



CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

University of California Press

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Politicizing the Past: The *Atthis* of Kleidemos

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO Wilamowitz initiated serious study of the Atthidographers of fourth-century Athens when he argued that their work derived from a chronicle published by the Exegetai around 380 B.C.¹ Following Wilamowitz many scholars viewed the *Atthides* as essentially conservative in outlook not because of any political bias on the part of the Atthidographers but simply by virtue of the antiquarian nature of the genre.² In any case, since little more than fragments survived, few scholars paid close attention to the work of the Atthidographers, and those who did were primarily interested in the *Atthides* as sources of the Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.*³ This situation was radically altered by the publication of Jacoby's *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens*, in which Jacoby argued for a very different view of the Atthidographers.⁴ For Jacoby their work was heavily political, and Atthidography, far

I would like to thank R. Sealey and P. Harding for kindly reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper, which was also read to an audience at the University of Pennsylvania. Two anonymous reviewers for this journal suggested numerous improvements. The flaws that remain are entirely my own responsibility.

1. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen* 1 (Berlin, 1893; repr. 1985) 260–90.

2. The most important studies before Jacoby include G. Mathieu, *Aristote, Constitution d'Athènes: Essai sur la méthode suivie par Aristote dans la discussion des textes* (Paris, 1915) 114–28; G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* 1 (Munich, 1920) 82–97; and H. Bloch, "Studies in the Historical Literature of the Fourth Century," *HSPH* 1940 Suppl. 1: 303–55. The view that the *Atthis* (a term used by earlier scholars to denote the entire genre) was politically liberal was argued by A. Bauer, *Die Forschungen zur alten Geschichte 1888–89* (Munich, 1899) 177–81.

3. See L. Pearson, *The Local Historians of Athens*, *APA Phil. Mon.* 11 (Philadelphia, 1942); and K. von Fritz, "Atthidographers and Exegetai," *TAPhA* 71 (1940) 91–126.

4. F. Jacoby, *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford, 1949) *passim*.

from being mere antiquarian local history, was part of the vigorous partisan debate of the mid-fourth century. Jacoby was careful to explain exactly what he meant when he called Atthidography political:⁵

The "political" (as we may call it) conception of the *Atthis* means the assumption that political war was waged from the fifties of the fourth century onward not only by speeches of the politicians in the Assembly or political pamphlets but also (in a wider frame and perhaps more impressively) by an historical description of the whole development of the State and the constitution of Athens.

An extreme version of Jacoby's thesis is to be found in J. K. Schreiner's 1968 study *Aristotle and Perikles*, in which the author asserts: "It is almost a law of Athenian historiography that each historian opposes his predecessor: Herodotus defended Perikles, Hellenikos criticized him . . . and Thucydides returned to Herodotus' defense of him. Androtion, the moderate, refuted the democrat Kleidemos throughout his work. Phanodemos, accordingly, is likely to have dissented from the view on Athenian history embodied in the *Atthis* of his predecessor Androtion."⁶

Jacoby's thesis, however, has had its critics. In 1977, having examined the fragments of Kleidemos and Androtion as well as the ancient testimonia, P. Harding concluded that "the testimonia give no indication that either of these two historians was ideologically biased and that the fragments do not support the idea that they wrote their *Atthides* from a political point of view, distorting the history of the development of the Athenian constitution for contemporary political purposes."⁷ Recently P. J. Rhodes has been a little more willing to see partisan influence in some episodes recorded by the Atthidographers, but he too has chosen to present the genre as nonpolitical, emphasizing the differences between each of the Atthidographers and concluding that this was not "a uniform genre in which each writer tried to outdo his predecessor or to reply with a work of a different slant."⁸

The notion that the Atthidographers' works were crudely polemical is certainly too simple, but it is equally mistaken to dismiss the genre as mere antiquarianism, because historical treatment of the past had already been politicized before the *Atthides* appeared. From as early as the Peloponnesian War political discourse had expanded to include pamphlets, philosophical dialogues, deliberative and forensic speeches, and historiography, all of which used exempla drawn from the past in order to support a political stance that was almost invariably hostile to the

5. Jacoby (*supra*, n. 4) 76.

6. J. K. Schreiner, *Aristotle and Perikles: A Study in Historiography*, Symbolae Osloenses Fasc. Suppl. 21 (Oslo, 1968), 19.

7. P. Harding, "Atthis and Politeia," *Historia* 26 (1977) 158.

8. P. J. Rhodes, "The Atthidographers," in H. Verdin, G. Schapens, and E. de Keyser, eds., *Purposes of History: Studies in Greek Historiography from the Fourth to the Second Centuries B.C.* (Leuven, 1990) 73–82.

democracy. When faced with the *epitaphios logos*, which publicly eulogizes a mythic, heroic Athens, one can easily forget that by the middle of the fourth century there was also a way of writing about the Athenian past that was partisan and critical.⁹ The first of these works known to us is Stesimbrotos's *Concerning Themistokles, Thucydides, and Perikles*, the fragments of which reveal a strong antipathy toward the democratic leaders Themistokles and Perikles.¹⁰ Stesimbrotos dealt with a succession of powerful leaders and, in effect, produced a history of Athens. His work was composed around the time of the Peloponnesian War, and its influence can be seen in the works of a number of conservative thinkers in the next generation. In the *Gorgias*, for example, Plato's criticisms of the democracy identify the past as the source of the problems of the present. Sokrates asks whether Kallikles knows of any politician whose career has produced a beneficial effect on the Athenians. When Kallikles mentions the merits of Themistokles, Kimon, Miltiades, and Perikles, Sokrates answers,¹¹

ἐγκωμιάξεις ἀνθρώπους, οἱ τούτους εἰσιτάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν. καὶ φασὶ μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἶδεῖ καὶ ὑπουλός ἐστιν δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασιν τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὐτῆ τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν.

Two other students of Sokrates, Aischines and Antisthenes, also produced works critical of the democracy and the demagogues of the fifth century. In the *Περὶ ἀρετῆς*, Aischines proposed that when god blesses a city he adorns it with

9. On the *epitaphios logos* as a vehicle for a national history, see N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, transl. A. Sheridan (London, 1986). Loraux does not see any conflict between Jacoby's thesis and her own, arguing that the conservative, idealized view of the *epitaphios logos* and the polemic of Atthidography already coexist in Thucydides. See her comments on pp. 4, 88, and 129. Juxtaposed to the uniformity of the *epitaphios logos* is the virulent debate carried on in the political pamphlets and speeches of Antiphon, Thrasymachos, Critias, and Lysias, and in the *Περὶ πολιτείας* ascribed incorrectly to Herodes Atticus. See E. Drerup, *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* 2.1 (Paderborn, 1908); and the useful summary of J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1908; repr. 1958) 179–82, who points out that the pamphlets were abundant, hostile to the democracy, and influential on history writing.

10. Stesimbrotos = *FGrH* 107; see also Laqueur, *RE* 3A:2, 2463–67 s.v. "Stesimbrotos": "Aus dem Fragmenten tritt uns eine scharf polemische Einstellung gegen Themistokles und Perikles entgegen." Two examples are typical: Stesimbrotos records (F 2) the jibe that Themistokles robbed the Athenians of spear and shield and equipped them with rowing cushion and oar handle instead; Stesimbrotos is Athenaios's and Plutarch's source (F 10) for the entirely scurrilous reports of Perikles having had an affair with his son's wife. The fragments relating to Kimon suggest Stesimbrotos's Kimon was unlike any other Athenian leader and was notable for his laconic style. His practice of chastising the Athenians and adding, "But the Spartans are not like this" (F 7), may have irked the *dēmos* but made him a model to all oligarchic sympathizers. See E. Gruen, "Stesimbrotos on Miltiades and Themistocles," *CSCA* 3 (1970) 91–98.

11. Plato, *Gorg.* 518e–19a.

andres agathoi, and when he punishes it he strips the city of its gentlemen. The dialogue's political stance is demonstrably oligarchic, and Aischines uses the same trio as Stesimbrotos—Themistokles, Perikles and Thucydides—to serve as test cases for his claim that *aretē* cannot be taught.¹² Even closer to Stesimbrotos is Antisthenes, whose *Politikos* was an invective against the Athenian demagogues.¹³ Antisthenes' attitude to democracy is made clear by two anecdotes preserved by Diogenes Laertius: the Athenians, advised Antisthenes, should vote that their donkeys were horses, since they were in the habit of electing as generals men who were unfit to command.¹⁴ In the same spirit he maintained that it was pointless separating wheat from chaff or discharging those unfit for military service if you did not also exclude the base from participation in political life.¹⁵

By the middle of the fourth century this approach had been adopted by historians: Book 10 of Theopompos's *Philippika*, dealing with Athenian history, was entitled *Tὰ περὶ τῶν Ἀθηνησὶ δημαγωγῶν* and had nothing good to say about any leader of the *dēmos* except Kimon.¹⁶ In the hands of the historian, no less than with the philosophers, this approach was an excuse for collecting the least flattering stories about figures such as Themistokles and contrasting them with favorable traditions concerning Kimon.¹⁷ The cumulative effect was to represent the democracy as a system created by a succession of degenerate rabble rousers like Kleon, Hyperbolos, and Kallistratos. The opposition to democracy had moved beyond the complaints of [Xenophon] and was not confined to the theoretical criticisms of Plato and Aristotle or Isokrates. The characters of Athenian history, and the past itself, could not escape becoming part of the debate about Athenian democracy.

Those who supported democracy did not respond by articulating a theory of democracy.¹⁸ Instead they related stories in which Themistokles and other democratic figures were vindicated, or better, made normative. For example, Lysias

12. Aisch. Sokrat. Περὶ ἀρετῆς, in J. Frider Fischerus, ed., *Dialogi Tres Graece* (Leipzig, 1786). The argument is a weaker version of Plato's treatment of the same question at *Prot.* 319e–320b.

13. Herodikos *apud* Athen. 5.220d describes the work as a *katadromē* against all the Athenian demagogues. See H. D. Rankin, *Antisthenes Sokraticos* (Amsterdam, 1986) 136.

14. Diog. Laert. 6 8 C fr. 196.

15. Diog. Laert. 6 6 C fr. 104.

16. Theop. = *FGrH* 115 (Bk. 10 = fgs. 85–100).

17. By the time of Plutarch, competing versions of many key events were in circulation. Some of his sources maintained that Themistokles had hoodwinked the ephors into allowing the Athenians to rebuild the Long Walls; Theopompos claimed he had bribed them (Plut. *Themist.* 19.1 = *FGrH* 115 F 85).

18. M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986) 343, argues that prior to 413 the Athenians had developed democratic institutions but had failed to articulate a theory of democracy. C. Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking* (Cambridge, 1988), takes a somewhat broader view and interprets Protagoras, Thucydides, and Demokritos as democratic thinkers. J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, 1989), introduces some useful distinctions when he asserts that democratic discourse made theory unnecessary for those engaged in this discourse. He cautiously suggests that the origins of *formal* political theory lie in "the failure of the elite to control political ideology" (338–39).

attacks Theramenes for his collaboration with the Spartans by way of a neat antithesis: Themistokles built the walls; Theramenes tore them down.¹⁹ Similarly his attack on Nikomachos puts together Solon, Themistokles, and Perikles as *nomothetai* chosen by the Athenians' forefathers.²⁰ But the torrent of antidemocratic writing would not be answered by occasional references to democratic heroes. Eventually, in the work of Kleidemos in the middle of the fourth century, a democratic answer would take shape in the form of a history of Attica organized around the twin themes of naval strength and the rule of the *dēmos*. Just as the upheaval of the Peloponnesian War prompted a spate of antidemocratic writings, so too the uncertainties of the 350s—Athens' failure in the Social War and her impotence in the face of the threat posed by Philip—heightened tension and caused political debate and historiography to collide. This new discourse was characterized not only by the tendentious interpretation of past events, from the Amazon invasions to the Persian Wars, but even in the forging of documents designed to validate competing versions.²¹ It was in this climate of recrimination and partisanship that Kleidemos produced this work.

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According to Pausanias, Kleidemos was the earliest of the Atthidographers.²² His discussion of the *naukrariai* (F 8), in which he likens them to symmories, appears to postdate the reforms undertaken in 358/7 and 355/4, when the symmories were placed in charge of the maintenance of the Athenian navy. Accordingly he is usually dated to the middle of the fourth century.²³ Jacoby compiled thirty-six fragments of all his works, most of which name Kleidemos but not the title of the work from which they come, so that it is often unclear whether the fragments are from the *Atthis* or some other work. Where we do know the titles of Kleidemos's works there is still much confusion: aside from the *Atthis*, there are also references in Athenaios and Hesychios to a *Protogonia*, which Jacoby took to be the title of the *Atthis*.²⁴ Furthermore Athenaios mentions a *Nostoi*, but Jacoby was troubled by Athenaios's reference to eight books (ἐν ἡ Νόστων) and proposed that this was a corruption of "something like ἐν β̄

19. Lys. 12.

20. Lys. 30.5

21. C. Habicht, "Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege," *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1–35. Habicht identifies a critical period from 348 to 330 B.C. during which nine important historical documents first entered Athenian political life: the *psēphisma* of Miltiades (490 B.C.), the *psēphisma* of Themistokles (480 B.C.), the *psēphisma* of the Troezenians (480 B.C.), the *psēphisma* of the Athenian boule concerning Salamis (479 B.C.), the Hellenic Oath of 479 B.C., the *psēphisma* concerning the statue of Hippias Charmou (479/8 B.C.), the *psēphisma* against Arthmios of Zeleia, the Peace of Kallias, and the Epeheic Oath. For the view that the Themistokles decree was a fabrication created by Kleidemos, see G. Huxley, "On Fragments of Three Historians, II: Kleidemos and the 'Themistokles Decree,'" *GRBS* 9 (1968) 313–18.

22. Paus. 10.15.5. For the testimonia and fragments, see Jacoby, *FGrH* III B n. 323.

23. Jacoby, *FGrH* III B Suppl. vol. 1, 58.

24. *Ibid.* 59.

περὶ νόστου Πεισιστράτου” (the work in question being the *Atthis*).²⁵ Athenaios also refers to an *Exegetikon*, a handbook on religious and ritual matters. The single fragment indisputably from the *Exegetikon* (F 14), gives details of the offering trench to be dug to the west of a burial, and specifies the words to be recited as a purificatory libation is poured out. The information and the tone of the passage strongly support the view that the *Exegetikon* was an antiquarian, not political, work. Among the shorter fragments half a dozen are glosses from Hesychios, Philodemos, and Photios, each dealing with a matter of religious practice or terminology—names for sacrifices, epithets for the gods, calendar dates given over to apotropaic rites—and it is likely that these also were excerpted from the *Exegetikon*.²⁶ It is quite possible, therefore, that all the fragments that come down to us under the name of Kleidemos are from only two works, one a collection of religious lore, the other his history of Athens. This is noteworthy because Kleidemos was awarded a crown by the *dēmos*.²⁷ It suggests that in Kleidemos’s *Atthis* many Athenians found a version of their early history that appealed to both their patriotic and their democratic sentiments.

Reconstructing his *Atthis* is a difficult job, since few of the fragments are longer than a sentence or two. It was at least four books long, beginning no later than Theseus (F 17, F 18) and continuing down to and including the Peloponnesian War (F 10, with references to the Sicilian Expedition).²⁸ The fragments of the *Atthis* have the same antiquarian tone and content displayed by the *Exegetikon*. They include topographical notes: references to Agrai, a hill outside Athens where the Lesser Mysteries of Demeter were held (F 1), and the location of a Metroön (F 9); to the Melanippeion, a heroön to the son of Theseus (F 2); and to Maketia, an alternative name for Macedon (F 3). There are also bits of religious and historical arcana: Hesychios found in Kleidemos’s *Atthis* the information that a pastry offered to Selene was called “the seventh cow” (F 12). Athenaios discovered the cooks were called heralds, and that one of their jobs was to summon people to assembly (F 5). The scholiast to Kallimachos explained

25. Ibid. 61.

26. Jacoby asserted that the *Exegetikon* was a “publication of documents” (ibid. 59), but the basis for this claim is unclear.

27. Tertullian, *De Anim.* 52 = *FGrH* 323 T 2: “Nam etsi prae gaudio quis spiritum exhalet, ut Chiron Spartanus, dum victorem Olympiae filium amplectitur; etsi prae gloria, ut Clitodemus dum ob historicarum praestantiam auro coronatur” (following Wissowa’s emendation of the unintelligible *ab historicis diu praestantiam*). The textual problems in Tertullian’s statement do not make it any less probable that Kleidemos was crowned. Stories that tell of the rewards given to Herodotos for oral performances of his work prove that there is nothing inherently implausible about a historian’s being honored by the *dēmos*. See Plut. *De Herod. Malig.* 26 (= *Moral.* 862B) and Euseb. Hieron. ol. 83, 4 (445/4 B.C.), as well as W. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989) 80.

It is perhaps worth recalling that a genre that preceded the *Atthides* and may have influenced them was a variety of elegy concerned with local history composed for public performance. See E. L. Bowie, “Early Greek Elegy, Symposium and Public Festival,” *JHS* 106 (1986) 13–36.

28. For the fullest treatment of the probable shape of Kleidemos’s work, see Jacoby, *FGrH* III B Suppl. vol. 1, 58–61.

a Homeric reference to the "Ionians of the trailing robes" by referring to Kleidemos's observation that in the early days the Athenians wore ankle-length robes like the Persians, Syrians, and Carthaginians (F 13).

One would be hard put to argue that any of this material, in its transmitted state at least, was politically charged, and Harding has argued that "any propaganda that was slipped in . . . would have been submerged beneath the mass of other material."²⁹ This is a notion of propaganda that he finds oversubtle and rejects. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to dismiss Kleidemos's *Atthis* as solely, or even primarily, antiquarian on the basis of the apparent tone and content of the extant fragments. Later lexicographers and scholiasts mined the *Atthides* for precisely this type of obscure material. If the original episodes from which these glosses derive were part of a broader political interpretation of Athenian history, the very process of transmission through the grammarians and lexicographers would selectively filter out all but the most antiquarian material. Accordingly, when Hesychios wanted to explain the phrase "Agamemnon's cisterns," he found in book 2 of Kleidemos's *Atthis* the explanation that Agamemnon had dug wells at Daulis and all over Greece. It is likely that this is simply an antiquarian anecdote, but we have no way of putting Kleidemos's story into any kind of context, and the only antiquarianism we can be certain of is that of Hesychios.

More revealing for an accurate appraisal of Kleidemos are the longer passages preserved by Plutarch, since it is here that we get the chance to compare his versions with other treatments of stories from the common stock available to Athenian writers. We have longer passages from Kleidemos's work on three very important figures in Athenian history, Theseus, Kleisthenes, and Themistokles; and it is in his treatment of these characters that Kleidemos reveals himself as a partisan of the democratic line.

* * *

By the time Kleidemos composed his *Atthis*, Theseus had become the greatest of Athenian heroes. Originally his deeds were modeled on the career of Herakles, and the similarities between the mature Dorian hero and the clean-shaven Ionian youth were proverbial.³⁰ After the Persian Wars, stories telling of Theseus's dealings with the Amazons became a mythical analogue for the Persian invasion, and a popular subject in the visual arts, so that increas-

29. Harding (*supra*, n. 7) 159.

30. On Theseus, see most recently C. Calame, *Thésée et l'imaginaire athénien: Légende et culte en Grèce antique* (Lausanne, 1990) chap. 6; and W. R. Connor, "Theseus in Classical Athens," in A. G. Ward et al., *The Quest for Theseus* (New York, 1970) 143-74. On the proverb "Another Herakles," see Plut. *Thes.* 29.3. Appropriately, Theseus was famous for having erected a pillar at the Isthmus marking the boundary between the Peloponnese and Ionia (Plut. *Thes.* 25.3). Plutarch observes that Theseus instituted the Isthmian Games in emulation of Herakles and the Olympic Games. On iconographic similarities, see J. Neils, *The Youthful Deeds of Theseus*, *Archaeologica* 76 (Rome, 1987) 143-48. A good example is London E 36 (= Neils Cat. 4), ca. 510 B.C.; it shows Theseus hauling away a live (Erymanthian) boar instead of the more usual slaying of the sow Phaia.

ingly Theseus came to stand for Athens itself.³¹ At the same time political leaders from Peisistratos to Kimon sought to enhance their personal prestige by identifying themselves with Theseus.³² In the fifth century, as the democracy came to articulate its own identity, Theseus became a focal point for discussions of the *politeia*, partly because as king he had synoikized Attica and partly because as hero he brought the imprimatur of aristocratic authority to the democracy's beginnings.³³ Consequently Theseus served as a polyvalent symbol, standing for Athens in general, for particular leading families, or for the democracy.

His importance as a democratic hero is most clearly reflected in his treatment by Euripides, who presented Theseus in the *Suppliant Women* as the royal leader of a democratic polis. Appropriating terms from all over the political spectrum, Theseus explains the nature of his rule: *καὶ γὰρ κατέστησ' αὐτὸν εἰς*

31. The literature on Theseus and the Amazons is considerable. Important contributions include J. Boardman, "Herakles, Theseus and Amazons," in D. Kurtz and B. Sparkes, eds., *The Eye of Greece: Studies in the Art of Athens* (Cambridge, 1982) 13; D. von Bothmer, *Amazons in Greek Art* (Oxford, 1957) chaps. 8, 10; and W. B. Tyrrell, *Amazons: A Study in Athenian Mythmaking* (Baltimore, 1984) 9–22. In Athens the battle was depicted on the wall of the Stoa Poikile and in the metopes of the Hephaisteion, overlooking the Agora; see J. M. Camp, *The Athenian Agora: Excavations in the Heart of Classical Athens* (London, 1986) 66–72; H. A. Thompson and R. E. Wycherly, *The Athenian Agora*, vol. 14, *The Agora of Athens* (Princeton, 1972) 147–49; and S. v. Bockelberg, "Die Friese des Hephaisteion," *Antike Plastik* 18 (1979) 23–50. Outside Athens, Theseus fought Amazons in the metopes of the Athenian Treasury at Delphi and on the stool of Zeus at Olympia by Pheidias; see T. H. Carpenter, *Art and Myth in Ancient Greece* (London, 1991) 126, 164; and Ruth B. Edwards, "The Growth of the Legend," in Ward et al. (*supra*, n. 30) 41.

32. On Peisistratids and Theseus, see Connor (*supra*, n. 30) 143–50. On the Alkmaionids and Theseus, see K. Scheffold, "Kleisthenes," *MH* 3 (1946) 65–67; and Neils (*supra*, n. 30) 149. On Kimon and Theseus, see Plut. *Thes.* 24 as well as C. Sourvinou-Inwood, "Theseus Lifting the Rock and a Cup Near the Pithos Painter," *JHS* 91 (1971) 98–99. At Delphi a statue group showing the Tribal Heroes of Athens stood outside the precinct of Apollo. At one end stood Miltiades and Athena; at the other were Theseus, Kodros, and Philaios, so that the entire group served to fuse Athenian myth and history with Philaid claims into a single, coherent statement. See most recently *LIMC* 4 (1988) s.v. "Erectheus" no. 80 (Kron). E. R. Knauer, "Mitra and Kerkeion: Some Reflections on Symbolic Attributes in the Art of the Classical Period," *AA*, 1992, 384 and n. 33, suggests that the statue of Theseus was intended to be seen as a portrait of Kimon. I thank Dr. Knauer for generously sharing her insight with me.

33. The traditions associating Theseus with the synoikism of Athens are closely bound up with the debate over the *politeia*. Plutarch explains the synoikism of Attica in terms more appropriate to the foundation of the democracy: *τοῖς δὲ δυνατοῖς ἀβασιλευτον πολιτείαν προτείνων καὶ δημοκρατίαν αὐτῶν μόνον ἀρχοντι πολέμου καὶ νόμων φύλακι χρησομένην* (*Thes.* 24). Similarly the Marmor Parium (*FGrH* II B n. 239 l. 20) notes *Θησ[εὺς βασιλεύσας] Ἀθηῶν τὰς δώδεκα πόλεις εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνώκισεν καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν παρέδωκε*. Misconceptions were sufficiently widespread for Thucydides (at 2.15.1–2) to feel the need to set the record straight. If debate over Theseus and his relationship to both synoikism and the democratic *politeia* was a feature of fifth-century political thought, it would help to explain the omission of Theseus from the *epitaphios logos*, to which Loraux (*supra*, n. 9) draws attention. As Loraux well demonstrates, the ideology of the polis, though defined in reaction to that of the aristocracy, is not the same as democratic ideology. As a system, democratic thinking comes after the creation of a state ideology. Theseus is of interest to those who approach the Athenian constitution as the product of a historical process. The *epitaphios logos* is fundamentally uninterested in origins or change. It aims at timelessness. It is "a repetitive and exemplary enactment of a single *arete*" (p. 134).

μοναρχίαν / ἐλευθερώσας τήνδ' ἰσόψηφον πόλιν. (352–53).³⁴ As democracy sought to establish itself as the legitimate *politeia* of the Athenians, its supporters made the claim that democracy was the opposite of lawlessness. Order, they claimed, was the result of, and therefore the hallmark of, democracy.³⁵ Accordingly, Theseus could be positioned as a hero of the democracy, not despite his royal lineage, but because his kingship, like the democracy, had supported the rule of law. It is the democratic sovereign Theseus who articulates the democracy's fundamental characteristics when, in reply to a messenger who has asked to speak with the tyrant, he says:

πρῶτον μὲν ἤρξω τοῦ λόγου ψευδῶς, ξένε,
 ζητῶν τύραννον ἐνθάδ'. οὐ γὰρ ἄρχεται
 ἐνὸς πρὸς ἄνδρὸς ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρα πόλις.
 δῆμος δ' ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει
 ἐνιαυσίαισιν, οὐχὶ τῷ πλούτῳ διδοῦς
 τὸ πλεῖστον, ἀλλὰ χά πένης ἔχων ἴσον.

(403–8)

But in the generation before Kleidemos, Theseus underwent one final transformation. With the term “oligarchy” banished from political debate following the fall of the Thirty, conservative thinkers were forced to find other ways of conveying their criticisms of democracy.³⁶ Some distinguished between the true democracy founded by Theseus and the debased democracy of more recent times. In both the *Helen* and the *Panathenaios*, Isokrates claimed that Theseus had handed over the constitution to the people, but he argued that this democratic *politeia* had remained aristocratic. The problem was not with Theseus, who was too popular to be criticized, but with those who assumed the leadership after Theseus. Of these later demagogues Isokrates writes:³⁷

34. See Calame (*supra*, n. 30) 222. Calame also notes the possibility of other democratic treatments of Theseus in Sophokles' *Theseus*, in the *Atthis* of Hellanikos, and in the *Theseus* of Alkaios; see p. 275 n. 91.

35. The importance of the rule of law as a guiding principle in the evolution of Classical Athens is rightly emphasized by R. Sealey throughout his recent study *The Athenian Republic: Democracy or the Rule of Law* (University Park, 1987).

36. On the transition in Athenian political life occasioned by the defeat of the Thirty, see M. I. Finley, “Athenian Demagogues,” *P&P* 21 (1962) 17; C. Pecorella Longo, *Eterie e gruppi politici* (Florence, 1971); and more recently, Barry Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1986) 17–20. The belief that oligarchic *hetaireiai* were driven underground and functioned in secret, a view proposed by Pecorella Longo, fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the very groups being studied. Ruschenbusch is closer to the mark when he observes, “Die Politik des 5. Jahrhunderts sei nicht von ideologischen, sondern von praktischen Erwägungen bestimmt gewesen.” See E. Ruschenbusch, “Ephialtes,” *Historia* 15 (1966) 370. This conclusion holds true for the fourth century as well. See S. Perlman, “The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century B.C.,” *Athenaeum* 41 (1963) 327–55.

37. Isok. *Panath.* 131; on handing over the *politeia* to the people, see *Panath.* 129 and *Helen* 38, which does not even mention the word “democracy.” For an account of the aristocratic democracy associated with Theseus, see *Panath.* 126–34 and esp. 139 (leadership) and 149 (magistracies). See the remarks of Calame (*supra*, n. 30) 412–15. There was also a struggle over Solon. Isokrates calls

οἷτινες ἄπειροι πολιτειῶν ὄντες, οὐ διήμαρτον αἰρούμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείσης οὐ μόνον εἶναι κοινοτάτης καὶ δικαιοτάτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφορωτάτης ἅπασι καὶ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδίστης. κατεστήσαντο γὰρ δημοκρατίαν οὐ τὴν εἰκῆ πολιτευομένην, καὶ νομίζουσαν τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἐλευθερίαν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῖς τοιούτοις μὲν ἐπιτιμῶσαν, ἀριστοκρατίᾳ δὲ χρωμένην.

On the other hand, for those who could not be bothered disguising their dislike for democracy Theseus was a convenient a target. Theophrastos's Oligarchic Character concludes his tirade against the democracy with the outburst³⁸

καὶ τὸν Θησέα πρῶτον φῆσαι τῶν κακῶν τῇ πόλει γεγονέναι αἴτιον. τοῦτον γὰρ ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων εἰς μίαν καταγαγόντα λύσαι τὴν βασιλείαν· καὶ δίκαια αὐτὸν παθεῖν· πρῶτον γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀπολέσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

What the Oligarch was referring to was the belief that, as Aristotle said, Theseus was the first to turn toward the multitude, but that subsequently the populace had turned against him until he was forced to quit the city, a story that neatly turned that most democratic of institutions, ostracism, against the democracy's darling.³⁹

By the time of Kleidemos, then, Theseus figured everywhere in Athenian culture. How did Kleidemos deal with Theseus? There are two passages in his *Life of Theseus* in which Plutarch names Kleidemos as his source. The first is chapter 19 (= F 17), in which Plutarch introduces Kleidemos's version of the expedition to Krete by drawing attention to the idiosyncrasies of Kleidemos's account: ἰδίως δὲ πῶς καὶ περιττῶς ὁ Κλείδημος ἀπήγγειλε. In recounting the Kretan episode Plutarch mentions Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, Euripides, Hellanikos, Philochoros, and Aristotle, so that when he calls Kleidemos's version "distinctive" and "unusual" we must assume that it was genuinely unlike the other accounts available to him. Even an outline of the story reveals its peculiarity: beginning at a much earlier point than most accounts (ἄνωθ' ἐν ποθέν ἀρξάμενος), Kleidemos maintained that the Greeks had a convention according

him *dēmotikōtatos* even as he ascribes to him a constitution in which participation was restricted to the propertied classes. On the dramatic shift in the presentation of Solon, see E. Ruschenbusch, "ΠΑΤΡΙΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ: Theseus, Drakon, Solon und Kleisthenes im Publizistik und Geschichtsschreibung des 5. und 4. Jh. v. Chr.," *Historia* 7 (1958) 398–424. Perhaps the most remarkable product of this tendentious politicizing of the past is Isokrates' description of the Spartans as *malista dēmokratoumenoi*, a description justified on the grounds that the Spartiates enjoyed perfect equality among themselves. This should be contrasted with Isokrates' own condemnation of the Spartans throughout the *Panathenaios*.

38. Theoph. Char. 26 (Jebb 29). A slightly different text is published by R. G. Ussher, ed., *The Characters of Theophrastus* (London, 1960) 224–25. See also G. D. Kapsalis, *Die Typik der Situationen in den Charakteren Theophrasts und ihre Rezeption in der neugriechischen Literatur* (Bochum, 1982) 86.

39. [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* F 2 (= Plut. *Thes.* 25), Plut. *Thes.* 35.

to which only Jason was allowed to sail with ships manned by more than five men. This was so that he could continue the fight against piracy. After the flight of Daidalos to Athens, Minos broke the convention, but was killed in a storm that blew him off course to Sicily. Deukalion, Minos's son, took up the fight and demanded the handing-over of Daidalos, threatening that otherwise he would kill the children whom Minos had as hostages. To this Theseus replied that he would not hand over Daidalos because they were blood relatives: Daidalos was the cousin of Theseus. In the meantime, Theseus set about having a fleet built in secret at Thymaitadai, off the beaten track, and at Troizen. Once the fleet was ready, Theseus set sail with the Kretan exiles, made a successful landing, marched to Knossos, and killed Deukalion at the entrance to the Labyrinth. Power now devolved onto Ariadne, with whom Theseus completed a treaty according to which the Athenians and Kretans would live in peace and friendship forever more.

As far as we can tell, this version of the story is unique. This is most apparent in the ending. Having restored the exiles, and succeeded in Athens' first overseas expedition, Theseus shows his true greatness by establishing a lasting peace between the Kretans and Athenians. Not only does this make Theseus out to be as great a statesman as a warrior, but also, by implication, it refutes stories of the seduction and abandonment of Ariadne on Dia or Naxos, stories that hardly did Theseus credit. As Plutarch was to write later, there were many stories about Ariadne (*Thes.* 12), and "other stories also about marriages of Theseus that were neither honorable in their beginnings nor fortunate in their endings."⁴⁰ The ending of Kleidemos's account of the Kretan expedition suggests that his Theseus was a sanitized version of the mythical hero.

More important than cleaning up Theseus's love life, however, was finding a way to strengthen the identification between the Athens of the heroic past and the Athens of the present. In this regard the presentation of Theseus as the original founder of Athenian sea power is one of the most distinctive features of Kleidemos's account. His Theseus is modeled on Themistokles. Minos, who is elsewhere presented as a lawgiver, becomes instead a lawbreaker.⁴¹ His actions, furthermore, involve not only individuals such as Daidalos and Theseus, but are a transgression of a common decree of the Greeks (δόγμα κοινὸν . . . Ἑλλήνων). Accordingly, while Theseus's defense of Daidalos is morally justified by the ties of blood, the naval expedition to Krete also takes on the overtones of a defense of the common interest of the Greeks, much as the Athenians had led the common defense of the Greeks at Salamis. Theseus displays cunning worthy of Themistokles, the man responsible for the building of the Athenian fleet that fought at Salamis, in having his fleet constructed in

40. Plut. *Thes.* 29.

41. On Minos as lawgiver, see Plato, *Laws* 624b, 630d, 632d. For Thucydides, Minos is also the original naval power of the Aegean: see Thuc. 1.4.

secret (βουλόμενος λανθάνειν), just as Themistokles had engineered the building of the Long Walls behind the backs of the Spartans. One of the secret locations is Troizen, the town of Theseus's childhood and the location of the famous evacuation ordered by Themistokles. The other spot is Thymaitadai, a city deme of the tribe Hippothontis (VIII), next to Peiraieus and the nearest point on Attic soil to Salamis.⁴² This version of the story was making a particular point: Theseus, like Themistokles, was responsible for Athens' might as a naval power.

This was as much a political statement as a historical one, because the navy was synonymous in the fourth century with the democracy. [Xenophon], no friend of the democracy, says as much when he observes, ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλαύνων τὰς ναῦς καὶ ὁ τὴν δύναμιν περιτιθεὶς τῇ πόλει.⁴³ [Xenophon]'s pamphlet is unambiguous in its condemnation of the Athenians' *politeia* because, as he says, by choosing democracy the Athenians had decided to elevate the *ponēroi* over the *chrēstoi*; but, he added, their empire was based on control of the sea, and to that end naval power was necessary. Helmsmen were more useful than hoplites.⁴⁴ The centrality of naval power both characterized the full democracy and allowed its critics to distinguish it from other *politeiai*. Isokrates, accordingly, could argue that the democracy he eulogized in the *Panathenaios* was different from the *politeia* of his own day. We have already seen how he associated the earlier, aristocratic democracy with the name of Theseus, but what the *Panathenaios* makes clear is the nature of the change. According to Isokrates the Athenians were compelled to adopt this newer, debased democracy (ἦν ἀναγκασθέντες μετελάβομεν) by the realization that it was better suited to their naval power: περὶ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν ταύτην χρησιμωτέραν εἶναι νομίζοντες.⁴⁵ In the context of an encomium to Athens, Isokrates could hardly dwell on the shortcomings of the current democracy, but he was anxious to assert the moral superiority of hoplite democracy. He explains, ἀλλ' ἀκριβῶς ἤδεσαν τὴν μὲν κατὰ γῆν ἡγεμονίαν ὑπ' εὐταξίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πειθαρχίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων μελετωμένην, τὴν δὲ κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων αὐξανομένην.⁴⁶ Isokrates' Theseus, as the founder of aristocratic democracy, was a champion of the hoplites and *aristoi*. Kleidemos's presentation of Theseus as a founder of Athenian sea power must be read,

42. On Thymaitadai see *RE*, ser. 2, vol. 6 pt. 1 s.v. "Thymaitadai"; J. Traill, *The Political Organization of Attica*, Hesperia Suppl. 14 (Princeton, 1975) 52; and P. Siewert, *Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes* (Munich, 1982) 101: "Zusätzlich hatte die Hippothontis aus dem Nachbarsektor der Kekropis (VII) Thymaitadai und Korydallos erhalten. Beide sind durch den von Pérama, der Übergangsstelle von Salamis, durch das Gebiet von Xypete laufenden antiken Weg mit Athen verbunden." The deme may have been out of the way in Theseus's day, but by the time of Kleidemos its associations with Salamis were obvious.

43. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2.

44. On the advantages of sea power, see *ibid.* 2.2–13.

45. Isok. *Panath.* 114.

46. *Ibid.* 115.

therefore, as part of the debate over Theseus, and as an attempt to recast Theseus as a hero and forerunner of the extreme democracy.

The second occasion on which Plutarch's *Life of Theseus* drew heavily on Kleidemos was in the account in chapter 27 of the Amazon invasion of Athens. This was a common topos of the *epitaphios logos*.⁴⁷ In Lysias's *Epitaphios* and Isokrates' *Panegyrikos* the invasion of the Amazons culminates in the total annihilation of the invading army, paralleling the defeat of the Persians.⁴⁸ Kleidemos, however, once again chose to diverge sharply from the common view. Although he gave a detailed account of the battle between the Athenians and the Amazons, mentioning a variety of specific locations in Athens, his version did not climax in an Athenian military victory. Instead Kleidemos held that the outcome of the battle was even: the left wing of the Amazons was drawn up near the location later known as the Amazoneion and was successful in routing the Athenian forces arrayed against it. Only the Athenians who attacked from the Palladion, Ardettos, and the Lykeion were able to drive the Amazonian right wing back to its camp and slay many of the invaders. The invasion ended when a treaty was negotiated by Hippolyte, the Amazon whom Theseus married. Plutarch says that Kleidemos wished to be accurate in every detail (ἐξακριβοῦν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστὰ βουλόμενος), as if he were writing to set the record straight. In place of a desperate victory won by the manly prowess of the Athenians over their feminine and Eastern opponents, we are offered the picture of a wise and prudent ruler who achieves peace by persuasion and negotiation. The reason for Kleidemos's departure from the accepted tradition lies in the fact that in these traditional accounts the Amazon invasion, a mythicized version of Xerxes' invasion, is an encounter fought exclusively on land. It thereby excludes the navy and appropriates all the glory of Athens' ultimate victory to the hoplite class. It conceives of a Persian invasion defeated without a victory at Salamis. Kleidemos could not disregard the traditional version completely. He was not free to invent an Amazonian Salamis, but by downplaying the military defeat of the Amazons, Kleidemos could offer a version of events that glorified Athens and Theseus without especially honoring the hoplites.

Kleidemos's version is also marked by careful attention to the topography of the battle, yet there is one glaring omission. Nowhere in the account reported by Plutarch is there any mention of the fact that the camp of the Amazons was located on the Areopagos, despite the fact that this had been part of the story from at least as early as the first performance of the *Eumenides*, in 458 B.C. Kleidemos does say that the right wing of the Amazons was driven back to their

47. Loraux (*supra*, n. 9) 4; and J. E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (New York, 1981) 176. Ziolkowski places the Amazon invasion in the *genos* subdivision of the standard *epainos*.

48. Lys. *Epitaph.* 6–8; Isok. *Paneg.* 68–70. On utter annihilation, see *Paneg.* 69, διεφθάρησαν ὡς περ ἂν εἰ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπολέμησαν, and *Paneg.* 70, λέγεται δ' οὖν περὶ μὲν Ἀμαζόνων ὡς τῶν μὲν ἐλθουσῶν οὐδεμία πάλιν ἀπῆλθεν.

camp, where many of them were slain; but its exact location, as far as we can tell, is not given. It might be argued that the Areopagos was named, and that it simply has not been transmitted by Plutarch; but given Plutarch's attention to detail in this passage, that is unlikely. Plutarch mentions the Amazoneion, the Museion, the graves located by the heroön to Chalkodon, the Peiraic gate, the shrine of the Eumenides, the Palladion, Ardettos, and the Lykeion. Why should the Areopagos be omitted? Either the notion that the Amazons' camp was on the Areopagos was not widely held, or else Kleidemos chose to ignore it. His reason is not hard to guess. The Areopagos was dropped in favor of a more acceptable democratic location, the Pnyx. It is here that the Amazonian right wing is drawn up, and it is on this wing that the Amazons are rolled back by the victorious Athenians. The Pnyx, then, is the focal point for the military defeat of the Amazons.

It should come as no surprise that even Kleidemos's topography was politically charged. Debate over the Areopagos was central to the politics of the fourth century, and as the shift to democracy became more complete, the Areopagos served to symbolize an earlier, less democratic *politeia*. The *Ath. Pol.*, for example, imagines the early Areopagos as a guardian of the laws with powers of impeachment and the right to appoint archons.⁴⁹ Accordingly, for [Aristotle] and other fourth-century writers, Ephialtes' attack on the Areopagos became the turning point in Athenian history.⁵⁰ In the *Areopagitikos* Isokrates claims that it

49. [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.6, 4.4, 8.2, 8.4.

50. The substance of Ephialtes' reforms is much debated. The more important discussions include C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1952) 154–55; H. T. Wade-Gery, "The Judicial Treaty with Phaselis and the History of the Athenian Courts," *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1968) 180–200; R. Sealey, "Ephialtes," *CP* 59 (1964) 11–22; E. M. Carawan, "Apophysis and eisangelia: The Role of the Areopagus in Athenian Political Trials," *GRBS* 26 (1985) 115–40, and "Eisangelia and euthyna: The Trials of Miltiades, Themistocles and Cimon," *GRBS* 28 (1987) 167–208. Most recently M. Ostwald, "The Areopagus in the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία," in M. Piérart, ed., *Aristote et Athènes* (Paris, 1993) 139–53, argues, on the basis of *IG* 1³ 105, that attempts had been made to curtail the judicial powers of the Areopagos prior to 461 B.C., but that a residue of these were left to be swept away by Ephialtes. This interpretation is laid out in fuller detail in *Popular Sovereignty* (*supra*, n. 18) 28–42, where Ostwald examines the trial of Phrynichos ca. 493 B.C., the trials of Miltiades on charges of tyranny (in the Chersonese) and deception (occasioned by the failure of his Parian expedition) ca. 493 and 489 B.C., the trial of Hipparchos ca. 480 B.C., the trial of Themistokles ca. 471 B.C., and the trial of Kimon in 462 B.C. All six trials took place before the reforms of Ephialtes, and, although all were trials for crimes against the state and although three involved demands for the death penalty, the Areopagos does not appear to have exercised jurisdiction in any of the cases. Ostwald concludes that legislation had already been enacted before Ephialtes whereby jurisdiction over trials for crimes against the state involving the death penalty or heavy fines had been removed from the Areopagos and put into the hands of popular courts. Still, there was a significant change wrought by Ephialtes, sufficient, as Sealey points out, to earn him assassination. Examining the powers exercised by the boule in the middle of the fourth century that it did not possess early in the fifth, P. J. Rhodes argues that Ephialtes was responsible for transferring control of *eisaggeliai*, *dokimasiai*, and *euthynai* from the Areopagos to the boule, assembly, and dikasteria. See P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford, 1972) 201–7, and *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford, 1981) 311–22. For the debate over the *epitheta* that Ephialtes stripped from the Areopagos, see R. W. Wallace, *The Areopagos Council, to 307 B.C.* (Baltimore, 1985) 83–87.

was all downhill for Athens after the Areopagos was stripped of its powers.⁵¹ The *Ath. Pol.*, similarly, specifies the period after Ephialtes' reforms as the time when the city made mistakes (ἀμαρτάνειν) thanks to the demagogues and the empire (διὰ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχήν).⁵² The *Ath. Pol.*'s account of the reforms is little more than conservative slander: Themistokles hoodwinks Ephialtes into thinking the Areopagos is conspiring against him, causing Ephialtes to take refuge at an altar in his undergarments. Somehow this results in a sustained attack on the Areopagos in both the Council of Five Hundred and the Assembly, ἕως περιείλοντο αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν.⁵³ We do not have to accept the historicity of the *Ath. Pol.*'s story to see that by dropping the Areopagos from his account of the Amazon invasion Kleidemos was downplaying the importance of an institution that had come to symbolize a conservative *politeia*.

The Pnyx was also the subject of debate. This emerges from the conflicting explanations of the name's etymology, even though the grammarians and lexicographers all assumed that Πνύξ derived from πυκνώω. A scholion to Aristophanes' *Acharnians* and the *Suda* both record that the Pnyx was synonymous with the term *ekklēsia*. They state that the name derived either from the packing of stones, παρὰ τὴν τῶν λίθων πυκνότητα (presumably a reference to the massive masonry employed in the various phases of the Pnyx's construction), or from the way the members of the Assembly were packed in, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυκνοῦσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ.⁵⁴ But the *Etymologicum Magnum* preserves quite a different explanation: παρὰ τὸ πεπυκνωθῆναι τῇ πλήθει τῶν ἐκκλιπόντων ἐκεῖσε ἀνθρώπων. κλίνεται πυκνός. ἢ ὅτι πυκνά ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὴν οἰκήματα.⁵⁵ The first of these two explanations emphasizes the crowding of the Assembly and is surely pejorative. By referring only to the physical conditions of the neighborhood, the second of these interpretations appears to manage a more neutral definition. In fact, the second definition in the *Etymologicum Magnum* can be traced back to Kleidemos. Harpokration (= F 7) reports, "Pnyx was the name used for the Athenian Assembly. There are many references to it in the Atthidographers. Kleidemos in Book 3 of his *Protogonia* says, 'They assembled on the Pnyx, so called on account of the fact that the *synoikēsis* is close-packed.' " Not only does Kleidemos avoid the definition that is tainted by oligarchic distaste for the masses; he evokes in his definition Theseus's *synoikism* of the community. The Pnyx, therefore, serves to embody the democracy, to recall the work of the first democratic hero, and to bear witness to Athens' greatest military victory in myth-historic time.

51. Isok. *Areopag.* 7.50–52.

52. [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 41.2.

53. Ibid. 25.4. On Aristotle's political thinking and the stages of democracy, see J. Day and M. Chambers, *Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962). For a skeptical view of the tradition surrounding Ephialtes, see Ruschenbusch (*supra*, n. 36) 369–70.

54. Schol. ad Arist. *Acharn.* 20; *Suda*, s.v. Πνύξ.

55. *Ety. Mag.* s.v. Πνύξ.

* * *

This fusion of myth, history, and current ideological debate can be seen in Kleidemos's treatment of Kleisthenes and the *naukrariai*, the boards that were thought to have controlled finances and built ships in Archaic Athens.⁵⁶ The most detailed fourth-century discussion of the *naukrariai* is found in the *Ath. Pol.*, which mentions them twice. At 8.3 we are told that each of the four tribes in the Solonian constitution was divided into three *trittyes* and twelve *naukrariai*. Later, at 21.5, we learn that Kleisthenes replaced the *naukrariai* with demes, and assigned the duties of the *naukraroi* to the demarchs. In this account, then, there were forty-eight *naukrariai*, subdivisions of *trittyes*, created by Solon and disbanded by Kleisthenes. Kleidemos told an altogether different story. According to his version (F 8), it was Kleisthenes who devised the system. Having created the ten tribes to replace the four previous tribes, Kleisthenes divided them into fifty parts, which were called *naukrariai*.

Jacoby attempted to reconcile Kleidemos's account with the information in the *Ath. Pol.* that Solon had coined the terms *naukraria* and *naukraros*, and had created forty-eight *naukrariai*. He claimed, "according to Kleidemos [Kleisthenes] only altered their numbers: in place of the 48 *naukrariai* of Solon he established 50, corresponding to the ten tribes."⁵⁷ But this explanation presumes that Kleidemos's *Atthis* postdates the *Ath. Pol.*, when it is almost certain that the *Atthis* is the earlier of the two works.⁵⁸ There are more serious objections. Since Kleidemos does not make any reference to Solon in this passage, or to any *naukrariai* before Kleisthenes, there is nothing to support the view that Kleidemos cast Kleisthenes' reforms as an alteration to a system already established by Solon. When Kleidemos said that Kleisthenes created the ten tribes, which he divided into fifty units called *naukrariai*, he was saying that the system of *naukrariai* originated with Kleisthenes. In Kleidemos's version there is no suggestion that the *naukrariai* were subdivisions of *trittyes*, or that they were superseded by demes. In fact, what is clearly meant is that the *naukrariai*

56. On the *naukrariai*, see Rhodes (*supra*, n. 50 [1981]) 151, "Information on the *naukrariai* is scanty"; as well as M. Amit, *Athens and the Sea* (Brussels, 1965) 104: "an insoluble riddle." The *naukraroi*, in particular, continue to generate a lively debate. See most recently B. Jordan, "The Naukraroi of Athens and the Meaning of ΝΕΜΩ," *AC* 61 (1992) 60–79. Why financial officers with religious authority (as evinced in the Kylonian affair) should be known by a title derived from naval matters has always perplexed scholars and may best be explained by the theory that *nau-* derives from ναός, a suggestion recently proposed by J. C. Billigmeier and A. S. Dusing, "The Origin and Function of the Naukraroi at Athens: An Etymological and Historical Explanation," *TAPhA* 111 (1981) 11–16.

57. *FGrH* III B Suppl. vol. 1, 66. The same interpretation is offered by Day and Chambers (*supra*, n. 53) 109.

58. On the date of the *Ath. Pol.*, see Rhodes (*supra* n. 50 [1981]) 51–58 ("towards the end of the 330's"); this is supported by J. J. Keaney, *The Composition of Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford, 1992) 4. On the date of Kleidemos, see Jacoby, *FGrH* III B Suppl. vol. 1, 58. It could be argued, of course, that the version recorded in the *Ath. Pol.* derives from a source earlier than Kleidemos, but such an assertion carries the burden of proof before one can speak of Kleidemos's "altering" figures in the *Ath. Pol.*

and demes served different functions, but were both established by Kleisthenes as subdivisions of the ten tribes. The demes were the basis of the political organization of the state, and the *naukrariai* were responsible for the maintenance of the navy. The *Ath. Pol.* and Kleidemos offer incompatible explanations of the *naukrariai*.

Kleidemos's decision to attribute the *naukrariai* to Kleisthenes cannot be explained by the suggestion that Solon was unpopular with the supporters of the democracy. The evidence from the *Ath. Pol.* demonstrates very clearly that a democratic tradition about Solon flourished in the fourth century. [Aristotle]'s account of the *seisachtheia* includes the story that Solon's friends got wind of the cancellation beforehand and exploited their knowledge to contract massive debts, which they were then able to write off. There were two versions of the story: συνέβη γὰρ τῷ Σόλωνι . . . ὡς δ' οἱ δημοτικοὶ λέγουσι, παραστρατηγηθῆναι διὰ τῶν φίλων, ὡς δ' οἱ βουλόμενοι βλασφημεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸν κοινωνεῖν.⁵⁹ [Aristotle] takes pains throughout the chapters on Solon to emphasize the democratic features of his legislation, and as Ruschenbusch has shown, interest in Solon as a founder of the *patrios politeia* increased dramatically around 350 B.C.⁶⁰ Why then did Kleidemos reject the view that Solon established the *naukrariai*? Not out of hostility toward Solon, to be sure, but because it was his intention to give the greatest credit to the most unambiguously democratic figures. Some might try to dilute the democratic quality of Solon's work, as Androtion did by suggesting that the *seisachtheia* was only a reduction in interest rates, but there was no such argument over Kleisthenes. He was remembered for handing over the *politeia* to the people, and was regarded as more democratic than Solon.⁶¹

The political significance of the decision to attribute the scheme to Kleisthenes becomes clearer in the light of Kleidemos's assertion that the *naukrariai* of Kleisthenes' day were the antecedents of the symmories of the fourth century. Present and past are linked; radical democracy is positioned as the true descendant of the original democracy; and naval might is presented as the common denominator of the past glory and present hope of the state. Kleisthenes is elevated to the status of founder of Athenian naval power, in the same way as Theseus before him and Themistokles after him. Like Theseus he is also remembered as a founder of the democracy, and there was never any question about the democratic leanings of Themistokles. A recurring pattern emerges in Kleidemos's treatment of the key figures of Athenian myth and history: the champions of the democracy are equally the champions of the navy. This is absolutely consistent with the partisan thinking of the mid-fourth century. As Jacoby said,

59. [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 6.2.

60. Ruschenbusch (*supra*, n. 37) 398–424. Solon is mentioned four times in the 75 extant speeches before 356, and 32 times in the 64 extant speeches after 356.

61. *Ath. Pol.* 20.1: ἀποδιδούς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν. *Ath. Pol.* 22.1: τούτων δὲ γενομένων [the reforms of Kleisthenes] δημοτικωτέρα πολὺ τῆς Σόλωνος ἐγένετο ἡ πολιτεία.

"Theseus, Solon, Kleisthenes are not simply historical persons but figures over whose attitudes in home policy men fought."⁶²

* * *

Like Theseus and Kleisthenes, Themistokles was fundamentally a hero of the democracy, and his name was inevitably linked to Athenian sea power. He had persuaded the Athenians to use the windfall profits from Laurion to equip a fleet against Aigina, and as Herodotos said, "it was the outbreak of this war that then saved Greece, by forcing the Athenians to become seafarers."⁶³ It was also Themistokles who persuaded the Athenians to reject the interpretation of the soothsayers and to man the ships rather than withdraw to the Akropolis or quit Athens altogether.⁶⁴ Even his duplicity, which to his detractors was moral turpitude, was used in his favor. When he organized the rebuilding of the Long Walls, he did so, some said, by hoodwinking the Spartan ephors; according to Theopompos, he bribed them.⁶⁵ Given the magnitude of his achievements and the drama of his downfall, it is no wonder that feelings ran high about Themistokles. Plutarch dismissed two stories about the Athenians stealing his remains (one of them by Andokides) as attempts to stir up emotion, especially oligarchic anger against the *dēmos*.⁶⁶ Lionized and reviled, Themistokles is a perfect example of how the Athenians entertained conflicting views of their past.

Since Salamis was both the high point of Themistokles' career and Athens' finest hour, there was little conservative writers could do to expunge him completely from their versions. They could, however, suggest that the true hero of the crisis was the Areopagos. This can be seen in the *Ath. Pol.*'s version of what happened prior to the battle. According to *Ath. Pol.* 23.1, the Athenian generals had no money left because of the current state of affairs (ἐξαπορησάντων τοῖς πράγμασι)⁶⁷ and so issued a proclamation that each man should save himself,

62. Jacoby (*supra*, n. 4) 77.

63. Hdt. 7.144.

64. *Ibid.* 143.

65. Plut. *Themist.* 19.

66. *Ibid.* 32.2.

67. In the Penguin edition of the *Ath. Pol.* (Harmondsworth, 1984), Rhodes translates the passage, "When the generals were unable to handle the crisis," as though their *aporia* were a failure of nerve. This is the only attested use of ἐξαπορέω in the active voice in Greek prose before Polybios, who uses it six times (1.62.2; 3.47.9, 48.4; 4.34.1; 16.34.6; 20.12.2). For Polybios it can convey a number of things, from the speechlessness of Philip V cut short by the directness of Aemilius Paulus (16.34.6) to the lack of a volunteer among the Spartans to approach Philopoimen (20.12.2). [Aristotle] also uses it to describe a lack, but he means that the generals were out of money, rather than incapable of handling the crisis. He uses the participle πορίσασα to report the Areopagos's donation, thereby contrasting what the Areopagos *provided* with what the generals *lacked*. This is clearly how Plutarch understood the passage when at *Themist.* 10.6 he renders this phrase as οὐκ ὄντων δὲ δημοσίων χρημάτων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. A further part of the conservative account of Salamis may have been that the Areopagos kept its head while all around were losing theirs, but the specific claim made by [Aristotle] is that the Areopagos provided money when the generals had none. For the meaning of the dative τοῖς πράγμασι ("because of the crisis") cf. LSJ s.v. ἀπορέω III.

whereupon the Areopagos stepped in and gave each man eight *drachmai* to man the ships. Accordingly, as the *Ath. Pol.* says, the Areopagos was responsible for the battle of Salamis. Kleidemos, on the other hand, concocted an incredible tale in which the *gorgoneion* from the statue of Athena went missing, giving Themistokles an excuse to rummage through everyone's baggage. Hidden in the goods that the Athenians had carried with them to Peiraieus was enough money, once confiscated, to pay the crews their allowance. In Plutarch's words, this was one of Themistokles' stratagems.

Jacoby's pronouncement on the episode is as follows:⁶⁸

The story, unknown to Herodotus and very vague in its details, appears in two versions. Only that of Aristotle is historically possible, that of Kleidemos being certainly anecdotic [*sic*]. If the event is historical neither version need originally have had a party-political tendency, and that of Aristotle could not. If the event was invented such a tendency is evident in the version of Aristotle, and in this case the other was probably the democratic answer.

In this instance Jacoby's judgment was overly cautious. While it is true that Kleidemos's story is probably fictitious, Aristotle's is completely implausible by virtue of the amount of money involved. Even assuming the lower number of 127 ships, based on Herodotos 8.1 (rather than the 200 of the Themistokles decree), and filling them not with their usual complement of 200 (Hdt 8.17) but with the lesser figure of 100 given by the Themistokles decree, one reaches a figure of 12,700 men. At eight *drachmai* per man, this figure comes to 101,600 dr., or a fraction under 17 talents. It is impossible to imagine the generals declaring every man for himself when the Areopagos still had in its possession such reserves. Eight *drachmai* were sufficient to support a rower for approximately twenty-four days.⁶⁹ There was enough money on hand, therefore, to finance the naval campaign against Xerxes' fleet. A proclamation of abandonment while this amount was in reserve is simply not believable, unless the generals were unaware of its existence; but since Themistokles was also a member of the Areopagos, this, too, is impossible. In any case, if the *Ath. Pol.*'s story is to be given any credence at all, it must be compared with the account of Herodotos, who never mentions a proclamation leaving each man to save himself. Rather, Herodotos 8.41 records that the proclamation made after Artemision was for each Athenian to save his children and household as best he could. This was an evacuation, not an abandonment. Having conveyed their families to Troizen, Aigina, and Salamis, the able-bodied men of Athens then reported to the Greek camp and began preparations for the next stage of the campaign. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion tentatively proposed by

68. *FGrH* III B Suppl. vol. 1, 81–82.

69. See M. B. Wallace, "Herodotos and Euboia," *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 27.

Rhodes, that the *Ath. Pol.* version is “an attempt to detract from the glory derived from the battle of Salamis by Themistokles.”⁷⁰

How did this fiction find its way into the *Ath. Pol.*? Huxley argues that it is a conservative rebuttal to Kleidemos’s prodemocratic story of Themistokles and the lost *gorgoneion*, but this is not a complete explanation, because the *Ath. Pol.* is not invariably committed to the oligarchic line in recounting historical events.⁷¹ [Aristotle]’s treatment of Solon, for example, acknowledges both a democratic and a hostile tradition.⁷² A fuller answer lies in the *Ath. Pol.*’s treatment of Athens’ constitutional history. The evolution of the Athenian constitution was marked by eleven *metabolai*, producing several *politeiai*.⁷³ Solon and Kleisthenes were seen as the founders of the first two democratic *politeiai*, and the final stage would be the extreme democracy. The whole process was conceptualized as a gradual increase (*αὔξησις*) in the power of the people.⁷⁴ In between the earlier and last phases of democracy, however, was the period of nearly eighty years from the Persian Wars down to the expulsion of the Thirty. These years saw Athens’ greatest successes (such as Salamis) and failures (such as the Sicilian Expedition). Actual historical events had to be accommodated within the conceptual scheme to explain the growth of the democracy. The Sicilian Expedition, for example, was a mistake of the democracy and precipitated the constitution of the Four Hundred, and later the rule of the Five Thousand, a *politeia* of which [Aristotle] approved.⁷⁵ Salamis, however, was undeniably a victory of the fleet and was popularly associated with Themistokles, an ardent democrat. [Aristotle]’s problem, therefore, was to explain why radical democracy had not emerged immediately after Salamis. The answer was provided by conservative nostalgia: the growth of the democracy had been interrupted by a golden age under the guidance of the Areopagos before the deluge of Ephialtes and the demagogues.⁷⁶ *Ath. Pol.* 23.1 reports: Μετὰ δὲ τὰ Μηδικὰ πάλιν ἴσχυσεν ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή καὶ διώκει τὴν πόλιν . . . καὶ ἐπολιτεύθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι καλῶς κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς. And at 25.1: ἔτη δὲ ἑπτακαίδεκα μάλιστα μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ διέμεινεν ἡ πολιτεία προεστώτων τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν, καίπερ ὑποφερομένη κατὰ μικρόν.⁷⁷ The prominence of the Areopagos for half a gen-

70. Rhodes (*supra*, n. 50 [1981]) 289.

71. Huxley (*supra*, n. 21) 316.

72. [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 6.2.

73. *Ibid.* 41.

74. On the four varieties of democracy, see Day and Chambers (*supra*, n. 53) *passim*. On the growth of popular sovereignty, see Ostwald (*supra*, n. 18) *passim*, but esp. 77–83, 129–36, and 169–71 on the organs of Athenian democracy, the impact of popular sovereignty on social values, and the subordination of the clans’ rights in religious matters to the authority of the state, respectively.

75. [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 33.2.

76. Keane (*supra*, n. 58) 23–24.

77. See also *Ar. Pol.* 5.1304: “And so, the council of the Areopagos emerged from the Persian Wars in high esteem, and decided to tighten up the constitution, but then in turn the maritime rabble, because they were responsible for the victory at Salamis and by virtue of this authority, made the democracy stronger through their sea power.” In modern times, skepticism of the historicity of this

eration after Salamis accounted for the brake on democracy's growth, but it also required an explanation, which was provided by the story of how the Areopagos saved the day before Salamis.

* * *

The fragments of Kleidemos's *Atthis* reveal a remarkable consistency of interpretation. Democracy at home and naval power abroad were mutually dependent: each reinforced the other. History, for at least the first of the Atthidographers, served to prove the truth of this insight and to show how the democracy and the navy were the twin foundations of Athenian greatness. Specifically, this was demonstrated by the policies and actions of the great mythical and historical heroes of the democracy, who had repeatedly acted to strengthen the democracy and the fleet. By doing so, each had reaffirmed the same nexus of values, and, not coincidentally, saved Athens from external threat. Theseus synoikized the Athenians, built the first navy, and defended Athens from Minos and the Amazons; Kleisthenes politically synoikized the state, established the fundamental organization of the democracy, and organized the early Athenian navy; Themistokles equipped the Athenians with a navy before Salamis, found the money to keep it operational, and saved Athens from the Persians. The *Atthis* of Kleidemos may have contained a good deal of antiquarian lore, but it would be a mistake to see his work as anything less than political.

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account has been widespread, although the most recent scholarship has wished to vindicate [Aristotle]. See Wallace (*supra*, n. 50) 77–83, and Ostwald [*supra*, n. 50] 140–43. Although Professor Ostwald offers cogent arguments in defense of the *Ath. Pol.* account, his own study of *IG* 1³ 105 effectively demonstrates that Areopagite influence was on the decline in the period between 479 and 461 B.C. Conservative and progressive trends may well exist side by side in every period of human history, as Ostwald observes, but they are rarely in the ascendant at the same time.



Lucan's *Auctor Vix Fidelis*

THE NARRATOR of Lucan's epic is painfully intrusive. Critics have long noted the work's extensive use of apostrophe, its near-continuous use and abuse of *recusatio*, and its tendency for "point," that odd piling-up of negatives that makes us feel that we know more about what has *not* happened than what *has*. The *Bellum Civile*, therefore, seems an obvious candidate for narratological analysis. Early critics did indeed focus on Lucan's role as a narrator, trying to identify his opinion of the emperor Nero,¹ or his supposed Stoic views.² More recently, scholars have begun to argue that Lucan's subject matter profoundly affects his narrative stance; that Lucan sets himself up to speak what is *nefas*—"unspeakable"—and accomplishes this through a voice which is "fractured . . . unsystematic and at odds with itself."³ I am in full agreement with such readings.

An early and shorter version of this paper was delivered at the annual meeting of the APA in Chicago, 1991. Thanks are due to several people for their help with this article at various stages: to S. Georgia Nugent for her perceptive comments; to the graduate-school comrades who suffered through the paper's earliest incarnation, Clara Shaw Hardy, Robert Hardy, and John Lawless; and to the anonymous readers at *Classical Antiquity*, who not only saved me from various infelicities and outright howlers, but provided many helpful suggestions and references. Any remaining errors are the fault of the author alone.

1. P. Grimal, "L'éloge de Néro au Pharsale: Est-il ironique?" *REL* 38 (1960) 297ff., contains a useful summary of earlier scholarship. See also R. Mayer, "On Lucan and Nero," *BICS* 25 (1978) 85–88. As I am not concerned with this particular aspect of the narrator's persona, I largely pass over the unwieldy bibliography on the subject.

2. Most notably B. Marti, "The Meaning of the *Pharsalia*," *AJP* 66 (1945) 352–76. Marti reads the poem as Stoic allegory, with Pompey as hero.

3. D. C. Feeney, *The Gods in Epic* (Oxford, 1991) 276–83 (quotation from p. 282). See also J. Henderson, "Lucan/the Word at War," *Ramus* 16 (1987) 124: "When the differences constructed and