ethnic Russians into foreign citizens in the old Federated Republics
that many had long since considered to be their homeland. Although the
disappearance of the Soviet State has allowed the Russians to go from being a
little bit more than 50% of the USSR’s population to represent more than 80% of
the Russian Federation, the reinforcement of the Russians as an ethnic majority
in stark contrast with a multiplicity of ethnic minorities has even more
highlighted the idea that Russia is not only the State of the Russians but that
the Russian identity must also integrate alien elements. As a last resort, the
present Russian Federation reproduces, on a smaller scale, the traditional
contradiction between the ethnic and cultural groups and the political and
territorial variables of the Russian national identity. This situation becomes
more complex because the Russian Federation is made up of 89 subjects (of which
32 are defined in ethnic terms) between old Autonomous Republics, regions,
districts and federal towns, all with equal rights and obligations according to
the 1993 Constitution. But given the fact that the 1992 Federal Treaty appears
to be more generous towards the
Republics, there exists a duplicity of interpretations as regards the
responsibilities that must be assumed by the federal institutions and those
corresponding to the Republics. Therefore, after the break-up of the Soviet
State, Russia has made its first steps along the path towards the recovery of
its national identity and the reconstruction of its nationality. This new
Russian identity is based, broadly speaking, on the Orthodox religion and a
nationalism that reproduces, for lack of other models, the egalitarian,
authoritarian and communitarian schemata of the traditional Russian society.
This search for a new identity takes place within the framework of the
traditional contradiction of a Russia split between its western aspirations and
its tendency towards isolation. Being used to living within its own myths,
Russian society looks for new social and moral points of reference to find a
new position as a nation, given the fact that the pre-Revolutionary myths based
on religion, Empire and autocracy were eliminated by the Bolshevik Revolution
and were replaced by the new Bolshevik myths (proletarian internationalism,
construction of socialism), now also disappeared.
However,
significant changes took place gradually in the subjective perception that the
Russians had their own identity, mainly as a consequence of the increase and
the radicalization of alien peoples’ defense of their rights which provoked an
unavoidable confrontation between the center and the periphery. The Russians
entered into direct competition with alien groups when claiming the solution of
inequalities and grievances; from becoming aware of the huge financial aids
granted to the Federated Republics, the delicate environmental situation, the
moral corruption of the Soviet society as a whole, to the real extension of the
Stalinist regime of terror and the arbitrariness’s of the previous decades,
which resulted not only in an explosion of nationalist feelings in the
Republics, but also encouraged the leaders of the periphery to elude their
responsibilities by means of systematic attacks on the center and the federal
authorities identified with the Russians. The latter, seeing that they were
associated with a policy and authorities that for seven decades had not treated
them in any way substantially different from the way they treated other
Republics and, in addition, seeing themselves as being deprived of national
political, economic and cultural institutions because of the overlapping of the
Soviet and Russian institutions, launched a revival of a deeply ethnical
Russian nationalism. The emerging of nationalist movements at the heart of the
RSFSR (Tatarstan, Yakutia-Sakha, Chechnya, Tuva, Buryatia, Dagestan, Northern
Ossetia, etc.) provoked a chain reaction in the Russian population, in such a
way that many Russian nationalist movements that arose under the protection of
the perestroika started, unlike their
predecessors of the 70’s, to employ the centrifuge tactics of the peripheral
nationalist movements. In such a situation, faced with the intensification of
the anti-Russian xenophobe feelings in the Transcaucasian and Centro-Asiatic
Republics and the establishment of new legislations as regards languages and
education that benefited autochthonous languages, the Russian nationalists
organized themselves by creating popular fronts, as was happening in the Baltic
countries or in Transcaucasia. This radicalization of Russian nationalism
provoked a double confrontation between the RSFSR and the Federated Republics,
on the one hand, and between the very same RSFSR and the federal authorities,
on the other. The fact that after the break-up of the USSR the Russian
Federation still existed as a sole territorial entity with such a complex
multiethnic composition gave rise among the Russian population to a feeling
that their country, now an orphan of reference points on which to draw and
construct a new identity, had simply become what was left of the USSR, once any
influence on the other Federated Republics, some of which (Belarus and Ukraine)
constituted some of the symbolic references of Great Russia since the X
century, had been lost.
The
following graph states the ethnic composition in the autonomous republics of
the Russian Federation.
Graph 1. Ethnic composition of the Russian Federation (1989)
Source:
Own elaboration from the data provided by Natsionalnii
Sostav Naseleniia SSSR (1991)
The
future articulation of the Russian national identity and State is extremely
complex insofar as, until now, it does not seem that they have planned either
any coherent plan for development or any precise orientations on economic,
social and national policies that would allow for the consolidation process of
democracy in the Russian Federation. Faced with the outbreak of national and
identity cohesion of post-Soviet Russia, the foundations on which the new
identity and the new State should be based contain major contradictions, while
the general context hinders the articulation of a civil society traditionally
underdeveloped, given the fact that, neither the concept of an ethnic Russia
nor that of the imperial Russia can mobilize or unite the Russian citizens
under the same national project; that the intensification of the economic and
regional particularities threaten to dislocate the territorial structure of the
Federation; that the moral and social disorientation has become generalized
among a population lacking in points of reference and identification due to the
disappearance of the old pre- and post-Communist values; and that the endemic
economic crisis has driven tens of millions of people to subsist below the
poverty level. In short, the facts and circumstances made explicit throughout
these pages constitute a complex network that Russia will have to solve in
order to begin the process of democracy, political, social and economic
stability and national reconstruction.
The awakening of national groups
in Russia and linguistic legislation
The
Russian Federation is made up of 176 national groups and an almost equal number
of languages spoken. These minority communities represent approximately 28
million people, 20% of the total population[13]. This ethnic, linguistic and
cultural diversity is reflected in the Federal Statutes of the country, with 21
National Republics, to which we have to add the Autonomous Regions and
Districts. Minority areas are characterized by a very strong interweaving of
peoples. The Russian population represents between 30 and 80% of the population
of the Republics in Siberia, between 30 and 70% of the central and northern
regions, and between 10 and 40% in the Caucasus. To it we have to add the
presence of other national groups which represent between 5 and 40% of the
Republics’ population. Besides, the titular nationality (eponym of the
Republic) is only majority in 7 of the 21 Republics. Taking this
multiculturalism into consideration has implied the acknowledgement of a
considerable political power in the titular minorities, although this power
often has to be relativised due to the absence or scarcity of financial means
and that Moscow still keeps an important influence through the subsidies (that
may reach 90% of some Republics’ budget) and the granting of credits for the
acquisition and provision of energy supplies. In addition, the important
sociocultural crisis that provoked the fall of communism still perpetuates.
Letting aside the North Caucasus, the UNESCO
Red Book on Endangered Languages only reports in Russia on three minority
languages that are not endangered[14]. All the others are considered
as being “on the verge of extinction” or “threatened”. This contrast between
the will of reconstructing national identity and the real situation may imply a
feeling of urgency that sometimes force titular nationalities to take radical
action in order to protect their language and their identity, while often at
the same time political and social tensions feed on ethnical and cultural
tensions.
Map 1. Ethnic groups in Caucasus region
Within
this context, the linguistic issue crystallizes in the demand for the
recognition of the identity of the different peoples of Russia, while this
constitutes in itself a source of tensions. In the territories of the old
Soviet Union, linguistic decrees and laws have very significantly contributed
to the worsening of the tensions in Moldova and language issues still mark the
agenda of political action in the Baltic States, especially in Estonia and
Latvia. In Central Asia, Russian minorities are in a delicate situation because
the use of national languages has become an important indicator of the
citizens’ political loyalty, although very often they lack the necessary
structures from which to learn them. The situation seems less serious in
Russia, where Russian still is globally accepted as a lingua franca and where each Republic can add one or more official
languages. But quite often the problem is found in the criteria for choosing
the official languages. All the Republics, excepting four of them, have adopted
linguistic laws that give priority to the language of the titular nationality.
In Bashkiria, the official status of the national language together with
Russian is the object of major controversy given the opposition of the Tatars
-the second most important community in demographic weight after the Russians
and before the Bashkirians- because of the refusal of the Bashkirians to
proclaim the official status of Tatar in the Republic. The situation is
especially complex in Dagestan where 80% of the population is Dagestanian but
more than 30 languages cohabit. Also, some decrees establishing the adoption of
the Latin alphabet instead of the Cyrillic one (for instance, the Decree of
July 1999 in Tatarstan) are usually interpreted as an overt challenge which
aims to increase the distancing from Moscow. In addition, the adoption of
constitutional clauses that limit and even impede the access to political or
administrative responsibilities for citizens that do not know the national
language of the titular ethnic group, as in the case of Adygea, Northern
Ossetia, Bashkiria and Mari El, also represent a danger for the stability of
interethnic relationships. There also exists the temptation on the part of some
titular nationalities to use the linguistic issue to provoke demographic
changes that would imply a higher representation of their community: what the
French call “le vote avec ses pieds” (“the
vote with one’s feet”) is also a reality in Russia, despite the fact that the exodus
of Russians towards Republics with a majority Russian population is mainly due
to economic problems. The lack of local structures for mediation to look after
the legitimate interests of the Russophone communities and of the other
minority groups is even more dangerous if we take into account that Moscow does
not always have enough capacity or legitimacy to play this role.
As
regards the development of linguistic legislation within the Russian Federation
after the disintegration of the USSR, the 1993 Constitution marked a change
concerning the previous situation, for it starts with the following Preamble:
“We, the
multinational people of the Russian Federation, united by a common destiny on
our land, asserting human rights and liberties, civil peace and accord,
preserving the historic unity of the State, proceeding from the commonly
recognized principles of equality and self-determination of the peoples,
honoring the memory of our ancestors (...)”[15]
Consequently,
the old Soviet Republics started to adopt a series of legal measures that
proclaimed the official status of the autochthonous language[16]. Russia also promulgated the
first linguistic law of its history on October 25, 1991 (Law on the Languages
of the Peoples of the Russian Federation), where the languages of the Republic
were mentioned as an integral part of national patrimony and of its historical
and cultural heritage. According to Article 2.2., “On the territory of the
RSFSR the State shall guarantee language sovereignty of each people irrespective
of its number and legal position and language sovereignty of a person
irrespective of the origin of a human being, his or her social and material
position, racial and national belonging, sex, education, relation to religion
and domicile area.”
All
the same, Article 3.2. establishes that: “The Russian language, being a main
means of cross-national communication of the peoples of the RSFSR according to
the established historical and cultural traditions, has the status of the state
language on the whole territory of the RSFSR”. Because of their importance, two
other legal texts also stand out: firstly, the Federal Law on the General
Principles of the Local Self-Government Organization, passed on August 28, 1995
and modified on April 22, 1996, for it grants competencies in the field of
education in the autonomous territorial entities (Article 6.2.6.). The second
text, the Federal Law on National and Cultural Autonomy of June 17, 1996,
proclaims the right to maintain and develop the autochthonous languages of the
Republics and autonomous territorial bodies (Article 9), recognizes the right
to be educated in Primary School in the mother tongue of the pupil and to
choose the language of education (Articles 10, 11, 12).
The
Constitution and the federal laws that regulate the rights of the speakers of
the languages of the autochthonous communities have been followed by a long
series of linguistic legislations approved by the different Republics. Thus,
practically all the Constitutions of the Republics proclaim the official status
of Russian and of the autochthonous language, except for those of Dagestan,
Kabardino-Balkaria, Mordovia and Northern Ossetia, where other languages or
even dialects of the autochthonous language can be added to them. As regards
the legal texts of lesser importance, such as decrees or linguistic
regulations, the Republics of Karelia, Udmurtia, Dagestan and
Karachaevo-Cherkessia still have not adopted any as such, while this is not the
case in the Republics of Tatarstan, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chuvashia,
Tuva, Buryatia, Kalmykia, Khakassia, Yakutia-Sakha and Bashkiria where they
have done so.
The
fundamental elements common to the legal dispositions as regards the languages
proclaimed in the different Republics of the Russian Federation are found in
the desire for conservation, development and promotion of the autochthonous
language, its introduction or extension in the educational system, the training
of teachers, the promotion of literature, of science and arts, as well as the
use of these languages in the audio-visual media. Parallel to this, each
Republic takes care of regulating the use of the official languages in the
administration, in the legislation and official documents, in the juridical
system and in the relations between the administration and the citizens.
The
linguistic and cultural processes that take place in the Russian Federation are
determined by a combination of factors reported on in the previous pages: a)
the great cultural, linguistic and religious diversity of the population
throughout the entire territory; b) the demographically predominant presence of
the Russians in most of the Autonomous Republics; c) the influence of the
national-territorial criteria established by the Soviet regime in order to
manage linguistic and ethnical diversity; and d) the processes of economic
restructuring that are taking place in a disorderly fashion.
I
have already mentioned that in only 7 of the 21 national territorial entities
the titular nationality constitutes the majority of the population[17]. In addition, most of these
entities reproduce on a microscale the mosaic of nationalities, languages,
cultures and religions present throughout the entire Federation. In the same
way, Russian constitutes the language of communication between the center and
the periphery, while the Russification process which started, with some pushing
and pulling movements according to the interests and legitimization strategies
of the Soviet regime, in the mid 30’s, still has its effects on minority
languages. As we have already seen, the application of a national-territorial
criteria allowed for the development of the languages of the titular
nationalities by means of the creation of some regional elites, and cultural,
social and economic structures that made them turn into almost-States, even
before the disappearance of the Soviet State. But from 1992 onwards, and in
contrast with what was happening previously, the Federal Law on the
National-Cultural Autonomy also allowed the national and linguistic communities
that did not have their own politico-administrative structures to also enjoy
the right to constitute themselves as autonomous territorial entities and to
create the necessary conditions for the preservation and promotion of their own
languages.
The
economic situation derived from the chaotic transition from a planned economy
to a free market economy also constitutes another hindrance for the peripheral
ethnic and linguistic communities, given the fact that the majority of them
depend on the subsidies granted by the authorities to avoid the total collapse
of their economic structures; this leaves little margin for financing policies
to promote autochthonous languages, if we consider the urgent priorities as
regards social welfare, education, public health care and modernization of the
economy.
In
spite of everything, the main risk of interethnic tensions is concerned less
with the relationships that may be established from now onwards between the
federal authorities and the peripheral Republics, than with the capacity of the
nationalities to take into consideration the situation, the needs and the
interests of the other national communities present in their territory; to
conciliate their desire to promote the autochthonous language with the
awareness of the complexity and the slowness of the processes of transition and
change in deep-rooted linguistic habits; and to establish operational
structures that allow titular nationalities and minority groups to have access
to the learning of the autochthonous language, very often only recently turned
into the official language along with Russian. In short, it is fundamental and
urgent that the nationalities can assume and successfully face this challenge
in order to avoid a true disaster and an intensification of interethnic
tensions:
It is obvious that the languages of all the peoples in Russia including Russian a